Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-1665
02-29-2024
KAI D. INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. COUNSELOR SCHWAB, et al. Defendants.
PATRICIA L. DODGE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARILYN J. HORAN, JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the sole remaining defendant(s) in this case, John/Joan Doe(s), be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Kai D. Ingram, a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Counselor Schwab, Wilson, and unknown Doe defendants.In his Complaint, he asserts violations of his rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 8.) Ingram seeks “a million dollars a day for every day that [he is] illegally detained.” (Id. at 8.)
The caption of the case reflects only one Doe defendant; however, in the Complaint, Ingram lists under “Defendant No. 4” the name “John/Joan Does.” (ECF No. 8 at 3.) The number of Doe defendants does not affect the analysis herein. For ease of reference, the Court will refer to these defendants in the plural form.
After service of the Complaint on DOC employees Schwab and Wilson, they moved to dismiss the claims against them. (ECF No. 16.) Their Motion to Dismiss was granted and all claims against Schwab and Wilson were dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 39.) Accordingly, the sole remaining defendants in the case are the unknown Does.
B. Legal Standard
A complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
The Court may sua sponte consider the adequacy of the complaint pursuant to the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”). See, e.g., Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 n.11 (3d Cir. 2022) (explaining that the PLRA's screening provisions at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) are “applicable throughout the entire litigation process.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (the court may sua sponte rest its dismissal upon a ground not raised in a motion to dismiss pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA).
Finally, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”). Additionally, the Court must “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[,]” and “they cannot flout procedural rules- they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
C. Factual Allegations in Complaint
Ingram is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Greene for a parole violation. (ECF No. 8 at 5, 9). Believing his current incarceration to be illegal, Ingram previously filed two civil actions against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) and multiple DOC employees. (Id.) The PBPP denied Ingram parole on May 10, 2022, and November 8, 2022. (Id. at 6).
The claims against Schwab, Wilson and the John/Jane Does relate to events that are alleged to have occurred after the Parole Board denied Ingram parole on May 10, 2022. (Id. at 6). While Ingram makes factual allegations against Schwab and Wilson, he provides absolutely no information about the Doe defendants in his Complaint other than listing them as defendants. Ingram does not provide their job titles, duties, employers, or addresses, nor does he indicate whether they are being sued in their individual or official capacities. (Id. at 3.) Further, he alleges no facts concerning their alleged involvement in the events about which he complains, only a statement that “[t]he Plaintiff has also named John and Jone [sic] Does which will [be] discovered through the discovery process.” (Id. at 4.) Simply put, other than naming unidentified Does as defendants, Ingram does not state any claim against them.
D. Discussion
In his Objections to this Court's Report and Recommendation with respect to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the named defendants, Ingram states for the first time that the Doe defendants are employees of the PBPP and that the claims against them are based on the PBPP's denial of parole. (ECF No. 37 at 14-15.) As this Court has previously explained to Ingram in his other cases seeking relief on this basis, he cannot recover against PBPP employees for their parole decisions in a civil rights action.
As this Court explained in Ingram v. SCI Smithfield, Case No. 2:21-cv-359, ECF No. 37 at 12 n.7, PBPP officials are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in adjudicatory acts (citing Goodwine v. Keller, No. 09-1592, 2012 WL 4482793, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2012).) Indeed, absolute immunity applies when a parole board member or officer hears evidence, makes recommendations as to whether to parole a prisoner, or makes decisions as to whether to grant, revoke or deny parole. Sample v. Johnson, 2023 WL 2649458, at *4 (W.D. Pa. March 27, 2023).
In another § 1983 action in which Ingram sought to recover damages for a claimed illegal detention after being denied parole, this Court explained that such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Ingram v. Rudzienski, Case No. 2:22-cv-42, ECF Nos. 34, 39. Under the rule announced in Heck, inmates must seek federal habeas corpus relief or similar state remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody. Any claim under § 1983 which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the PBPP's decision to deny parole is barred by Heck.
Thus, even if Ingram had properly identified the Doe defendants as PBPP employees, his claims against them for denying him parole would fail.
E. Amendment
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
As explained herein, it would be futile to permit him to amend his Complaint because Ingram has no viable claim against the Doe defendants.
F. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the Doe defendants with prejudice.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, the parties may, within fourteen (14) days, file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).