Opinion
21-P-990
11-07-2022
EMMANUEL INNOCENT v. ARLENE C. CABREJA.
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Emmanuel Innocent, appeals from a judgment of the Probate and Family Court dismissing his complaint for annulment of his marriage to the defendant, Arlene C. Cabreja. We affirm.
Background.
We summarize the facts found by the judge following a trial at which both parties testified. On April 9, 2008, Cabreja obtained a valid divorce from her former spouse in the Dominican Republic. At that time, the law in effect in the Dominican Republic required divorced women to wait ten months before remarrying. On January 24, 2009, shortly before the ten-month nisi period following Cabreja's divorce expired, the parties were married in the Dominican Republic. They subsequently had two children and resided together until Innocent filed a complaint for divorce on April 13, 2015.
The law was repealed in 2014, but that fact has no bearing on our decision.
While the divorce proceedings were pending, in September 2015, Innocent filed a complaint for annulment of marriage pursuant to G. L. c. 207, § 14 (the 2015 complaint). Innocent alleged that Cabreja "knowingly and purposely" married him before her divorce from her prior spouse was final. The 2015 complaint was dismissed on March 28, 2016, by a different judge of the Probate and Family Court. The judgment of dismissal stated: "Unbeknownst to [Innocent] at the time of marriage, and possibly to [Cabreja], there was an impediment to said marriage. Said impediment was removed on or about February 8, 2009, and the parties continued to live together as husband and wife thereafter until April 12, 2015. Accordingly, [Innocent's] [c]omplaint is properly dismissed." See G. L. c. 207, § 6. Innocent appealed, but the appeal was later dismissed for lack of prosecution. Innocent then filed a second complaint for annulment in 2018, which was dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
General Laws c. 207, § 6, provides: "If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract with due legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife, and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one of the parties in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was dead, that the former marriage had been annulled by a divorce, or without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their marriage has been removed by the death or divorce of the other party to the former marriage, if they continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married from and after the removal of such impediment, and the issue of such subsequent marriage shall be considered as the legitimate issue of both parents."
Thereafter, in June 2019, Innocent filed a third complaint for annulment of marriage (the 2019 complaint) in which he again alleged that the parties' marriage was "null and void at its very inception" due to Cabreja's failure to wait the full ten-month nisi period following her divorce from her previous husband before the two were married. A trial was held on September 16, 2020, after which the judge concluded that the claims asserted in the 2019 complaint were barred by the doctrine of res judicata (both claim and issue preclusion). Alternatively, the judge determined that although an impediment did exist at the time of the parties' marriage because there were sixteen days remaining in the nisi period at the time of the marriage ceremony, annulment was not available because the impediment had been removed.
Discussion.
In Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843-844 (2005), the Supreme Judicial Court explained the doctrine of res judicata as follows:
"The term 'res judicata' includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the action. . . . The invocation
of claim preclusion requires three elements: (1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits.
"Similarly, issue preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue determined in an earlier action where the same issue arises in a later action, based on a different claim, between the same parties or their privies. Before precluding a party from relitigating an issue, a court must determine that (1) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue in the current adjudication. Additionally, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must have been essential to the earlier judgment. Issue preclusion can be used only to prevent relitigation of issues actually litigated in the prior action. Accordingly, we look to the record to see what was actually litigated [citations and quotations omitted]."
In this case, there is no question that the judge properly considered the appropriate factors and correctly concluded that the claims asserted in the 2019 complaint are barred by both claim and issue preclusion. The parties are the same, the cause of action (and issue) is identical, and the claims raised in the 2019 complaint were conclusively adjudicated in the first judgment of dismissal. Accordingly, the judge properly dismissed Innocent's complaint under the principles of res judicata.
As the judge correctly observed, even though Innocent did not specifically allege fraud in the 2019 complaint (as he did in the 2015 complaint), the same impediment to the marriage was alleged in both the 2015 and 2019 complaints.
Given our conclusion, we need not address the judge's alternative rationale for dismissing the 2019 complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
Vuono, Wolohojian & Kinder, JJ.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.