Opinion
2:21-cv-359
02-02-2022
KAI D. INGRAM, Plaintiff v. SCI SMITHFIELD, et al., Defendants.
MARILYN J. HORAN, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 32) and dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend.
II. Report
A. Relevant Background
Plaintiff, Kai D. Ingram, is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), which currently houses him at SCI Greene. He is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action in which he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to his February 2021 arrest and subsequent and continued detention as a technical parole violator.
Petitioner initiated this civil action in March 2021. After he paid the filing fee in April 2021, the Clerk of Court docketed his Complaint (ECF 6.) It names in the caption the following defendants: SCI Smithfield; C. Garman, who is SCI Smithfield's Deputy Superintendent; SCI Smithfield Superintendent; SCI Smithfield Counselor Amy Hines; SCI 1 Smithfield Unit Manager Runk; SCI Smithfield Parole Agent Casner; SCI Smithfield Parole Agent Kepheart; the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”); Pennsylvania Parole Preliminary Hearing Officer; Parole Supervisor Shan C. Strohecker; Parole Agent Clint Caprio; District Director of Parole Kirk C. Loos; SCI Greene Superintendent; SCI Green Grievance Coordinator; SCI Smithfield Lt. Vaugn; and SCI Smithfield L. Hollibaugh. All individual defendants are sued in their official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff names as defendants in the caption both C. Garman and SCI-Smithfield Deputy Superintendent, which is Garman's title.
Some of the defendants' names are misspelled on the docket. Herein, the Court uses the correct spelling of their names as set forth in Defendants' brief (ECF 33).
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that on February 3, 2021, while he was on parole from a state sentence, he “surrendered himself” to the parole offices in Scranton, Pennsylvania for failure to report (a common condition of parole). (ECF 6 ¶ 2.) An unidentified individual or individuals detained him at that office for several hours. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff was then transferred to SCI Smithfield at around 9 p.m., where he remained for about thirty days until he was transferred to SCI Greene. (Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that “there is no possible way that [his] commitment to SCI Smithfield” that night “could have been legally substantiated[, ]” since its Records Office was closed at that late hour. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) According to Plaintiff, this office was “responsible [for] confirming warrants as they relate to the correct individuals being committed.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)
Plaintiff asserts that he was illegally detained beginning on February 3, 2021 because when he turned himself in on that date he “did not receive notice of any parole violation at the time of his entry [into] or exit” from the Scranton parole office. (Id. ¶ 4). He alleges he also “did not receive notice of any parole violation upon his commitment to SCI Smithfield.” (Id. ¶ 5.) 2
On February 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining of his alleged illegal detention. (Id. ¶ 13.) Later that same day, Defendant Casner, whom Plaintiff identifies as a “SCI Smithfield Parole Agent, ” visited Plaintiff at SCI Smithfield and provided him with written notice of a parole violation that had been lodged against him that day (February 10, 2021). (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff explained to Defendant Casner that he believed he “had already been illegally detained for seven (7) days without any legal written notice explaining or establishing the legality of his detention.” (Id.) Plaintiff obtained “no results” from this conversation. (Id.)
Plaintiff had a hearing on February 22, 2021. (Id. ¶ 7.) Two days beforehand, Defendant Garman denied the grievance Plaintiff had filed in which he complained of his alleged illegal detention. Defendant Garman wrote in his response: “The notice of charges and hearing was signed by PBPP authorities on 2/10/21, and forwarded to SCI Smithfield. Agent Casner served you notice of these charges…which you signed on 2/11/21. The hearing date established was 2/22/21. The actions of PBPP to provide you due process has been satisfied. The Grievance is denied.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that he could not file an appeal of Defendant Garman's response because he was unable to physically access SCI Smithfield's law library or an inmate photocopier due to the COVID-19 restrictions in place there at that time. (Compl., ECF 6 ¶¶ 18-22.)
Plaintiff's hearing was held as scheduled on February 22, 2021. Plaintiff elected to waive his right to counsel. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) At the hearing, Plaintiff “expressed his constitutional concerns.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant Casner was present at the hearing and heard Plaintiff's concerns. (Id. ¶ 7.) According to Plaintiff, neither Defendant Casner nor anyone else with SCI Smithfield or the PBPP addressed his concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8.) 3
Plaintiff's detention continued after the February 22, 2021, hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 14-18.) On March 25, 2021, the PBPP issued a Notice of Board Decision recommitting him as a technical parole violator. (Defs' Ex. A, ECF 33-1.)
Defendants attached to their brief a copy of the PBPP's final Notice of Board Decision, which it issued March 25, 2021. (Defs' Ex. A, ECF 33-1.) Because that Notice was issued by an adjudicating body, the Court may take judicial notice of it. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2); Burgess v. Cerilli, No. 18-cv-1189, 2019 WL 2298788, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 2019) (“In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Davis v. Cotov, 214 F.Supp.2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (district court took judicial of an administrative appeal decision notice issued by state parole board.) In contrast, Plaintiff has attached documents to his response (ECF 35) related to grievances he filed when he was at SCI Greene. The Court cannot consider these grievance-related documents because Plaintiff did not attach them to the Complaint and they are not the type of documents of which the Court may take judicial notice. However, even if the Court could consider these documents, they do not affect the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
In the meantime, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Greene on March 4, 2021. (Compl. ECF 6 ¶¶ 21-25.) Plaintiff alleges that when he arrived there, Corrections Officer Cole (who is not a named defendant), told him that he would not be provided with “writing materials” even though Plaintiff had “informed her that he needed to correspond with courts and that it was of an emergency nature.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that he was also denied access to SCI Greene's law library. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff “voiced his concerns” about his lack of access to the law library or to writing materials to Defendant SCI Greene Superintendent, who “took no action.” (Id. ¶¶ 25.) He then submitted a grievance to Defendant SCI Greene Superintendent “expressing his constitutional claims.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendant SCI Greene Grievance Coordinator advised Plaintiff that his grievance was denied in accordance with the provisions of DC-ADM 804 because he did not 4 submit it within fifteen working days after the events on which claims are based occurred. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.)
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he is being illegally detained. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.) He claims that his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of an alleged parole violation until February 10, 2021 (seven days after he was taken into custody) or a hearing until February 22, 2021 (well after the “allotted forty-eight (48) hours” he claims, without context, that the Constitution requires under the circumstances). (Id. ¶¶ 15-16; id. ¶¶ 1-7.) Plaintiff also claims that based on these same alleged facts he was unlawfully “seized, ” i.e., arrested and imprisoned, under the Fourth Amendment. (Id.) As relief, he seeks an injunction in the form of an order directing that he be immediately released from his allegedly illegal detention to an approved parole plan. (Id. ¶ 26.) He also seek money damages for each day he has been illegally detained. (Id. ¶ 32.)
After Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he filed a motion for preliminary injunction (ECF 18), in which he sought an order from the Court directing that he be immediately released on parole to a halfway house. (ECF 18.) The Court denied that motion because, as discussed again below, Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. (ECF 24, 27.)
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF 32.) The motion is fully briefed. (ECF 33, 35, 36.)
B. Standard of Review
At the pleading stage, Rule 8 requires a “short plain statement” of facts, not legal conclusions, “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When 5 dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court typically must allow a plaintiff to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accept[ing] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, ” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11.
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014). 6
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”). Additionally, the Court must “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[, ]” and “they cannot flout procedural rules- they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
C. Discussion
Plaintiff brings Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 7 States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Importantly, a plaintiff must plead a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983. Thus, each defendant can be held liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g., id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Corr. Med., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev'd sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015)); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of employees, does not apply under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Thus, supervisor-defendants cannot be held liable for every illegal act that takes place in a correctional facility. Rather, they can be liable only for their own conduct.
