Summary
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-employer where plaintiff "offers only his own self-serving assertions that his performance during this period was satisfactory"
Summary of this case from Avant v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. CCB-02-2869
February 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM
The defendants, Baltimore Gas Electric Company and Constellation Energy Group ("BGE"), have moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Neil Ingram ("Ingram"). The issues in this motion have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Neil Ingram, an African-American male, was employed by BGE from approximately 1985 until his termination on September 17, 2001. Between 1985 and 1995, Ingram worked as a student employee, a laborer, a Gas Meter Mechanic Trainee, a Gas Meter Mechanic, and a Senior Gas Meter Mechanic. In 1995, Ingram applied and was chosen for a position as a Gas System Technician, working under Senior Gas System Technician Joe Douglass and Supervisors Robert Lynne and James Ports in the Gas Measurement Section. Around May 1999, as part of a reorganization of BGE's Gas Measurement Section, the section leadership decided to eliminate one of the Gas System Technician positions. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. J, Cavey Aff, at ¶ 3-5; id at Ex. K, Jackson Aff., at ¶ 3-4.) The section leadership decided to keep Douglass in the position rather than Ingram, because they believed that Douglass had greater experience and skills. (Id. at Ex. J, Cavey Aff, at ¶ 5;id at Ex. K, Jackson Aff., at ¶ 4.) Around May 2000, Ingram was chosen for another position, working as an IC Technician under Lynne. Ingram remained in this position until he was suspended from BGE on September 14, 2001, and ultimately terminated on September 17, 2001.
Ingram was chosen for this position over at least two white employees, Ron Turner and Charlie Hill, as well as one African-American employee, Freddie Smith. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. D., Lynne Dep., at 42-44.)
Ingram cites two apparent instances in which he was denied a promotion or similar employment opportunity with BGE in favor of a white co-worker. In 1994, BGE initially selected a white employee, Kevin Eisenacher, over Ingram for the position of Senior Gas Meter Mechanic. Ingram then filed a grievance with BGE's Human Resources ("HR") department, claiming that he was better qualified for the position than Eisenacher. According to an electronic record of this grievance, the HR staff investigated Ingram's claim, and determined that Ingram "did not respond as accurately to interview questions as the selected candidate[s]." (Defs.' Reply at Ex. T, Gibson Aff., at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) While Ingram's grievance was pending, Eisenacher opted to accept a different position in the power plant area, and Ingram then was offered and accepted the position as Senior Gas Meter Mechanic. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 28-29.) Ingram also suggests that he was better qualified than Joe Douglass, who is white, to remain as the Gas System Technician when one of the positions was eliminated in 1999. (Id. at 122-24;id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff., at ¶ 18.)
Ingram states that his grievance also complained that the decision was based on race (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff., at ¶ 11), but the BGE grievance record of Ingram's complaint does not mention race (Defs.' Reply at Ex. T, Gibson Aff, at Ex. 1).
The parties previously entered into a Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement to seal a number of discovery documents, because they contained personal and potentially sensitive information regarding third parties. Pursuant to this agreement, various exhibits attached to the defendants' memorandum and reply (including Exhibit T), and the plaintiff's entire memorandum and all supporting exhibits, were filed under seal. To the extent that it is necessary to cite to those exhibits to explain the reasons for the court's decision, however, that information will be disclosed in this memorandum. Cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine. Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that documents submitted in connection with a summary judgment motion should be publicly accessible unless the district court finds that non-disclosure "serves an important governmental interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest").
Ingram also states that he was denied training opportunities that were provided to white employees. Ingram testified that his supervisors allowed Douglass to receive more training than Ingram while they were Gas System Technicians, (Id. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 242-44;id. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 10.) Ingram also states that he was denied opportunities to undergo cross-training and to attend training seminars, while white co-workers were offered these opportunities. (Id. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 10; Defs.' Mem. at Ex. A, Ingram Dep., at 256-59.)
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied company training to receive a Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") because of a speeding violation that he received in 2000, while white employees with comparable driving records were allowed to receive the training. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 16; see also Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 10.) BGE produced evidence that Ingram's CDL training was suspended pursuant to company policy, and that the white employees that Ingram identified as comparators did not have similar driving records. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. L, Anderson Aff.) Ingram does not dispute this evidence, and states in his memorandum that he is no longer pursuing this claim. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 17 n. 36.) Although the CDL license is a requirement for the IC Technician position, BGE allowed Ingram to continue in the position by riding along with other employees or driving company vans. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. A, Ingram Dep., at 133-34.)
