Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-0990-D
September 5, 2001
ORDER
Defendants-counterplaintiffs ("defendants") move the court to continue the trial of this case and to defer all outstanding deadlines, including the discovery deadline of October 1, 2001, for a period of six months. Plaintiff joins in part and opposes in part the motion. It concurs in a 60-day continuance of certain pretrial deadlines and opposes any delay of the trial date.
The court understands the term "outstanding deadlines," see Ds. Mot. at 2, to mean "unexpired" deadlines.
Apparently, as a result of a docketing anomaly, plaintiff's memorandum in response was filed September 5, 2001, after defendants' reply brief was filed on September 4, 2001. The court has considered all the pleadings in deciding the motion.
Defendants maintain for various reasons — including plaintiff's alleged litigation conduct — that additional time is necessary for pretrial proceedings and for trial. Plaintiff argues that a 60-day continuance is warranted based on delays that have occurred thus far, but contends the court should extend only the deadlines for completing discovery, amending pleadings, and filing motions. It urges the court to retain the current trial setting of the March 4, 2002 two-week docket. In reply, defendants assert that a 60-day continuance is inadequate to accomplish what is necessary before trial and that additional time is necessary before the case can be tried.
Having considered the pleadings before it, and without assigning blame to one side or the other, the court is persuaded that a shorter continuance than that requested in defendants' motion would be inadequate. The court concludes that, if imposed, a short continuance would place undue and unjustified burdens on the parties because, after they attempted to comply with more accelerated deadlines, it would probably be necessary to grant still another continuance. The court prefers instead to adopt a more realistic and reasonable schedule to which the parties can adhere with the confidence that it will not lightly be altered.
Accordingly, the court grants defendants' August 16, 2001 motion for continuance. Any deadline set out in the court's September 12, 2000 scheduling order that had not expired as of the date defendants filed their continuance motion on August 16, 2001 is hereby extended six months. If that date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or date on which the clerk's office is closed by direction of the court or is otherwise inaccessible, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), the deadline is the next day that is not one of the aforementioned days.
The court resets the trial of this case to the court's two-week civil docket of Monday, October 7, 2002. N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 40.1 provides, "Unless the presiding judge orders otherwise, the granting of a motion for continuance will not extend or revive any deadline that has already expired in a case." Therefore, any relief from an expired deadline must be obtained by motion or agreed order (subject to court approval). Unexpired deadlines based on the prior trial setting, however, are hereby reset so that the parties shall now comply with them on the basis of the new setting.
SO ORDERED.