The Court of Appeals has identified three ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. Liability may attach if the supervisor: (1) directed the subordinate to take the action in question; (2) had “knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct, meaning the supervisor knew that his or her 8 subordinate was violating the plaintiff's rights but failed to stop the subordinate from doing so;or (3) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the violation. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence…must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
1. Claims Against SCI Smithfield, the PBPP and Official Capacity Claims
Defendants assert that SCI Smithfield and the PBPP are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies and state officials acting within their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Betts v. New Castle Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (“official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against the state.”) (citing Lombardo v. PA. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008)). The DOC, the facilities that comprise the DOC (such as SCI Smithfield), and the PBPP are agencies or arms of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, as such, they and their employees who are sued in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity unless an exception to such immunity applies. See, e.g., Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).
“Such immunity…may be lost in one of two ways: (1) if the Commonwealth waived its immunity; or (2) if Congress abrogated the States' immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its power.” Id. Neither exception applies to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The Commonwealth has not waived its immunity, see, e.g., id. (citing Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11 and 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b)), and Congress did not abrogate states' sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983. Will v. Mich. 9 Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-46 (1979). Thus, all § 1983 claims asserted against SCI Smithfield, the PBPP and the individual defendants who are sued in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Although claims against state officers in their official capacity for prospective relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, this exception, first set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), does not apply in this case. That is because, as the Court recognized when it denied Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, he does not have a cognizable claim for prospective relief in this civil action. (ECF 24, 27.)
To reiterate, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Instead, the prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief). Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). These Supreme Court decisions stand for the proposition that prisoners may “use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement-either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. As explained by the Supreme Court in Wilkinson:
a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.10 Id. at 81-82.
Under Wilkinson, parole challenges may be brought in a civil rights action when the plaintiff seeks “to render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility...or parole suitability” and does not seek an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release into the community. Id. at 82. Such a suit under § 1983 would not necessarily invalidate the fact or duration of confinement, and at best, would afford a new eligibility review and speed consideration of a new parole application. Id.; see also Butler v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 613 Fed.Appx. 119, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2015).
Thus, Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is not cognizable in this § 1983 action. Id.; see, e.g., Butler, 613 Fed.Appx. at 123 (district court properly concluded that if the plaintiff sought an injunction invalidating or altering the sentence imposed by the Parole Board “he could not do so via a § 1983 civil suit.”). As such, Plaintiff has no cognizable claim for injunctive relief against any defendant sued in his or her official capacity.
Finally, neither SCI Smithfield nor the PBPP qualify as a “person” under section 1983. See, e.g., Phippen v. Nish, 223 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (state correctional institution is not a “person” under § 1983); Fenton v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 18-5484, 2019 WL 398929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019) (neither Pennsylvania state correctional institution nor the PBPP are “persons” that can be sued under § 1983.”) Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against either SCI Smithfield or the PBPP for this reason as well.
Based on the above, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to the extent they seeks dismissal of SCI Smithfield, the PBPP and all claims brought against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Dismissal should be with prejudice because Plaintiff's claims against the SCI Smithfield and the PBPP, as well has his official capacity claims, are barred under Eleventh Amendment immunity. 11
2. Claims Against SCI Smithfield Superintendent, Hines, Runk, Kepheart, Strohecker, Caprio, Loos, Vaugn and Hollibaugh
As explained above, a plaintiff must plead a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right, see, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207, and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Plaintiff names Defendants SCI Smithfield Superintendent, Hines, Runk, Kepheart, Strohecker, Caprio, Loos, Vaugn and Hollibaugh in the caption of the Complaint only. He makes no allegations related to these individuals anywhere else in the Complaint. Plaintiff has thus failed to allege any personal involvement by these defendants as is necessary to sustain a § 1983 against any of them.
