To this end, "a default judgment entered in violation of section 580 is void and must be vacated." (Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 975 (Dhawan); see also Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 909 [" 'section 580 is to be interpreted, in accordance with its plain language, to deprive a trial court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a defaulting defendant which awards greater relief than that sought in the plaintiff's complaint' "].) Whether a default judgment violates section 580 is a question of law that we review de novo. (Dhawan, at p. 968; see also Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 ["[W]hether a judgment is void on its face is a question of law, which we review de novo"].)
Any claim not "'"factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court"'" will not be considered for the first time on appeal. (Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922 (Insurance Co.).) Application of the continuing violations doctrine requires a factual showing that "the conduct occurring outside the limitations period was (1) similar or related to the conduct that occurred within the limitations period; (2) the conduct was reasonably frequent; and (3) the conduct had not yet become permanent."
But these arguments did not present or develop Dawson-Springfield's appellate argument that she walked through the planter by necessity. (See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922 [declining to consider new theory on review of summary judgment, as it was "not '"factually presented, fully developed and argued to the trial court"'"].) Although Mendi Co raised forfeiture in its respondent's brief, Dawson-Springfield did not argue that any of the exceptions to forfeiture apply to this case.
Amin also cites Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, in which a complaint for indemnity was deemed sufficient under section 580 when it specifically incorporated the underlying arbitration claim by reference and attached it as an exhibit to the complaint. Amin argues that under the reasoning of this case and Yu, "Amin's Cross-Complaint, containing multiple causes of action for indemnity against . . .
But even if the issue had been raised in the new trial motion, it would have been too late. (Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922 [declining to review defendant's new theory, raised for the first time in a new trial motion, because "[n]ew theories that could have been raised, but were not, is not one of the causes that permits a new trial"].)
A motion for a new trial is also not a vehicle to preserve new theories for appeal. (See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922 ["New theories that could have been raised, but were not, is not one of the causes that permits a new trial"]; Green v. Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 407, 419 [" 'Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider . . . . Bait and switch on appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable expense, but also wreaks havoc on a judicial system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised earlier' "].
Thus, this undeveloped theory may not be raised now to challenge the summary judgment. (Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. American Safety Indemnity Co. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 898, 922.) " 'The elements of a cause of action for professional negligence are failure to use the skill and care that a reasonably careful professional operating in the field would have used in similar circumstances, which failure proximately causes damage to plaintiff.' "