Summary
holding that although plaintiff was not provided elective surgery to correct inguinal hernia, defendants attempted to schedule surgery and provided a truss, medication and restrictions on lifting; thus they were not deliberately indifferent
Summary of this case from Nichols v. PesantiOpinion
No. C 02-3294 MMC (PR)
December 3, 2002
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Zucre Iniguez ("plaintiff") filed this pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two doctors employed by San Quentin State Prison ("SQSP"), alleging he was provided with inadequate medical care during the time he was incarcerated there. Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief. The Court reviewed the complaint and found that, liberally construed, it stated a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment against defendants Dr. Jessica A. Clarke ("Dr. Clarke") and Dr. D.A. Calvo ("Dr. Calvo"). The Court also ordered the defendants to file a dispositive motion or to indicate that the claims could not be so resolved. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Although given time to do so, plaintiff has not filed an opposition. Nevertheless, the Court treats the allegations in plaintiffs verified complaint as an opposing affidavit to the extent such allegations are based on plaintiffs personal knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 nn. 10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
On August 27, 2002, plaintiff was transferred into the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
In the complaint, Dr. Calvo is identified solely by his position as SQSP's Chief Medical Officer.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving, party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.
The court will grant summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and that a dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,' designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).
At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; if direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
B. Plaintiff's Claims
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies. Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. In order for deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See id. at 1060. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if lie knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A claim of mere negligence related to medical problems is not enough to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment, nor is "a difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
Defendants have submitted declarations and the pertinent portions of plaintiffs medical file. According to these documents, on March 18, 2002, plaintiff was examined by an SQSP doctor and diagnosed with a recurrent inguinal hernia. Plaintiff was prescribed a truss and analgesic medicine to address the pain, and referred for a non-urgent surgical examination by an SQSP surgeon. On April 15 and 26, 2002, before plaintiff was seen by the surgeon, he was examined by Dr. Clarke, a physician. Dr. Clarke also diagnosed a recurrent hernia that could potentially be reduced by surgery, and also deemed the condition not urgent. After noting that plaintiff was scheduled for an examination by a surgeon, Dr. Clarke also addressed plaintiffs symptoms, prescribing a truss and pain-killing medicine, as well as restricting plaintiff from lifting more than five pounds. On May 21, 2002, Dr. Van Pelt, an SQSP surgeon, concluded that plaintiff was a candidate for "elective," i.e. optional, non-urgent surgery at Novato Hospital, a routine procedure to be performed on an outpatient basis. The next day, an SQSP nurse approved plaintiff for transportation to Novato Hospital for the surgery. SQSP medical personnel scheduled plaintiff for surgery at Novato Hospital three times between June 25, 2002, and July 19, 2002. Each of these appointments was cancelled because, respectively, the surgeon was not available, transportation was not available, and the appointment was taken by another prisoner with more acute medical needs. Thereafter, plaintiff was rescheduled for an appointment on September 20, 2002, but on August 27, 2002, he was transferred to the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The only opposition plaintiff offers to the above evidence is his contention that surgery was medically required and urgent. Both Dr. Clarke and Dr. Calvo, however, have offered the opinion that at no point was there any medical basis for deeming the surgery either required or urgent. This opinion is in accord with the diagnosis of the surgeon, Dr. Van Pelt, who referred plaintiff to Novato Hospital for surgery on an elective, non-urgent basis. Plaintiff produces no evidence that surgery was ever deemed urgent or medically required by a doctor or other medical professional, and the evidence before the Court demonstrates that petitioner was repeatedly examined by medical doctors who, on each occasion, determined any surgery to be elective and non-urgent. As noted, the only evidence plaintiff has produced to dispute these medical opinions are his own statements in the complaint that he needed surgery. Plaintiffs own statements do not create a genuine issue of material fact because, as discussed above, a difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344.
In sum, the evidence demonstrates that while plaintiff was not provided the elective surgery he desired, there is no genuine issue as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs medical needs. All of the evidence demonstrates that they were not. Plaintiff was examined on numerous occasions by medical doctors; he was prescribed a truss and medicine to alleviate his pain; he was restricted from lifting any significant weight; and repeated attempts were made to provide him with the surgery at an outside hospital. Although plaintiff may have preferred to have the surgery, there is no showing that surgery was medically required or that the treatment plaintiff did receive was medically inadequate. As a result, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All pending motions are terminated and the Clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.