As Defendants point out, PBPP officials are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in adjudicatory acts. See, e.g., Goodwine v. Keller, No. 09-1592, 2012 WL 4482793, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2012). Because the Complaint fails to allege any personal involvement on the part of any of defendant who may have worked for the PBPP during the events in question in this lawsuit (aside for perhaps Defendant Casner, whom the Complaint described as an “SCI Smithfield Parole Agent”), the Court cannot ascertain whether any PBPP official is entitled to absolute immunity. In any event, because there are other bases on which to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the defendants who are PBPP officials, the Court need not consider issues of absolute immunity.
Thus, it is recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion to the extent that it seeks the dismissal of Defendants SCI Smithfield Superintendent, Hines, Runk, Kepheart, Strohecker, Caprio, Loos, Vaugn and Hollibaugh for failure to allege their personal involvement. The Court should dismiss them from this lawsuit for this reason, in addition to the other reasons discussed below.
3. Claims Against Pennsylvania Parole Preliminary Hearing Officer
The unnamed defendant Plaintiff's identifies as “Pennsylvania Parole Preliminary Hearing Officer” is treated by Defendants as a John or Jane Doe defendant. As a result, their counsel 12 explained that, at least at this time, they do not represent that defendant. Defendants thus do not move to dismiss any claim asserted against that individual. (ECF 33 at 1.)
Under the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), courts are required to screen complaints at any time where, as is the case here, a prisoner seeks redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The PLRA requires the Court to sua sponte dismiss claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. Accordingly, if there is a ground for dismissal which was not relied on by a defendant in a motion to dismiss, the Court may sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such ground pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. See, e.g., Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008). In performing a court's mandated function of sua sponte reviewing complaints under the PLRA to determine if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id.
Here, Plaintiff names Defendant Pennsylvania Parole Hearing Officer in the caption of the Complaint only. He makes no allegations related to this individual anywhere else in the Complaint. Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege any personal involvement by this defendants as is necessary to sustain a § 1983 against him or her. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court dismiss that Defendant for this reason, in addition to the other reasons discussed below.
4. Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are predicated on his allegations that he was unlawfully “seized” because he did not receive a notice of a parole violation when he was taken into custody on February 3, 2021 and, therefore, he should have had 13 a preliminary hearing within 48 hours of his arrest to determine whether probable cause existed to represent a parole violation. (Compl. ECF 6 ¶¶ 1-9, 15-16, 26, 30; see also ECF 35 at 11-13.) His Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims is based on the same facts, and he further asserts that all defendants knew or should have known that his parole-violator confinement was illegal. (Id.)
“False arrest and false imprisonment are nearly identical claims, and courts often analyze the claims together.” Wilson v. Dewees, 977 F.Supp.2d 449, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2013). To state a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause. See, e.g., Wardell v. City of Erie, No. 1:13-cv-201, 2015 WL 6134014, at *8 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2015) (citations omitted). To establish a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful. Id. (citations omitted). Just as for false arrest, a plaintiff's claim for “false imprisonment [is] predicated on an arrest made without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson, 977 F.Supp.2d at 455. Thus, “if an arrest is supported by probable cause, then there is no constitutional violation and no viable § 1983 claim.” Id.
Since Plaintiff admits that he turned himself in on February 3, 2021 for failure to report (Compl., ECF 6 ¶ 2), the unidentified individual who arrested him on that date would have had probable cause to believe that he violated a condition or conditions of parole.
As for Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, the elements are that: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest; (2) this deprivation was without due process; (3) the defendant subjected him to this deprivation; (4) the defendant was acting under color of state law; and (5) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1113 (3d Cir. 1989). 14
Regarding parole revocation, it has been determined that parolees maintain a liberty interest in their freedom such that some amount of procedural protection is due them. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Supreme Court has provided that parole revocations require the following process: “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses…; (e) a ‘neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board…; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.” Id. at 489. The revocation hearing must also take place within a “reasonable time” after the parolee is taken into custody. Id. at 487-89; Butler, 613 Fed.Appx. at 124.
