Summary
noting that the pretrial order supersedes all pleadings and encompasses a plaintiff's full range of possible damages
Summary of this case from RK Company v. Harvard Scientific Corp.Opinion
No. 1:199CV185-D-A
June 13, 2002
OPINION DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
Presently before the court is the Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks to alter or amend the court's judgment to include an award of prejudgment interest and an award of attorneys' fees. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be denied.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiff in this action sought damages from the Defendant for breach of contract in connection with the Defendant's failure to pay a portion of a fire loss insurance claim, and for the Defendant's alleged bad faith refusal to pay that claim in full. The case was tried to a jury beginning on April 1, 2002, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff for $100,000 in contractual damages and $200,000 in punitive damages.
The Plaintiff has now filed this motion, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to have the court alter or amend its April 5, 2002, judgment to include an award of prejudgment interest and an award of attorney's fees.
B. Standard for Relief Under Rule 59(e)
Before the court can grant a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), the moving party must "clearly establish a manifest error of law or must present newly-discovered evidence." Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990); see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cage, 810 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.Miss. 1993) (recognizing three possible grounds for Rule 59(e) relief: (1) intervening change in controlling law; (2) newly-discovered evidence not previously available: or (3) to correct clear errors of law or prevent manifest injustice). Thus, Rule 59(e) motions cannot be used to raise issues which could, and should, have been raised before the judgment issued. Simons, 891 F.2d at 1159.
C. Discussion
It is axiomatic that a joint pretrial order signed by both parties supersedes all pleadings and governs the course and scope of the proceedings, and if a claim or issue is omitted from the order, it is waived, even if it appeared in the complaint. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 206 (5th Cir. 1998); see Branch-Hines v. Hebert, 939 F.2d 1311. 1319 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that pretrial order asserted plaintiff's full range of damages); Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that pretrial order can be relied upon to indicate nature of relief requested). In addition, the Fifth Circuit has specifically held that a parties' argument that they are entitled to prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees must be included in the pretrial order, or those claims are deemed to be waived. See Lindy Investments, LP v. Shakertown Corp., 209 F.3d 802, 804 (5th Cir. 2000) (prejudgment interest); Elvis Presley Enterprises, 141 F.3d at 206 (attorneys' fees).
Here, it is undisputed that the parties' joint pretrial order made no mention of prejudgment interest or attorneys' fees. In accordance with the above-noted authorities, therefore, the court finds that the Plaintiff waived those claims.
The Plaintiff requests, however, that the pretrial order be amended to include claims for an award of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees. The court holds that it is not at liberty to do so, pursuant to Uniform Local Rule 16.2(G). Rule 16.2(G) provides that a pretrial order may be modified by the trial judge "at the trial or prior thereto" in order to prevent manifest injustice. Unif Local Rule 16.2(G) (2000). Here, the Plaintiff did not request that the pretrial order be amended or modified until after the conclusion of the trial. Based on the plain language of Rule 16.2(G), the court finds that the Plaintiff's request is untimely. As such, the court denies the Plaintiff's request that the pretrial order be amended.
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that it should be awarded prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees pursuant to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(c) provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c) (2002). The court finds that Rule 54(c) is of no assistance to the Plaintiff, because the Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of either prejudgment interest or attorneys' fees. Both forms of relief are awarded solely in the court's discretion, and not as a matter of right. See Wirtz v. Switzer, 586 So.2d 775, 785 (Miss. 1991) (holding that prejudgment interest is awarded solely in court's discretion); Snyder v. Leake, 87 F.R.D. 362, 364 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (holding that determination of whether to award attorneys' fees in cases of this type is "solely within the discretion of this court."). Accordingly, the court holds that the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 54(c).
D. Conclusion
In sum, the court finds that the Plaintiff's motion should be denied. The Plaintiff's failure to include a claim for prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees in the pretrial order resulted in the waiver of those claims. Likewise, the Plaintiff's present request to amend the pretrial order, which was not filed until after the conclusion of the trial of this cause, is untimely. Finally, the court finds that the Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend (docket entry 130) is DENIED.