Opinion
No. NBSP 053207
January 25, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Inland US Management, LLC, has filed a motion for use and occupancy payments in this commercial summary process action pursuant to § 47a-26b. The plaintiff seeks an order directing the defendant, University Suds, Inc., to deposit with the court, monthly use and occupancy payments of $4,532.65 (the sum the parties stipulate was the last agreed upon monthly rent due under the terms of the lease). The defendant filed an objection to the motion together with a memorandum of law. In its objection, the defendant argues that § 47a-26b authorizes orders for use and occupancy payments in residential summary process actions only. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in reply to the objection and the court heard argument on January 7, 2010.
General Statutes § 47a-26b provides, in relevant part: "Motion and order for payments for use and occupancy. (a) If the defendant appears, the court shall, upon motion and without hearing, unless the defendant files an objection within five days of the filing of the motion, order the defendant to deposit with the court within ten days of the filing of the motion payments for use and occupancy in an amount equal to the last agreed-upon rent or, in the absence of a prior agreed-upon rent, in an amount equal to the fair market value of the premises during the pendency of such action accruing from the date of such order . . ."
The issue raised by the defendant's objection is whether the authority to order use and occupancy payments under General Statutes § 47a-26b includes the authority to issue such orders in commercial summary process actions.
DISCUSSION
Although there are a number of reported cases in which Superior Court judges have ordered commercial tenants to make use and occupancy payments during the pendency of summary process actions pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-26b, (see Westfarms Associates v. Formal Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. SP 84677 (February 8, 1996, DiPentima, J.) ( 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 338); Invest II v. Southern Connecticut Mental Health Substance Abuse Treatment Center, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Session, Docket No. SP 94 0727340 (February 10, 1995, Tierney, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 613); and 50 Water Street Associates v. RTM Limited, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Housing Session, Docket No. SP 88 0407194 (April 25, 1990, Riefberg, J.) ( 1 Conn. L. Rptr. 545, 546) the parties acknowledge that the applicability of § 47a-26b to commercial tenancies has never been directly questioned or challenged in any reported case.
In AM Towing Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 282 Conn. 434, 442-43, 923 A.2d 628 (2007), our Supreme Court, declared that "chapter 830, entitled `Rights and Responsibilities of Landlord and Tenant;' General Statutes §§ 47a-1 through 47a-20a . . . [G]enerally applies only to residential tenancies." See also Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 558, 461 A.2d 988 (1983); Hoban v. Masters, 36 Conn.Sup. 611, 613, 421 A.2d 1318 (App.Sess. 1980).
Unlike chapter 830, however, chapter 832 entitled "Summary Process" (General Statutes § 47a-23 through 47a-42a) includes multiple references to "commercial" tenancies. Some question may arise concerning the applicability of § 47a-26b to commercial property because, unlike § 47a-23 (the statutory requirements for notices to quit) and § 47a-23a (the statutory requirements for complaints), § 47a-26b does not expressly include the terms "residential" or "commercial." This court, however, has stated that chapter 832 applies the remedy of summary process to both commercial and residential properties. Later v. Pellettieri, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. SP 90 0455199 (January 28, 1991, Berger, J.) ("[c]hapter 832 is, of course, that part of the General Statutes that covers summary process-for all tenants, lessees, or occupants, both commercial and residential"); Connecticut Sonesta Corp. v. Columbus Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. 8102443 (June 11, 1981, Satter, J.) (chapter 832 of title 47a "expressly grants the remedy of summary process to commercial as well as residential properties"). Since this court has held that chapter 832 applies generally to both commercial and residential summary process actions, the specific issue before the court is whether it is reasonable to conclude that, by virtue of the inclusion of § 47a-26b in chapter 832, the legislature intended to authorize use and occupancy orders in both residential and commercial summary process actions.
"[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature." Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). "In construing [a statute], we are mindful of General Statutes § 1-2z, which instructs us that [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In seeking to determine that [intent and the meaning of a statute] . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . ." State v. Rupar, 293 Conn. 489, 505-06, 978 A.2d 502 (2009).
The defendant asserts that § 47a-26b "when read in conjunction with the inclusive statutory definitions" in § 47a-1 "provide a basis for use and occupancy payments to be deposited with the court in residential (occupied as a home or residence) eviction actions only." The defendant argues that by applying the terms "rent," "rental agreement," "dwelling unit" and "premises," as defined in § 47a-1, § 47a-26b cannot be read to authorize orders for use and occupancy payments in commercial summary process actions.
The only terms defined in § 47a-1 which are also found in § 47a-26b are "rent" and "premises."
The court is mindful of the rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed. "Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Waterbury Twin v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, 292 Conn. 459, 466, 974 A.2d 626 (2009). In the present case, however, the argument for strict construction of § 47a-26b centers more on the scope of the statute rather than on any ambiguous statutory text. Although the defendant has adroitly attempted to "shoe horn" the term "dwelling unit" into the term "premises" as it appears in § 47a-26b, the court does not agree with the defendant's reading of the statute. "It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is to be found not in an isolated phrase or sentence but, rather, from a statutory scheme as a whole . . ." Figueroa v. C and S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 6 (1996). Moreover, "When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 182, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).
The legislative intent or policy underlying the creation of summary process procedure has been often articulated by our courts. "Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy . . . It enables a landlord to obtain possession of leased premises without the delay associated with common-law actions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rock Rimmon Grange #142, Inc. v. The Bible Speaks Ministries, Inc., 92 Conn.App. 410, 413, 885 A.2d 768 (2005). One court has made the following observation of § 47a-26b. "It is clear from a reading of Section 47a-26b that use and occupancy payments are ancillary to the principal purpose of summary process: to provide the parties with prompt resolution of disputes concerning possession. Use and occupancy can only be ordered as to appearing defendants and is intended to protect the landlord from loss of rental income while the tenant files such motions as his/her counsel may deem appropriate." (Emphasis added.) Thibault v. Buckmiller, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Housing Session at Waterbury, Docket No. 008503 (December 31, 1991, Vertefeuille, J.).
Under subsection (d) of § 47a-26b, if a defendant fails to make a use and occupancy as ordered, the clerk "shall" order the defendant to file an answer to the complaint within four days or "judgment shall forthwith be entered for the plaintiff." Therefore, the sanction for the failure to make a use and occupancy payment, as ordered, is that the defendant is required to promptly file an answer and proceed to trial or suffer an adverse judgment.
"In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324, 332-33, 524 A.2d 1131 (1987). If the court were to accept the defendant's argument, such acceptance would lead to the illogical conclusion that the legislature enacted § 47a-26b to grant the authority to the court to order a residential tenant to make use and occupancy payments during the pendency of a summary process action but intended to permit a commercial tenant to delay summary process proceedings without the same sanction. Common sense dictates that such a construction would be completely contrary to the statutory framework designed by the legislature to bring summary process disputes to prompt resolution.
CONCLUSION
The court can find no language in § 47a-26b evincing an intention on the part of the legislature to limit use and occupancy orders to residential summary process actions. The court finds that the statutory scheme for summary process matters set forth in chapter 832, by force of necessary implication, manifests a legislative intent to include use and occupancy orders sought under § 47a-26b in commercial summary process actions.
The plaintiff's request for an order of monthly use and occupancy payments in the amount of $4,532.65 is granted.
SO ORDERED.