As relief for these alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, Plaintiff seeks a court order directing that he be immediately released from his alleged unlawful confinement. (Id. ¶ 26). As previously discussed, this injunctive relief is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages for each day that he has been illegally detained since February 3, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 32.) These Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for money damages are barred by the rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
As explained above, a prisoner's challenge to the validity of his confinement or to matters affecting its duration falls with the province of habeas corpus. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, although a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought by persons deprived of constitutional rights against persons acting under color of state law, a state prisoner may not use § 1983 as a vehicle to pursue redress (even just a claim for money damages) if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. 15
In Heck, a state prisoner convicted of voluntary manslaughter brought a civil rights action against prosecutors and a police investigator, asserting that the defendants engaged in an unlawful, unreasonable and arbitrary investigation leading to Heck's arrest; knowingly destroyed evidence that could have proven Heck's innocence, and caused an illegal voice identification procedure to be used at his state trial. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479. Rebuffing this effort, the Supreme Court held as follows:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted).
The Heck rule has been extended to civil rights cases challenging parole and probation revocations. In Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2006), the plaintiff instituted a § 1983 action against his parole officer following the revocation of his parole, alleging the officer “seized him without probable cause and caused him to be arrested and falsely incarcerated.” 453 F.3d at 176. The parole officer had arrested plaintiff for technical violations of his parole, including his failure to obtain approval to change his employment and residence. Id. at 175. The plaintiff also sued a panel member of the parole board who later revoked his parole, alleging that this defendant 16 failed to conduct an adequate investigation into whether the plaintiff was likely to commit a crime if released on parole and thus also caused him to be falsely incarcerated. Id. at 175-76. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against each of these defendants because a finding for plaintiff on his § 1983 claims against them would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the revocation decision, which had not been rendered invalid. Id. at 177.
That same reasoning applies here. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to money damages for his alleged illegal confinement following his arrest on February 3, 2021 as a technical parole violator. Accordingly, his claims cannot proceed absent a showing that the PBPP's parole violation sentence was previously declared invalid, which it has not been. Therefore, his claims are barred by the Heck rule. Id.; Butler, 613 Fed.Appx. at 123-24 (plaintiff's procedural due process claim asserting that he is entitled to money damages because he was not provided with a timely parole revocation hearing barred by Heck); Alford v. Wisenhower, No. 17-cv-6259, 2018 WL 650926, at *3-4 (D. N.J. Jan. 1, 2018) (plaintiff's claim that prison official kept him illegally confined knowing that his confinement was illegal because of the parole board's failure to hold a timely preliminary hearing in violation of his procedural due process rights barred by Heck.); Connolly v. Arroyo, 293 F. App'x. 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff's claims relating to the parole-revocation process, including a claim that he was denied a timely revocation hearing, were barred by Heck); Hess v. Chronister, 247 Fed.Appx. 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that all of plaintiff's § 1983 claims related to his detention for violating the terms of his parole without a hearing or notice of the charges against him are barred by Heck); Worthy v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 184 F. App'x. 262, 264 & 266 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Insomuch as [the plaintiff] sought relief for alleged due process deprivations that infected the parole revocation proceedings, success on his claims, and a 17 concomitant award of damages or declaration of unconstitutionality, would imply that his continued confinement on the basis of his revoked parole was invalid” and were Heck barred); Burton v. Delaware Ctny. Court House, No. 12-cv-4175, 2012 WL 3223691, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012) (plaintiff's damages claim premised on alleged constitutional deficiencies in his probation revocation hearing is Heck barred.)
