The third person may, of course, stand in such relation toward the corporation as to be chargeable with knowledge of the contents of its books with respect to his contract relations with it so as to make the books admissible against him." See also Institute of Protestant Deaconesses v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493, 146 A. 123; Wilkes v. United States, 80 F.2d 285. These cards seem to be records kept in the ordinary course of business for the mutual advantage of both the appellant and the appellee and available to inspection by all the parties here concerned. Therefore, they do not appear to be mere self-serving declarations of the appellant, as contended by the appellee.
The authenticity of a writing offered as evidence is always preliminarily for the court.Commissioners of Berks County v. Ross, 3 Binn. 538, 544; Hays v. Hays, 6 Pa. 368, 370; Caffery et ux. v. P. R. Ry. Co., 261 Pa. 251, 255; Institute of Protestant Deaconesses v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493, 500; O'Malley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 47 Pa. Super. 533, 538. Where the statement is signed, proof of execution by its responsible author is all that is necessary. It is sufficient that the attesting witnesses testify to the signing, or that the signature is identified.
. 5; Grenada Cotton Compress Co. v. Atkinson, 94 Miss. 93; Branch v. State, 80 So. 482; Bertram v. Adm., Ann. Cas. 1912A 1217; Pickering v. Peskind, 183 N.E. 301; Love v. State, 125 So. 685; Landers v. Hayes, 72 So. 107; Clark v. Wessendorf, 275 P. 925; State v. Abernathy, 130 S.E. 619; Farmer v. Orme, 21 P.2d 977; U.S.C.A., Title 8, secs. 356 and 398, note 1617; 22 C.J. 1070, 1083 and 1089; Des Moines Bd. v. Taylor, 108 N.W. 927; Fitchburg v. Luerenburg, 102 Mass. 358; Clark v. Slidell, 5 Rob. 330; Adams v. Carter, 25 So. 669; Watkins v. Miss. State Bd., 154 So. 277; Mullens v. Shaw, 77 Miss. 900; Bridges Hill v. Sup., 58 Miss. 817; Mallory v. Walton, 81 So. 113; Self v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 56 F.2d 364; Hews v. Equitable, 143 Fed. 850; Benefit Assn. v. Armbruster, 129 So. 78; Atlanta Mut. v. Price, 97 So. 826; Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.L.R. 1505; Granger's Ins. Co. v. Brown, 57 Miss. 308; Equitable Life v. Campbell, 151 N.E. 682; Spaulding v. Mutual Ins. Co., 109 A. 22; Institute v. Lingenfelser, 146 A. 123; Wold v. City, 9 P.2d 931; Cook Const. Co. v. Crawford, 26 F.2d 574, 49 Sup. Ct. 29; Lundgren v. U. Ind., 213 N.W. 553. Admissions, particularly written admissions, and more particularly admissions under oath, are a highly satisfactory character of evidence and cogent proof is required to overcome the same.
The common law has implied a covenant in a lease and then permitted forfeiture upon breach only in a very narrow factual context; that is when the lessee denies title in the lessor. Institute of ProtestantDeaconess v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493, 146 A. 123 (1929), Jones v.Stiffler, 137 Pa. Super. 133, 8 A.2d 455 (1939). We do not find this proposition of law applicable.
The Statute of 1772, supra, does not limit its effect to denial of the specific performance of an oral lease for over three years. It provides that the force and effect of such a lease shall be a lease at will only. By judicial construction, the tenancy at will thus created is changed from a lease at will to one from year to year, when possession has been taken and held for more than a year under the lease and the rent has been paid and accepted in accordance with its terms: Ferri v. Liberatoscioli, 338 Pa. 454, 456, 13 A.2d 45; McDowell v. Simpson, 3 W. 129, 136; Stover v. Cadwallader, 2 Penny. 117; Dumn v. Rothermel, 112 Pa. 272, 282, 283, 3 A. 800; Institute of P. Deaconesses v. Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493, 498, 146 A. 123. But these decisions are not pertinent to this case, for the defendant left the premises before a year was up and paid no rent. The purpose of the statute is to avoid opportunity for fraud and perjury likely to arise from oral conveyances of estates in lands and oral leases of lands involving long terms — that is over three years. It is not a mere rule of evidence.
Any act of the lessee by which he disaffirms or impugns the title of his lessor works a forfeiture of the lease, and the lessor may reenter: Newman v. Rutter, 8 Watts 51. The refusal to pay rent under a claim of right to the reversion is a denial of the landlord's title and gives the immediate right of entry at common law: Clark v. Everly, 8 W. S. 226. To every lease the law tacitly annexes a condition that if the lessee do anything which may affect the interest of the lessor, the lease shall be void and the lessor may reenter. Refusal to pay the rent and the tenant's claim of title gives an immediate right of action without notice to quit: Inst. of Prot. Deac's v.Lingenfelser, 296 Pa. 493, 146 A. 123. Plaintiffs, therefore, had the right of reentry and to recover possession of the leased personal property replevin was the appropriate remedy. In this action plaintiffs gave a bond and retained the property.