Ins. Co. v. Cates

11 Citing cases

  1. Household Realty Corp. v. Lambeth

    188 N.C. App. 545 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 4 times
    In Household Realty, the mortgagee was not negligent in any way concerning a third party's unauthorized cancellation of a deed of trust.

    In an action to determine the priority between two lenders arising from a fraudulent mortgage elimination scheme, the trial court correctly determined that the deed of trust from the first lender, which was cancelled by an unauthorized act, was entitled to priority over a subsequent deed of trust from an innocent third party. The case is controlled by Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456 (1927) rather than Monteith v. Welch, 244 N.C. 415 (1956).2. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust — fraudulent cancellation — failure to respond to Administrative Demand

  2. Washington v. Hodges

    156 S.E. 912 (N.C. 1931)   Cited 7 times

    (b) Dr. E. M. Brown endorsed said notes for a valuable consideration to the Trust Company of Washington as Sinking Fund Commissioner of the City of Washington, and the plaintiff is now the owner and holder of the notes. M. U. Hodges, who executed to Mrs. Lena Swain the seven notes of $500 each, as above set forth, which represented the balance owing on the purchase of land, and on said land there was a mortgage showing canceled upon the records, which afterwards in the suit of Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Ada G. Cates, the said M. U. Hodges and others (reported 193 N.C. 456), was declared in full force and effect. (3) The land was sold by a commissioner appointed to foreclose the encumbrance in the Union Central Life Ins. Co. case, supra, and after paying the liens on the property there was a balance of $552.22.

  3. Am. Sw. Mortg. Corp. v. Arnold

    865 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021)

    ¶ 20 Plaintiffs argue that they did not authorize FMC to file the Satisfaction of Mortgage, and that therefore they are entitled to a priority lien encumbering the Arnolds’ property. Plaintiffs cite Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cates , 193 N.C. 456, 462, 137 S.E. 324, 327 (1927), for the proposition that "[t]he discharge of a perfected mortgage upon public record by the act of an unauthorized third party entitles the mortgagee to restoration of its status as a priority lienholder over an innocent purchaser for value." First Fin. Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Sledge , 106 N.C. App. 87, 88, 415 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1992) (citing Union Central , 193 N.C. at 462, 137 S.E. at 327 ).

  4. Am. Sw. Mortg. Corp. v. O'Meara

    865 S.E.2d 907 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021)

    ¶ 19 Plaintiffs argue that they did not authorize FMC to file the Satisfaction of Mortgage, and that therefore they are entitled to a priority lien encumbering Ms. O'Meara's property. Plaintiffs cite Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cates , 193 N.C. 456, 462, 137 S.E. 324, 327 (1927), for the proposition that "[t]he discharge of a perfected mortgage upon public record by the act of an unauthorized third party entitles the mortgagee to restoration of its status as a priority lienholder over an innocent purchaser for value." First Fin. Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Sledge , 106 N.C. App. 87, 88, 415 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1992) (citing Union Central , 193 N.C. at 462, 137 S.E. at 327 ).

  5. Wilmington Savings Fund Soc'y, FSB v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.

    265 N.C. App. 593 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Considering an argument raised at oral argument and noting our "scope of review is limited by what is included in the record, the transcripts, and any other items filed pursuant to Rule 9, all of which can be used to support the parties’ briefs and oral arguments"

    The trial court reasoned Plaintiff was not a successor-in-interest of Kondaur because it "acquired" the note and deed of trust, and is thus unable to stand in the shoes of Kondaur and its predecessors-in-interest to maintain the original priority of its interest. The trial court appears convinced by Defendant's argument, asserting only the original victim, in this case Kondaur, is eligible to seek the equitable remedy to maintain its priority under Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Cates , 193 N.C. 456, 137 S.E. 324 (1927), and its progeny. We disagree.

  6. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Ferguson

    No. COA18-1278 (N.C. Ct. App. Jul. 16, 2019)

    As between a mortgagee, whose mortgage has been discharged of record solely through the act of a third person, whose act was unauthorized by the mortgagee, and for which he is in no way responsible, and a person who has been induced by such cancellation to believe that the mortgage has been canceled in good faith, and has dealt with the property by purchasing the title, or accepting a mortgage thereon as security for a loan, the equities are balanced, and the lien of the prior mortgage, being first in order of time, is superior.Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456, 462, 137 S.E. 324, 327 (1927). But, as our Supreme Court has further instructed, if the mortgagee "[i]s responsible for the mortgage being released of record, as when the entry of satisfaction is made possible by his own neglect . . . he will not be permitted to establish" the priority of his lien to the detriment of a subsequent innocent purchaser.

  7. In re O'Reilly

    30 B.R. 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The mortgage could be revived without damage to the mortgagee's priority. Zimmer v. Fryer, 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938); Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456, 137 S.E. 324 (1927); Needham v. Caldwell, 25 Tenn. App. 189, 154 S.W.2d 535 (1940); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Section 282(c) (1949). However, in the case of fraudulent cancellation by the mortgagee, the Court in Heyder, supra, advanced the precedent that "[i]f through his (the mortgagee's) negligence the record is permitted to give notice to the world that his claim is satisfied, he cannot, in the face of his own carelessness, have his mortgage enforced against a bona fide purchaser taking his title on the faith that the registry is discharged. Where one gives to another the power to practice a fraud upon innocent parties, the Court will not interfere in his protection at the expense of those who have been deceived and misled by such fraud."

  8. Johnson v. Johnson

    229 N.C. 541 (N.C. 1948)   Cited 12 times

    Hence, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a favorable decision in any event, the verdict returned by the jury was the only one justified by the evidence, and the judgment rendered was correct on the merits. Clark v. Henrietta Mills, 219 N.C. 1, 12 S.E.2d 682; Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N.C. 270, 176 S.E. 568; Ins. Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456, 137 S.E. 324; Fulcher v. Lumber Co., 191 N.C. 408, 132 S.E. 9; Overton v. Highsmith, 191 N.C. 376, 131 S.E. 742. As the record has not revealed an error affecting any substantial right of the plaintiffs, the judgment rendered in the court below will not be disturbed.

  9. Sutton v. Bank

    190 S.E. 716 (N.C. 1937)

    STACY, C. J. Conceding that under the principles announced in McLamb v. McLamb, 208 N.C. 72, 178 S.E. 847, and Ins. Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456, 137 S.E. 324, and the kindred doctrines promulgated in Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E. 312, and Porter v. Ins. Co., 207 N.C. 646, 178 S.E. 223, the plaintiff originally had some rights, cognizable in equity, it would appear that his agreement, made in exchange for indulgences, not to bring any further proceeding "to restrain said sale," ought to be respected in this, the third suit instituted for the purpose. The cestui also has some rights.

  10. First Financial Savings Bank v. Sledge

    106 N.C. App. 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 9 times

    The law in this State is clear regarding material alterations of written instruments. The discharge of a perfected mortgage upon public record by the act of an unauthorized third party entitles the mortgagee to restoration of its status as a priority lienholder over an innocent purchaser for value. Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cates, 193 N.C. 456, 462, 137 S.E. 324, 327 (1927). The owner of a mortgage, however, will lose priority over an innocent purchaser if the mortgagee is negligent with respect to the release of the mortgage.