It is noted that Defendants argue that Plaintiff's procedural due process claims should be dismissed with prejudice because he received all the process due to him, including written notice of his alleged violations on February 10, 2021 and a revocation hearing within a reasonable time. (ECF 33 at 10.) They do not rely on the Heck rule in support of their argument that Plaintiff's procedural due process claim should be dismissed. However, the Court may do so under the PLRA's screen provisions.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff's procedural due process claims were not barred by Heck, Plaintiff has not stated a procedural due process claim against any defendant. He alleges that he did not receive written notice of his parole violations until February 10, 2021, or a hearing until February 22, 2021. He asserts that he should have received written notice of his parole violations on February 3, 2021, and also that he was entitled to hearing within 48 hours of his detention to determine whether there was probable cause to detain him as a technical parole violator. However, in the Complaint, Plaintiff admits that he turned himself in for failing to report (Compl., ECF 6 ¶¶ 2-3), which is a standard condition of parole. In any event, “a showing of prejudice is essential for a federal constitutional claim asserting denial of due process.” Butler, 613 Fed.Appx. at 124. Plaintiff has alleged no way in which he was prejudiced when he did not receive written notice of his parole violations until February 10, 2021 or a hearing until February 22, 2021. Nor can he, 18 since he turned himself in on February 3, 2021 and received written notice of his parole violations ten days before the hearing and thus had sufficient time to prepare for it.
Based on the above, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for damages against all defendants. The dismissal should be with prejudice because these claims are barred under Heck, and also because Plaintiff cannot show how he was prejudiced by the alleged violation of his procedural due process rights.
5. First Amendment Claim
Finally, Defendants point out that although Plaintiff did not cite the First Amendment in the Complaint, the allegations he makes could be construed as an attempt to assert a First Amendment claim for lack of access to the courts based on his allegation that he was denied access to the law libraries at SCI Smithfield and SCI Greene. Thus, Defendants also move to dismiss a First Amendment claim to the extent Plaintiff raised such a claim in the Complaint.
In his response (ECF 35, 36), Plaintiff clarifies that he is raising Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process and Fourth Amendment claims in the Complaint. He does not contend that he is also bringing a First Amendment claim against any defendant. It appears to the Court that Plaintiff may have discussed in the Complaint his alleged lack of access to writing materials and to SCI Smithfield's and SCI Greene's law libraries to provide background and explain why he allegedly could not properly grieve his constitutional violations.
In any event, to state a claim for a violation of the right to access the courts under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he (1) suffered an “actual injury, ” meaning he “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable' ” legal claim; and (2) that he has “no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 19 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “To that end, prisoners must satisfy certain pleading requirements: The complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,' and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.'” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).
Plaintiff has not satisfied these pleading requirements. He alleges that he was denied access to the law library at SCI Smithfield due to COVID-19 restrictions. (Compl, ECF 6 ¶¶ 18-19.) He also alleges that he has been denied access to the law library at SCI Greene after his transfer there. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) Plaintiff asserts that because of these failures, he has been prevented from “seek[ing] redress of constitutional claims in any manner.” (Id. ¶ 24.) However, Plaintiff fails to specify exactly what those claims are, or that those claims were lost or otherwise rejected as a result of his inability to access the facilities' respective law libraries. He appears to be referring to the constitutional claims he raises in this action, but he has clearly asserted them by successfully filing the Complaint, and has defended them by filing his responses to Defendants' Motion (ECF 35, 36.)
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss a First Amendment claim for violating Plaintiff's right to access the courts if he asserted such a claim in the Complaint (and it appears that he did not).
III. Leave to Amend
When dismissing a civil rights case for failure to state a claim, a court must give a plaintiff a chance to amend a deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive 20 a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
Under the circumstances presented here, any amendment would be futile because Plaintiff's claims against SCI Smithfield, the PBPP and all claims brought against the individual defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Immunity; his claims for injunctive relief are not cognizable; his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by Heck's favorable termination rule (and he also cannot show how he was prejudiced by the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation); and, he appears to concede that he is not asserting a First Amendment claim for violating his right to access the courts.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 32). It is also recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff leave to amend because amendment would be futile under the circumstances.
Under the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). 21