such a manner as to severely diminish "public confidence" in the "integrity" and "impartiality of the judiciary," in violation of CJC Rules 1.2 (A) and (B); and failed to adjudicate the contempt matter fairly, in violation of CJC Rule 2.2. See In re Judicial Qualifications Comm. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239, 300 Ga. 291, 297, 794 S.E.2d 631 (2016) (explaining that former Canon 2 (A) of the CJC, which said that "‘[j]udges shall respect and comply with the law,’" "is not implicated by ‘mere decisional or judgmental errors’" but is violated by "[a] knowing and willful misapplication of the law") (citation omitted); Inquiry Concerning Fowler, 287 Ga. 467, 468 & n.1, 696 S.E.2d 644 (2010) (concluding that a judge violated former Canon 2 (A) and former Canon 1, which said "‘[j]udges shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary,’" in the prior CJC, because he improperly stated on a routine basis to criminal defendants that they had the burden of proving their innocence); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 405-409 & n.4, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002) (determining that a magistrate judge violated former Canon 2 and former Canon 3, which required judges "‘to perform the duties of the judicial office impartially and diligently,’" of the prior CJC when he ordered a litigant to pay a fine without providing notice and a hearing, ordered another litigant to pay damages without notice and a hearing, and ordered a warrantless search without determining whether probable cause existed); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 843, 848-851, 462 S.E.2d 728 (1995) (concluding that a judge’s conduct in refusing to set appeal bonds to which two criminal defendants were entitled by law, issuing two bench warrants without probable cause, and forcing a criminal defendant to plead guilty without counsel violated former Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the prior CJC, and noting that the judge’s "cavalier disregard of these defendants’ basic and fundamental constitutional rights exhibited] an intolerable degree of judicial incom
Moreover, Canon 3 (B) (2) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[j]udges shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it,”16 and so, even in the absence of bad faith, misapplications of the law produced by unreasonable ignorance or egregious misunderstandings of fundamental and easily discernible legal principles may implicate the Code. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404 , 408-409 (566 SE2d 310 ) (2002). See also Leitch, 291 Ga. at 675 (Nahmias, J., concurring) (noting that Code of Judicial Conduct may be implicated by “judges who consistently or willfully fail to follow clear and binding legal rules and precedents”).
Accordingly, the Special Master determined that Judge Fowler should be temporarily suspended from his role as a judge, because his continued service as a judge would "(a) cause immediate and substantial public harm, (b) cause an erosion of public confidence in the orderly administration of justice, and (c) establish[] a violation of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct." See In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404 ( 566 SE2d 310) (2002). See also Code of Judicial Conduct Canons 1 and 2 (A); JQC Rule 25 (e).
More systemic wrongdoing is required to prove judicial incompetence. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94–70, 265 Ga. 326, 328(1), 454 S.E.2d 780 (1995) (defining “ ‘willful misconduct in office’ to mean actions taken in bad faith by the judge acting in her judicial capacity”); see also In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 408–409(1), 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002) (removing judge from office for demonstrating a lack of competence in areas of law related to the discharge of his fundamental duties, telephoning an attorney's client to propose a settlement in a case, and retaliating against a subordinate judge); In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 843, 850–851(5), 462 S.E.2d 728 (1995) (removing judge from office for refusing to set appeals bonds when law required it, issuing bench warrants for arrests without probable cause, and forcing a defendant to enter a guilty plea in the absence of counsel). 4.
(Citations omitted.) Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 406, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002). The evidence of record here clearly establishes the violations of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as alleged by the JQC. Judge Peters readily admitted to much of the misconduct at the JQC hearing, but simply believed that he had been disciplined “enough” by having been placed on paid administrative leave since June 16, 2010.
Pursuant to its constitutional obligation to review any proposed removal of a judge, this Court "exercise[s] its judgment based upon the entire record in order to determine whether [the] conduct [of a judge or judicial candidate] warrants discipline, and, if so, what sanctions should be imposed." In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge , 275 Ga. 404, 406, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted). "In performing this independent function, we give substantial consideration and due deference to the [Hearing Panel's] ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it.
Nor are the findings and conclusions of the JQC binding upon this Court. See Rules of the Judicial Qualifications Commission, Rule 16 (a) (petition to modify or reject the recommendation of the JQC may be brought to the Supreme Court); In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404 ( 566 SE2d 310) (2002) (recommendations of the JQC are not binding upon this Court). Similarly, the findings of the JQC in this case, while relevant to the applicant's fitness, are not determinative of the ultimate issue to be decided by the Board.
]" In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 269 Ga. 425 499 S.E.2d 319 (1998). By taking the position that his military crimes were not in the nature of crimes that involved moral turpitude and in failing to disclose his actions or make an expression of contrition for them prior to being elected to the judiciary, and by his "steadfast unwillingness to accept moral accountability," In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 412 (3) ( 566 S.E.2d 310) (2002), Judge Robertson's continued presence on the bench erodes the public's confidence in the judiciary and puts at risk the integrity of the judicial system of which he is a member. 3. Discipline may be imposed upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence, JQC Rule 7 (e), that the judge engaged in "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute."
See CJC, Application D; JQC Rule 2 (B) (2). Crawford also acknowledges that this Court is not constrained by the Hearing Panel's recommendation as to the appropriate sanction and that we generally have the authority to impose any permissible sanction – including a harsher sanction – despite what the JQC recommends. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 01-44 , 275 Ga. 404, 404-406, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002). As noted above, JQC Rule 6 (B) (1) identifies removal from office "with ... a prohibition on seeking or holding judicial office in the future" as a permissible sanction, and in the past we have imposed a permanent ban on seeking or holding judicial office, see, e.g.
¶ 16. Next, a similar case to the one at hand is Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Franklin, 704 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1997), in which the Commission brought a formal complaint against a judge who heard a case between a friend/distant relative and a third party, wrote a check for insufficient funds, and violated the law by failing to file a report of campaign contributions and expenditures. We held that the appropriate punishment was public reprimand, a fine of $1500, and suspension for thirty days without pay. Id. at 94; see also Judicial Discipline Disability Comm'n v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 253, 16 S.W.3d 212 (2000) (removing judge who engaged in practice of law, failed to honor agreement to remunerate his client's health insurer from settlement funds, concealed attorney's fees, wrote fifty-nine checks for insufficient funds, did not pay federal income taxes, used fictitious license plate, and failed to deposit client funds in trust account); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. 404, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002) (removing from office judge who, among other things, ordered party to pay fine without providing party notice of hearing or opportunity to be heard, ordered warrantless search of home without conducting evidentiary hearing, and wrote about forty-five business and personal checks for insufficient funds); In re Riley, 298 S.C. 329, 380 S.E.2d 816 (1989) (publicly reprimanding judge who, among other things, mismanaged office funds by depositing two personal checks into office account which were returned for insufficient funds). Our sister states' precedent, as well as our own, dictates that although writing checks for insufficient funds is reprehensible conduct for a judge, usually it must be in conjunction with some other inappropriate act or acts before doing so warrants removal.