Opinion
0
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 30-2008-00107218, Derek W. Hunt, Judge.
Frank A. Weiser for Defendants and Appellants.
Bewley, Lassleben and Miller and Ernie Zachary Park for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Raj Astavakra and Sushma Gopu appeal from a judgment awarding Inland Western Fullerton Metrocenter LLC (Inland) damages in Inland’s action for breach of lease. Astavakra argues Inland’s action was barred by res judicata principles, and Gopu claims the judgment as to her, as a defaulted defendant, is flawed for a variety of reasons. We affirm as to Astavakra, reverse as to Gopu, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 2005, Inland leased space to Gopu in a Fullerton shopping center it owns. The lease was for 10 years and required a restaurant to be operated on the premises during regular business hours. In October 2006, Astavakra and Niraj Patel assumed the lease and began remodeling the premises. When they did not reopen the restaurant by June 2007, Inland brought an unlawful detainer action against them. Inland sought a declaration the lease was forfeited and reasonable rental value from the time they served notice to quit the premises until possession was turned over. Following a court trial, the judge awarded Inland possession, $160,567.90 in rental value and declared the lease forfeited. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (Inland Western Fullerton Metrocenter LLC v. Astavakra (June 25, 2009, G040524) [nonpub. opn.].)
While that appeal was pending, Inland filed the instant action against Gopu, Astavakra and Patel for breach of lease. Inland sought damages “in a sum in excess of $250,000, ” which included the rental value of the premises from the time Astavakra and Patel quit possession until a new tenant was found. Not receiving an answer to its complaint, Inland filed a request for entry of default on August 21, 2008, as to all three defendants. The default was entered the same day, but the parties later stipulated Astavakra and Patel could answer the complaint, which they did. Gopu, on the other hand, did not make any appearances in the case.
When the matter was called for trial, the parties agreed on the following: 1) The damage award in Inland’s prior unlawful detainer action was for the rental value of the premises up until trial in that case; 2) Inland was now seeking damages for the rental value of the premises from that point until the time a new tenant was found in September 2009; and 3) the rental value for that period amounted to $298,645.18.
The only point of contention was whether the prior judgment precluded Inland from bringing the instant action. As to that point, counsel for Astavakra and Patel argued the instant action “arises out of the same violation of the primary right alleged and adjudicated in the first action, the breach of the commercial lease agreement entered into between the parties. [¶] The issues have been adjudicated and the first action is now final. Thus, this action is barred under the one-action rule and the doctrine of res judicata.”
The court disagreed. It ruled a landlord “can get collateral damages in an unlawful detainer for the unpaid rent up to the time of the dispossession from the premises, but that, in no way, affects the right under the lease — if it exists — to collect money into the future until you find another tenant.” Therefore, the court awarded Inland damages in the requested amount of $298,645.18.
In rendering its judgment, the court inquired as to the status of Gopu, who, as mentioned above, did not appear in the case. Inland’s attorney stated, “As to Sushma Gopu, I have in my file, your Honor, a conformed copy of the request for entry of default. So this (i.e., the trial) was intended as a prove-up as to that defendant.” The court responded, “I do have a default against her... (from) August 21, 2008. [¶] Now, that may position [Astavakra and Patel] for some sort of contribution... but that’s not [going to be] done today.” Rather than getting into that particular issue, the court simply stated that “all three defendants” — Gopu, Astavakra and Patel — were jointly and severally liable for the amount of the judgment. A judgment reflecting as much was entered on April 9, 2010.
Gopu, Astavakra and Patel filed a joint notice of appeal. However, according to appellants’ attorney, Patel died while the appeal was pending, and his estate has settled with Inland. Therefore, his appeal has been abandoned.
I
Astavakra contends the trial court erred in failing to find that Inland’s action was barred by res judicata principles. We disagree.
Res judicata, or claim preclusion as it is sometimes known, “describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) It means that “‘“a final judgment, rendered upon the merits by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, is conclusive of the rights of the parties and those in privity with them, and is a complete bar to a new suit between them on the same cause of action.”’ [Citation.]” (Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1681-1682.) The doctrine also generally bars claims that could have been brought in the earlier action. (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.)
However, the law is clear that an unlawful detainer proceeding is not a bar to an action for damages in a subsequent lawsuit. As one court has explained, “Unlawful detainer is a summary procedure designed principally to enable the landlord to gain speedy possession of the property. That is why the scope of such proceedings is strictly limited. [Citations.] ‘[D]amages and rent are incidental thereto and are recoverable only because the statute so provides.’ [Citation.] Thus, although Code of Civil Procedure section 1174, subdivision (b), authorizes rental damages in unlawful detainer, nothing in the statutes requires the landlord to litigate his rental claims in the unlawful detainer rather than a separate civil proceeding, as authorized by Civil Code section 1951.2. To require the landlord to litigate rental damages in unlawful detainer could delay and frustrate the primary purpose of the proceeding, the obtaining of possession. [Citation.]” (Northrop Corp. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 725, 729.)
Consequently, the Legislature has determined a judgment in an unlawful detainer action does not relieve a lessee from liability pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.2 in a subsequent proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.5.) Judicial decisions are in accord, even when, as here, incidental damages were awarded in connection with the original unlawful detainer action. (See, e.g., Danner v. Jarrett (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 164; Roberts v. Redlich (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 566.) Therefore, the trial court correctly determined Inland’s present action was not barred by res judicata principles.
II
Gopu raises separate issues related to her status as a defaulted defendant. She contends the judgment against her must be vacated because 1) it is for more than Inland requested in its complaint, 2) the complaint lacks sufficient particularity, 3) the damages are excessive, and 4) she never received notice of entry of default or notice of entry of judgment.
Inland concedes the amount of the judgment exceeds the amount requested in the complaint, thereby necessitating a remand for further proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580.) But it claims, “Any other issue concerning the default is properly addressed to the trial court as it concerns fact issues not properly raised for the first time in this court.” We agree. Because Gopu’s initial contention merits a remand to the trial court, we will defer her remaining claims to the trial court for consideration in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed as to Astavakra, the judgment is reversed as to Gopu, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., IKOLA, J.