Opinion
12-3882
07-18-2013
INGRID COTTERELL INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUST ENERGY, Defendant-Appellee, REBECCA MACDONALD, KEN HARTWICK, SCOTT GAHN, DARREN PRITCHETT, BETH SUMMERS, HUMERA SIDDIQUI, WAYNE MORGAN, JASON HEROD, Defendants.
FOR APPELLANT: Ingrid Cotterell Ingram, pro se , Corona, New York. FOR APPELLEE: Charles E. Dorkey III, Seth H. Borden, Rebecca Tingey, McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, New York, New York.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J ANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY F EDERAL R ULE OF A PPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F EDERAL A PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE ( WITH THE NOTATION " SUMMARY ORDER "). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of July, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS ,
Chief Judge,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges.
FOR APPELLANT:
Ingrid Cotterell Ingram, pro se,
Corona, New York.
FOR APPELLEE:
Charles E. Dorkey III, Seth H.
Borden, Rebecca Tingey, McKenna
Long & Aldridge LLP, New York,
New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
Ingrid Cotterell Ingram appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.) dismissing her employment discrimination suit against her former employer, Just Energy. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, with the view that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Upon such review, we conclude that Ingram's appeal is without merit for the reasons articulated by the district court in its memorandum and order. See Ingram v. MacDonald, No. 10-cv-3859 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012, ECF No. 111). We have considered all of Ingram's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK