The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs negligence claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the New York Workers' Compensation Law, NY. Workers' Comp. Law § 29(6), and dismisses these claims. See Brown v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-3861, 2019 WL 4454230, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2019) ("[T]he New York Workers' Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury caused by the negligence or wrong of another employee . . . [and] negligence claims are routinely dismissed on this basis."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-3861, 2019 WL 3282927 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019); Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-CV-5556, 2019 WL 1332857, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) ("It is well settled within the Second Circuit that common law negligence claims are barred by the New York[ ] Workers' Compensation Law." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Corrado v. N.Y.Unified Ct. Sys., 163 F.Supp.3d 1, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2016))).

As to prong three, courts hold that a plaintiff must allege which major life activity or activities their impairment substantially affects in order to clear the Rule 12(b)(6) threshold. See Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-CV-5556, 2019 WL 1332857, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) ("Plaintiff's complaint makes a single allegation vaguely referencing his 'cardiac disorder,' but does not include any allegations from which the Court could glean which, if any, major life activity is substantially limited by this 'cardiac disorder.' Absent any such allegations, a claim under the ADA cannot persist and must be dismissed.") (internal citation omitted); see also Dechberry, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 151 ("Although plaintiff arguably identifies her alleged disability . . . she does not explain what 'major life activity' is 'substantially limited.

While these allegations are serious, they are not supported by specific facts to raise an inference that they are the result of a discriminatory animus. See, e.g., Salerno v. Town of Bedford, NY, 2008 WL 5101185, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2008) (finding "[a]llegations of negative job evaluations or excessive reprimands . . . insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim"); Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-CV-05556 (JMA)(SIL), 2019 WL 1332857, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) (finding general allegations of harassment "on an ongoing basis" predicated on "false accusations of misconduct" and a failure to investigate those accusations were too "vague and conclusory" to support a hostile work environment claim). Although other allegations are more specific by comparison—for instance, that Capowski threw a chair at Wallace in 2012, and that Lee verbally harassed her in November 2015 by telling Wallace not to discuss her son at work—Wallace does not explain how these incidents were motivated by a protected characteristic under Title VII.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA and thus fails to plead a failure-to-accommodate claim. See Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-cv-5556, 2019 WL 1332857, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) (dismissing ADA claim because plaintiff failed to allege what major life activity was substantially limited by cardiac disorder, returned to work within one month of taking time off for cardiac disorder and did not allege that he had a record of disability or that employer regarded him as disabled); cf. Colas v. City of Univ. of N.Y., No. 17-cv-4825, 2019 WL 2028701, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that "as a result of her leg muscle spasms, neck pain, fatigue and shortness of breath, episodes of cramping and contractions, ligament pain, back pain, along with joint pain, nausea and headaches her function was greatly altered, namely in her baseline walking pattern, speed, circulation and coordination of balance") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Eisenberg further fails to plead a failure-to-accommodate claim because she does not allege that she ever requested any accommodations for her medical conditions. Plaintiff allege

District courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-CV-05556 (JMA) (SIL), 2019 WL 1332857, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) (dismissing negligence claim against former employer based on the exclusivity provision in New York Workers' Compensation Law); Corrado v. New York Unified Court Sys., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (same), aff'd sub nom. Corrado v. New York State Unified Court Sys., 698 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2017); D'Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 281, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); Pasqualini v. MortgageIT, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (same); Riscili v. Gibson Guitar Corp., No. 06-CIV-7596 (RJH), 2007 WL 2005555, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2007) (same); Ribis v. Mike Barnard Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 489, 507 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (same); Pellei v. Int'l Planned Parenthood Fed'n/W.

Regarding whether Plaintiff has alleged that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, "[t]he ADA provides that '[t]he term "disability" means, with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.'" Ingram v. Nassau Health Care Corp., No. 17-CV-05556(JMA)(SIL), 2019 WL 1332857, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). "A disability can be shown following one of [these] three definitions."