Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-1944-K
February 6, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Texas Department of Public Safety's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion. The Court also orders plaintiff to show cause why David Miranda, the only other defendant in the case, has not been served with citation.
I. Background
Plaintiff Bobby Wayne Ingram brought this action pro se, alleging that Texas State Trooper David Miranda violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Ingram contends that Miranda used excessive force during an unwarranted traffic stop, which caused him physical and emotional injuries. Ingram also alleges that the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS") knew or should have known that Miranda had engaged in a pattern of misconduct and that it failed to properly investigate, supervise, train, and discipline Miranda. Although Ingram originally filed this case on September 28, 2001, Miranda has not been served with citation.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Ingram's Claims Against DPS
DPS argues that Ingram's claims against it should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the protection afforded states under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereign immunity that it embodies, limits federal court jurisdiction. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Vogt v. Board of Comm'n of the Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 2002). Although the language of the amendment seemingly applies only to suits against states brought by citizens of foreign sovereigns, the Supreme Court has determined that the amendment prohibits individuals from bringing suit in federal court against a state that has not consented to being sued here. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 962 (2001); Vogt, 294 F.3d at 688.
Even if a state is not a named defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bars prosecution of a suit in federal court if the "defendant state agency is so closely connected to the State that the State itself is 'the real party in interest.'" Vogt, 294 F.3d at 689 (quoting Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1999)). The issue is "whether the lawsuit is one which, despite to presence of a state agency as the nominal defendant is effectively against the sovereign state." Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts in the Fifth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether an entity is an "arm of the state":
1. Whether state statutes and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state;
2. The source of funds for the entity;
3. The degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys;
4. Whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems;
5. Whether the entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and
6. Whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.
Vogt, 294 F.3d at 689. "The most significant factor in assessing an entity's status is whether a judgment against it will be paid with state funds." Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1991).
There is little doubt that DPS is an arm of the State of Texas. Taylor v. Seamans, 640 F. Supp. 831, 833 (E.D. Tex 1986) (holding that DPS is an arm of the State of Texas for Eleventh Amendment purposes). In fact, DPS is part of Texas' executive branch, assigned the task of enforcing state laws protecting public safety and providing for the prevention and detection of crime. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Its duties are statewide in nature, its funding is governed by legislative appropriations, and a judgment against the DPS would come directly from the State of Texas' coffers. Id. § 411.002 (Vernon Supp. 2003), § 411.013 (Vernon 1998). Moreover, DPS has no "local autonomy," but is governed by the Public Safety Commission, which is composed of three Texas citizens appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Texas Senate. Id. § 411.003 (Vernon 1998). Finally, the State of Texas considers DPS a "governmental unit" for purposes of its sovereign immunity analysis. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Therefore, it is clear that DPS is an arm of the State of Texas entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
There are three exceptions to the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity, but none are applicable here. First, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 411 (1908), and its progeny, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action to enjoin a state official from enforcing a statute that allegedly violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03, 104 S.Ct. 900, 909 (1984). This exception, however, applies only to suits for prospective relief, not suits for monetary relief like this one. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1362 (1973); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03, 104 S.Ct. at 909. Second, Congress has the authority to limit the doctrine of state immunity. However, Ingram's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Supreme Court has ruled that § 1983 does not override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146-47 (1979). Finally, the state can consent to suit in federal court, but the State of Texas has not. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S.Ct. at 907. Consequently, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to resolve Ingram's claims against DPS.
III. Ingram's Failure to Serve Miranda
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides:
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). This case has been on file for more than 16 months, and Miranda has not been served. Ingram must file with this Court a motion to enlarge time for service that shows good cause why Miranda has not been served no later than February 28, 2003. Otherwise his claims against Miranda will be dismissed as well.
IV. Conclusion
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted against DPS because DPS is an arm of the State of Texas. Therefore, Ingram's claims against DPS are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling the same in the appropriate forum. All costs are to be paid by the party incurring them.
Additionally, Ingram is hereby ORDERED to file on or before February 28, 2003, a motion to extend time for service, showing good cause why Trooper David Miranda has not been served in this action. If Ingram fails to file a motion to extend time or fails to show cause for the 16 month delay in serving Miranda, his claims against Miranda will be dismissed as well.