Summary
In Ingram v. Ingram, 49 N.C. 188, the Court declared that an agreement among persons interested in an estate, not to bid against each other at the administrator's sale, is void, as being against the public policy.
Summary of this case from Aycock v. GillOpinion
December Term, 1856.
The law presumes that every administrator settles up the estate in his hands within two years. In an action, therefore, on agreement to pay a debt when a certain estate is settled, if two years have elapsed from the date of the administration, the plaintiff has a prima facie right to recover, and the burden of showing that the estate was not settled, is thrown on the defendant.
An agreement between persons interested in an estate, the consideration of which is not to bid against each other at the administrator's sale, is against the public policy, and void.
THIS was an action of ASSUMPSIT, tried before ELLIS, Judge, at the Spring Term, 1856, of the Superior Court of Union County.
The action was founded upon the following written instrument, viz:
"Whereas, John M. Ingram, has released to me all his interest in the estate of George W. Ingram, and also agreed not to bid for the property, when sold, upon which I hereby agree to pay him, when the estate of George W. Ingram is settled by the administrator, his claims on the estate of said George W. Ingram, consisting of one hundred and seventy-five dollars for the hire of negroes, due the 1st of January, 1843, for which no note was given; and a note due on the 1st of January, 1842, for one hundred dollars and eighteen cents; also, a note for twenty dollars, due 1st of January, 1836. Given under my hand, May 13th, 1848." (Signed by defendant.)
The defendant pleaded the "general issue," and that the "contract was against public policy."
The execution of the instrument was proved; also, that the administration, on the estate of George W. Ingram, was granted to one Roland Crump, in April, 1848. The writ, in this case, was issued 10th February, 1854.
The defendant's counsel contended in the Court below, that plaintiff could not recover. 1st. Because he had not proved that the estate of G. W. Ingram had been settled before the suit was brought. 2nd. The contract was against the public policy, and therefore void.
His Honor was of opinion with the defendant on both these points. Whereupon, the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit and appealed.
Ashe, for the plaintiff.
Osborne, for the defendant.
We do not concur with his Honor upon the first ground of objection taken for the defendant, to wit, that the action was commenced too soon. The law required that the estate should be settled up by the administrator within two years, and the presumption is, that he performed his duty, unless the contrary be shown. This presumption was sufficient to make a prima facie case for the plaintiff, and throw the burthen on the defendant of proving that the estate of the intestate had not been settled when the writ was issued.
The second objection is fatal to the action, and upon that, we think that the decision of his Honor was correct. The principle established by the cases of Sharpe v. Farmer, 4 Dev. and Bat. Rep. 122, Ramsay v. Woodard, 3 Jones' Rep. 508, and Blythe v. Lovingood, 2 Ire. Rep. 20, is directly applicable to the present case. It is that "the law prohibits every thing which is contra bonos mores, and, therefore, no contract which originates in an act contrary to the true principles of morality, can be made the subject of complaint in the courts of justice." In Blythe v. Lovingood, the contract was declared to be void, because it was founded upon a consideration, by which the State was to be deprived of a fair price for its land. In the case before us, the consideration of the defendant's promise was, that the creditors or some of the next of kin of George W. Ingram, deceased, were to be deprived of the fair value of his slaves.
The objection may seem to come with a very bad grace from the defendant, because she was particeps criminis. It is not for her sake that it is allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, of which she has the advantage, contrary to the real justice as between her and the plaintiff. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon a promise, the consideration of which is contra bonos mores, or against the public policy, or laws of the State, or in fraud of the State, or of any third person. See the cases referred to in Blythe v. Lovingood, ubi supra.
PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed.