Opinion
A143697
01-30-2017
INGRID RITZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TEACHERS' RETIREMENT BOARD, et al. Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG13682690)
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of a petition for writ of mandate to order the California State Teachers' Retirement System and Teachers' Retirement Board (collectively referred to as CalSTRS) to comply with its ministerial duty and recalculate one of its members' post-retirement benefit increases. Plaintiff Ingrid Ritz had a long-running dispute with CalSTRS about calculating the correct amount of her benefits, which resulted in what she believed was a written administrative decision in her favor ordering the agency to recalculate her postretirement benefits based on the correct "retirement allowance" of $2,261.97. But Ritz was dismayed to learn that when the agency implemented its decision, Ritz owed money to CalSTRS. This is because CalSTRS used the date of Ritz's service retirement allowance (July 1, 2000) rather than her original disability allowance effective date (February 24, 1988) as the base date to recalculate her postretirement benefits. Ritz alleges that in complying with the written decision and order, CalSTRS had a ministerial duty to comply with Education Code section 24410, which she argues mandated the use of the February 24, 1988 date. Which date applies is the sole issue on appeal, and we will reverse.
All statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Administrative Proceeding
Ingrid Ritz was a credentialed classroom teacher in the Los Angeles Unified School District when she suffered serious injuries while teaching. Because she had been a member of CalSTRS since January 5, 1970, she was eligible for and granted a disability allowance, known at the time as Coverage A Disability Allowance (Coverage A), with a benefit effective date of February 24, 1988. As of that date, she received 50 percent of her salary; her base disability allowance was $1,854.08 per month.
Fifteen years passed. In April 2003, Ritz was informed by a CalSTRS employee that she was eligible to convert her disability allowance to a "service retirement" which would have the effect of increasing her monthly benefits. Ritz was also told by the same CalSTRS employee that she could request that her service retirement be "back-dated" to an effective date of July 1, 2000, with her disability allowance terminated the day before on June 30, 2000. Ritz chose this option.
Eventually, CalSTRS granted Ritz's request to convert to service retirement and terminate her disability allowance, backdated as described above. But then Ritz ran into a roadblock in CalSTRS's implementation of her service retirement. In February 2007, she formally requested an administrative hearing on the ground that CalSTRS had miscalculated her service retirement base allowance, her subsequent annual benefit adjustments (known as COLA's) and her supplemental benefits. Ritz represented herself at the informal hearing, which was held over four days in 2012 before an administrative law judge. The ALJ issued a Decision and Order signed February 11, 2013. As relevant to the matter before us, the ALJ addressed the additional adjustments to the service retirement benefit to which Ritz is statutorily entitled, "including an annual improvement factor and a quarterly supplemental payment." The Decision and Order is unequivocal: "These post-retirement benefit amounts are based on statutory language that indicates how these amounts are to be calculated. These amounts need to be calculated on the initial monthly [service retirement] benefit of $2,261.97 (not on any prior [disability allowance] amount.)" The ALJ stated: "STRS must recalculate the post-retirement benefit amounts based on the initial monthly [service retirement] benefit of $2,261.97."
The ALJ wrote, "[Ritz] has been very frustrated with STRS and how she has been treated by them. It has taken an unreasonable length of time for this matter to finally be brought to an administrative hearing. While there is no evidence that STRS acted maliciously, best practices would be to allow for a due process hearing in a reasonable period of time. This matter has gone on too long and needs to be concluded."
The ALJ's Decision and Order concludes, as pertinent here, with the order that Ritz's appeal "of the calculations made by STRS on her Retirement Allowance is hereby granted. STRS shall . . . recalculate all post-retirement benefits based on the correct Retirement Allowance of $2,261.97."
The ALJ's proposed decision had a typographical error which showed the amount was $2,621.97. This was corrected by the Appeals Committee of CalSTRS on April 10, 2013, who noted that it did not affect the factual or legal basis of the decision.
The Appeals Committee of the CalSTRS board adopted the ALJ's proposed decision on April 10, 2013.
On April 26, 2013, John R. Weech, CalSTRS's assistant general counsel, wrote Ritz a letter informing her of the "changes to your benefit" as a result of the Decision and Order. The recalculation of her COLA would cause her current service retirement benefit to increase, and as a result she was entitled to $8,545.80 on account of having been underpaid from July 1, 2000, to the date of the letter. But on the other hand, according to Weech, she now owed CalSTRS approximately $9,192.12 for supplemental benefits. This was the explanation:
"Per the Order, CalSTRS will: . . . (2) Recalculate your Supplemental Benefit based on a Service Retirement benefit of $2,261.97 and Service Retirement benefit effective date of July 1, 2000. No Supplemental Benefits are due or should have been due for the period of July 1, 2000, through today. The reason you are not entitled to a Supplemental Benefit is because CalSTRS will now use your Service Retirement effective date rather than your Disability Allowance date in the calculation. Per the Order, CalSTRS is required to calculate your Supplemental Benefit using Ed. Code section 24412-24415 (Legal Conclusion #3). CalSTRS will collect back approximately $9,192.12 for the amount of Supplemental Benefits that have been paid to date based on your Disability Allowance date of February 24, 1988." (Emphasis added.)
This was not what Ritz had expected to be the result of the Decision and Order. Although CalSTRS had recalculated her postretirement benefits based on her service retirement allowance of $2,261.97, as she had urged, it used her service retirement allowance effective date (July 1, 2000) instead of her original disability allowance effective date (February 24, 1988) as the base date for the recalculation.
II. Proceedings in the Superior Court
On June 7, 2013, Ritz petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court, alleging that CalSTRS did not comply with its ministerial duty when it implemented the Decision and Order. Ritz's position was that Weech's letter misrepresented the Decision and Order, which had not ordered that the supplemental benefit payments be based on a service retirement benefit effective date of July 1, 2000. Ritz argued that "[s]uch order would violate . . . section 24410," and that she had "specifically appealed at the Administrative Hearing that CalSTRS must use [Ritz's] correct service retirement initial monthly allowance of $2,261.97 together with the agreed upon 'supplemental base date' of 02/24/1988, pursuant to . . . § 24410, to calculate [Ritz's] post-retirement annual quarterly supplemental benefits."
Ritz alleged that at the administrative hearing, she and CalSTRS had actually "agreed that the 'supplemental base date' " for her annual quarterly supplemental payment benefits was February 24, 1988, the benefit effective date for her original disability allowance, "as mandated" by section 24410. According to Ritz, the disagreement was only as to the "supplemental benefit base allowance" amount.
Ritz contended that when the Decision and Order directed CalSTRS to apply section 24400, et seq. in calculating her retirement benefits, that included section 24410 which "applies only to Members whose 'Coverage A' [disability allowance] has been terminated and whose [service retirement] initial monthly allowance is subsequently calculated pursuant to either . . . § 24212 or § 24213 and whose [service retirement] effective date is the day after termination of the [disability allowance]. Under those unique facts [Ritz's] 02/24/1988 [disability allowance] effective date must be retained as the 'base date' to select the correct (annually adjusted) Purchasing Power Factor to calculate post-retirement quarterly supplemental benefits."
Ritz amplified that the "Purchasing Power Factor," adjusted annually, is a "critical component in the statutory calculation" to determine her quarterly supplemental payment benefit increases. The Purchasing Power Factor is determined by a "base date" which, according to Ritz, must be February 24, 1988, pursuant to the terms of section 24410.
Ritz estimated that as of the date of her writ petition, she had been deprived of approximately $90,000 in past quarterly supplemental benefits, as well as future benefits. She requested issuance of a writ of mandate directing CalSTRS to pay her past and future mandated retirement benefits with interest, and comply with section 24410 by using her original disability allowance effective date of February 24, 1988 as the base date. She also sought her costs and attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 800.
CalSTRS opposed the petition and argued that the only issue was one of law. CalSTRS submitted the declaration of Mark Gini, a pension program manager at CalSTRS who began employment at CalSTRS in 2007. Among other things, Gini provided background on the supplemental [retirement] benefits program and how the calculations were made in this case. "Supplemental retirement benefits provide purchasing power protection when a member's current benefit no longer keeps pace with inflation. . . . [O]nce the purchasing power of their benefit falls below 85%, the quarterly supplemental benefits automatically begin."
Ritz filed objections to the Gini declaration on multiple grounds, but the trial court appeared to admit his declaration. In any event, the evidentiary objections were not raised on appeal.
Gini described how CalSTRS determines eligibility for supplemental retirement benefits. "If a member is receiving a retirement benefit and has previously been on Disability Allowance, as with Ms. Ritz, CalSTRS must consider . . . section 24410. Section 24410 states that if a member was previously on a Disability Allowance, CalSTRS will consider the member's original disability allowance date for purposes of calculating the supplemental benefit."
Gini's declaration explained that before the ALJ's Decision and Order required CalSTRS to use the service retirement benefit ($2,261.97), CalSTRS had considered the original disability allowance date (February 24, 1988) as required by section 24410 to calculate supplemental benefits. But after the ALJ ordered CalSTRS to use the service retirement allowance to calculate all post retirement adjustments, CalSTRS switched to using the service retirement date (July 1, 2000).
CalSTRS conceded that the version of section 24410 then in effect "required the use of the original disability allowance date in calculating supplemental benefits, but was silent as to the allowance amount to be used." CalSTRS also conceded that although the Decision and Order explicitly fixed the allowance amount as the service retirement allowance of $2,261.97, which CalSTRS had no choice but to follow, CalSTRS nonetheless decided to use the service retirement date (July 1, 2000) to calculate the supplemental benefit. Its position was that to "use the disability allowance date would not only go against the intent of the law, but would allow Ms. Ritz to retroactively have her [supplemental retirement] benefit substituted for her [disability] allowance in the supplemental calculation."
The superior court held the first of two oral arguments on this matter on March 10, 2014. Thereafter, it issued an order for further briefing, and held another hearing on September 18, 2014. On September 19, it issued an order denying the petition for writ of mandate. The trial court concluded that section 24410 was "ambiguous" because before it was amended in 2014, it stated that CalSTRS "was to use the original disability allowance effective date as the base date for purposes of determining postretirement benefit increases, but it did not state whether CalSTRS was to use the allowance amount calculated as of the original date or as of the date used in calculating the allowance."
In interpreting section 24410, the trial court noted that section 24410 had been amended to add a subdivision (b), but that this amendment by its terms was not applicable to an action filed in Superior Court before January 1, 2014, such as Ritz's petition. The inapplicable amendment stated that "If the disability allowance effective date is used pursuant to subdivision (a), then the original disability allowance the member was eligible to receive on that date shall be used for the purposes of determining postretirement benefit increases." Thus the trial court concluded that it could not rely on this amendment at all, including the court's interpretation that the amendment was a "clarification." Given its conclusion that the statute was ambiguous, the trial court determined that in order to interpret the statute in a way to achieve a "practical and workable" result, "CalSTRS must use the same date for determining both the amount of any service retirement and any postretirement benefit increases based on that amount." The trial court acknowledged that CalSTRS had no regulations pertaining to section 24410, no evidence that it had "longstanding policies or practices for implementing section 24410," and had presented no evidence that its "senior officials explicitly adopted or approved the proposed interpretation of section 24410" reflected in the calculation of Ritz's benefits after the administrative Decision and Order. Nonetheless, the Gini declaration stated that " '[n]o other CalSTRS member receives supplemental benefits conflating the disability date with the retirement amount,' " and this was "circumstantial evidence that CalSTRS has longstanding policies or practices for implementing section 24410." The trial court thus denied the petition for writ of mandate.
This appeal followed. The sole issue is whether in calculating Ritz's supplemental benefits CalSTRS improperly used the incorrect base date.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
This is a petition for writ of mandate to compel a public agency to perform a mandatory duty. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1085; City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 868.) As we described in Ellena v. Department of Insurance (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205, " '[T]he writ will not lie to control discretion conferred upon a public officer or agency. [Citations.] Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent [citations]; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty [citation]. [Citation.]' (People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491.)"
"A ministerial act is one that a public functionary ' " 'is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,' " ' without regard to his or her own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of such act. (Ridgecrest Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 986, 1002.) 'Thus, "[w]here a statute or ordinance clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, that course of conduct becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of discretion." ' (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Bd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1267.)" (Ellena v. Department of Insurance, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.)
When we review a trial court's judgment on a petition for writ of mandate, we use the substantial evidence test to review the trial court's factual findings, and our independent judgment on legal issues such as interpreting statutes. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 226.)
II. The Statute at Issue
This matter revolves upon the meaning and application of section 24410. Before it was amended in 2013, the statute stated:
"(a) If projected final compensation is used to calculate the service retirement allowance following the termination of the disability allowance or if the disability allowance is continued as the lesser of the two allowance calculations under Section 24212 or 24213, then the original disability allowance effective date shall be retained as the base date for purposes of determining postretirement benefit increases. (Emphasis added.)
"(b) This section shall be applicable for determining the base date for applicable postretirement increases made on or after January 1, 1982.
"(c) This section shall only apply to service retirements effective the day after the date of the disability allowance."
Section 24410 was amended in 2013 to insert a new paragraph (b):
"(b) If the disability allowance effective date is used pursuant to subdivision (a), then the original disability allowance the member was eligible to receive on that date shall be used for the purpose of determining postretirement benefit increases. This subdivision shall not apply to an action filed in superior court before January 1, 2014."
Section 24410, subdivision (b) was subsequently amended again, effective January 1, 2017. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that the 2017 amendment does not affect the outcome of this appeal.
In interpreting a statute, we start with its text. (Building Industry Association of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 62, 74.) "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction." (Collins v. Sutter Memorial Hospital (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (Collins).) As applied to the facts of the matter before us, this statute is unambiguous and its terms were plainly applicable in this case.
First, it is undisputed that Ritz made her service retirement effective the day after the date her disability allowance terminated, and that by having made that election she fell squarely within the provisions of section 24410, subdivision (c). The declaration of Mark Gini on behalf of CalSTRS states: "If a member is receiving a retirement benefit and has previously been on [d]isability [a]llowance as with Ms. Ritz, CalSTRS must consider . . . § 24410." This section thus applies to calculating Ritz's applicable postretirement increases.
In the trial court, CalSTRS contended that because the Decision and Order did not specifically mention section 24410, that is what prompted them to simply ignore that section 24410 requires the use of the February 24, 1988 base date when they recalculated Ritz's benefits. This cannot withstand scrutiny. As we have noted, CalSTRS concedes that section 24410 was the starting place for the calculation for Ritz's postretirement benefit increases, and this is what it used before Ritz made her initial request for an administrative hearing. This argument has not been raised as a justification on appeal.
Second, under section 24410, the original disability allowance effective date is the base date for determining postretirement benefit increases. This could not be more clear. Even CalSTRS thought so: it concedes that when CalSTRS first determined Ritz's postretirement benefit increases—even before Ritz sought an administrative hearing—it followed the mandate of section 24410, subdivision (a) and used Ritz's original disability allowance effective date of February 24, 1988.
As the Gini declaration states: "In initially calculating Ms. Ritz's supplemental benefits, CalSTRS followed . . . section 24410, subdivision (a), using the disability base date of February 24, 1988 . . . ."
Third, the Decision and Order of the ALJ was emphatic and explicit that Ritz's supplemental retirement benefits were to be calculated on her initial monthly service retirement amount of $2,261.97, and "not on any prior disability allowance amount." The ALJ's decision and order was adopted by CalSTRS, and the merits of that factual finding, legal conclusion, and order on this point are not before us. CalSTRS conceded that this amount is not in dispute in this writ proceeding. Therefore, CalSTRS was required to comply with section 24410 (before it was amended) and calculate Ritz's postretirement benefit increases on the terms ordered by the ALJ and required by section 24410.
At oral argument in the superior court, CalSTRS emphasized that this is a Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 proceeding having to do with "implementing the judge's order," and not "questioning a 1094.52 [sic: 1094.5] administrative hearing" where the validity of a final administrative order or decision is at issue.
Fourth, the 2013 amendment to section 24410 does not affect the outcome. New subdivision (b) required that if the disability allowance effective date is used, then the original disability allowance amount must be used in calculating the benefit. But this amendment states specifically that it is inapplicable to this case, which was filed in the superior court before January 1, 2014. And further, as we have noted, the Decision and Order of the ALJ—adopted by CalSTRS—was that the initial monthly service retirement amount must apply in calculating Ritz's postretirement benefit increases.
CalSTRS contends that the "literal application of a statute does not apply if it leads to absurd results," and then goes on to urge that section 24410 must mean that if the service retirement amount is used to calculate the supplemental benefit, then the service retirement date should be the base date. It is true that the "literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results," but "[t]his exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) We do not sit as a 'super-legislature.' (Daybrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri (1952) 342 U.S. 421, 423.)" (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698.) That course is particularly inappropriate here where the legislature has already amended section 24410 in 2013 and explicitly stated it is inapplicable to this matter, and where the only issue before us is whether CalSTRS implemented the ALJ's Decision and Order by reference to the applicable statutory mandate.
Based on the unambiguous language of section 24410 and the Decision and Order of the ALJ, there was no legal basis for CalSTRS to swap out the February 24, 1988 date required by the statute for the service retirement effective date of July 1, 2000, as the base date in recalculating Ritz's postretirement benefits. CalSTRS had a mandatory course of conduct to follow. It did not follow it, and the trial court erred in denying the petition for writ of mandate.
None of CalSTRS arguments to the contrary have any merit.
CalSTRS contends that section 24410 is ambiguous, because "it specifies a base date from which 'postretirement benefit increases' should be calculated, but the statute does not specify what the base amount should be." CalSTRS describes this as the ambiguity created when there are "grammatically plausible interpretations of the statute—i.e., the base amount could be either the Disability Benefit base amount or the Service Retirement base amount." This analysis is legally and factually incorrect. CalSTRS relies on Collins, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at page 14, where the court rejected the contention that Code of Civil Procedure section 660, which specifies three events that trigger a 60-day period for hearing and disposition of motions for new trial, included a fourth event that was not specified in the statute. Although Collins recognized that a party " 'demonstrates [statutory] ambiguity by tendering an alternative candidate of meaning, that is, a grammatically plausible reading of the language at issue,' " in Collins there was "nothing ambiguous in section 660 to construe." (Id. at p. 14.) The same is true here. CalSTRS simply has not shown that there is an alternative grammatically plausible interpretation in section 24410. But even more to the point, the Decision and Order has provided the answer to any ambiguity: in recalculating Ritz's post-retirement benefits, the ALJ ordered CalSTRS to use the service retirement base amount. The ALJ's decision was not challenged by CalSTRS. For purposes of determining the merits of Ritz's petition for writ of mandate, no construction is needed.
Given our conclusion, we need not address the remainder of CalSTRS's arguments, which are all premised on the assumption that "[b]ecause the language of the statute is ambiguous, this Court must look beyond the plain language of the statute and instead look to other avenues of statutory interpretation, namely (1) the application of the statute in practice, and (2) the long-standing interpretation of the agency charged with its application."
Nonetheless, we briefly note the following. CalSTRS makes various arguments as to why the mandate of section 24410, before it was amended, should not apply to the recalculation of Ritz's postretirement benefits, under the rubric that it "produces an unworkable result" or an "absurd result," that is, a higher potential supplemental retirement benefit for Ritz, which CalSTRS repeatedly describes as "unmerited" or a "windfall" or an "unmerited raise." That Ritz may, as a result of the implementation of the ALJ's Decision and Order, receive benefits that others do not receive, is not the issue before us. In any event, CalSTRS offers no support for the statement in its brief that Ritz's "interpretation of section 24410" would "lead to untenable and financially unsustainable results." And after the 2013 amendment to section 24410, subdivision (b), the statute would appear to preclude any future claims like Ritz's.
Ritz is a now a 72-year-old retiree, who with the assistance of CalSTRS arranged her service retirement to comply with section 24410 and to maximize her retirement. As the Decision and Order acknowledged in its legal conclusions, "It should be noted that the legislature has recognized an interest in STRS members retaining their 'buying power' so that their retirement income can keep up with inflation.'" The statutes at issue here apply only to members who received a disability allowance; they do not apply to those members who received a disability retirement under a program which began in 1992. There are a small and presumably dwindling number of people who are even eligible to apply section 24410 and, as the trial court noted, CalSTRS has no regulations interpreting it. The argument that this decision would open the floodgates is misleading, particularly in light of the 2013 amendment to section 24410.
CalSTRS cites section 24600, subdivision (g), but that statute does not state that section 24410 is inapplicable; it simply states when supplemental payments "pursuant to sections 24412 and 24415" to retired members and disabled members begin to accrue and cease to accrue.
CalSTRS also repeatedly states that "[n]o other CalSTRS member receives supplemental benefits conflating the disability date with the retirement amount," quoting the one sentence that makes this point in the Gini declaration. That may be true. But, as Ritz responds, she may be the only member who, based upon advice of the CalSTRS staff, arranged her service retirement to comply with section 24410 to maximize her retirement. The issue may never have arisen.
We need not address whether Gini's statement is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that, although there are no regulations governing section 24410, and no evidence that any senior officials at CalSTRS adopted or approved this interpretation, it is nonetheless "circumstantial evidence that CalSTRS has longstanding policies or practices for implementing section 24410." --------
CalSTRS also argues that because the statutory language is ambiguous, we should look to the legislative history of section 24410, which establishes that Ritz's reading of section 24410 is "inconsistent with the legislative history of section 24410." For this proposition, CalSTRS cites portions of the legislative history of AB 2042 from 1987. We are not clear how this legislative history pertains to how to interpret section 24410 and, more importantly, to whether the petition for writ of mandate should have been granted in this case. Further, as Ritz points out in reply, the 1987 summary digest of this legislation states that the bill "would require that the original disability allowance effective date be retained as the base date for determining any postretirement benefit increases on or after January 1, 1982."
Finally, CalSTRS contends that Ritz's reading of section 24410 does not "square with the underlying scheme." But the examples CalSTRS cites are not persuasive. Section 24415, entitled "Supplemental Benefit Maintenance Account proceeds; distributions" is a multi-part statute which CalSTRS characterizes as establishing that supplemental benefits are "limited and not vested," and "the amount available for distribution 'shall not exceed the amount necessary to restore purchasing power up to 85 percent of the purchasing power of the base allowance.' " From this CalSTRS concludes that "[b]ecause of the limited nature of this resource, it is not consistent with the statutory scheme" for Ritz to have a "jump" in her base amount "without any legislative justification." But this is another ipse dixit that any calculation that results in Ritz's entitlement to additional supplemental benefits must be inconsistent or absurd. Nor is section 24600 instructive on the issue before us. True, according to CalSTRS, it delineates when a disability allowance accrues and terminates and when a retirement benefit begins, and when supplemental benefits accrue and terminate. But these general statements do not address section 24410, the statute that is applicable to Ritz, whose "service retirement[] [became] effective the day after the termination date of [her] disability allowance." (§ 24410, subd. (d).) Finally, CalSTRS cites section 22130 for the definition of "[e]ffective date" as the "date upon which the benefit becomes payable." This statute is in the "Definitions" chapter of the Teachers' Retirement Law beginning at section 22100, rather than in the "Disability Allowance" chapter (chapter 25), which begins at section 24001. Again, CalSTRS argues that the effective date must be July 1, 2000, Ritz's service retirement date. Once again, however, section 24410 plainly and more particularly states that the "original disability allowance effective date shall be retained as the base date for determining postretirement benefit increases." (§ 24410, subd. (a).)
III. Attorney Fees
Ritz sought attorney fees and costs in the trial court, but the court did not reach the issue because it denied the writ. Under Government Code section 800, "A litigant who successfully challenges the determination of an administrative agency may recoup his or her attorney's fees and costs if the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious." (Abshear v. Teachers' Retirement Board (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1638.) The reasonable attorney fees are computed at $100 per hour, and may not exceed $7,500. (Gov. Code, § 800, subd. (a).) Because the determination as to whether to award fees is essentially factual, and left to the discretion of the trial court (American President Lines, Ltd. v. Zolin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 910, 934), we remand this matter to the trial court to consider this issue in the first instance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order granting the writ directing CalSTRS to comply with section 24410 and use February 24, 1988, as the base date, and use her retirement allowance of $2,261.97 to calculate Ritz's postretirement benefits, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Ritz shall recover her costs on appeal.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.