In his early years with BGE, Ingram received positive ratings in his annual performance evaluations. The first disciplinary and performance problems involving Ingram occurred in 1997 and 1998. On September 11, 1997, Ingram received an informal warning stating that he had "raised his voice in an inappropriate manner, thus causing a feeling of confrontation, employee alarm, and work disruption" during a conversation with another BGE employee, Ken Bosley. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 15.) Ingram filed a grievance with BGE's HR department contesting the warning, but the HR staff found no reason to withdraw the warning. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. E, Gibson Aff, at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) In March 1998, Ingram received a quarterly evaluation from Supervisor Robert Lynne in which his overall proficiency rating dropped from 5 to 3.4 on a scale of 1 to 5. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 17.) The evaluation cited the above incident with Ken Bosley, and also stated that Ingram had changed his work schedule without approval, failed to follow other required procedures, declined to assist co-workers, engaged in heated discussions with Lynne in which he accused supervision of lying and fabricating issues, attempted to elude his supervisor, and spent too much time having personal discussions with other employees. (Id.)
Ingram received an overall proficiency rating of "B" in his first two performance appraisals, in August 1994 and August 1995, signifying "performance is what is normally expected." (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 8;id. at Ex. 9.) On his next two performance appraisals in August 1996 and August 1997, Ingram received the highest overall proficiency rating of 5 on a scale of 1 to 5, signifying "Full Proficiency." (Id. at Ex. 10, 11.)
Ingram has testified that he was not confrontational during the conversation with Bosley, and he alleges that several supervisors coerced Bosley into saying that Ingram had been confrontational. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 65-70; id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff., at ¶ 15.)
Between approximately February 11 and March 2, 1998, Robert Lynne maintained a written record of several problems that he had with Ingram, which Lynne kept in his two-year supervisor's file. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 2, Lynne Dep., at 232-42; id. at Ex. 14.) Several of the incidents described in Lynne's notes also appear in the March 1998 evaluation. (Id. at Ex. 17.)
Ingram responded to the quarterly evaluation in a letter dated April 1, 1998, in which he disputed the specific instances of misconduct that were cited, accused Lynne of retaliating against him for reporting on another employee, and accused supervision of treating white employees differently from African-American employees with respect to employee breaks. (Id. at Ex. 13.) Ingram also filed a grievance with BGE's HR department, reportedly telling the HR staff that "his shortcomings were documented only because he `blew the whistle' regarding a co-worker problem." (Id. at Ex. 18.) Lois Pines, an African-American employee in BGE's HR department, investigated Ingram's grievance by interviewing Lynne, Ingram, and three African-American employees in the Gas Measurement Section, (Id.: id. at Ex. 5, Pines Dep., at 62-66.) Pines concluded that while Ingram's evaluation was "nit-picking," it was accurate and based on documented problems, and was not motivated by retaliation, favoritism, or racial discrimination, (Id. at Ex. 18; id. at Ex. 5, Pines Dep., at 66-67, 70, 117.)
At some point prior to his March 1998 evaluation, Ingram reported to supervision that another African-American employee, Alberta Curbean, was coming to work intoxicated. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 68-70.) Ingram states that when he revealed to Lynne that he was the employee who had reported on Curbean, Lynne told him not to report such incidents because it did not look good. (Id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff., at ¶ 10.)
Ingram received the highest overall proficiency rating of 5 in his next annual evaluation in August 1998 (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. A, Ingram Dep., at Ex. 8), but his overall proficiency rating was lowered again to 4 in his October 1999 annual evaluation (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 22). The October 1999 evaluation stated that Ingram required supervision to stay on his productivity targets, did not report to work on time, spent too much time away from his work area, was disruptive at meetings, and openly accused supervision of being liars, (Id.) Ingram attached comments to the evaluation, dated March 20, 2000, in which he suggested that Supervisor James Ports had retaliated against him for meeting with Susan Maseth and several African-American employees to complain about their treatment by Ports, (Id.) As a result of a grievance filed by Ingram with BGE's HR department, the evaluation comments regarding productivity were revised and the proficiency rating in the related area of Leadership / Administrative was raised from a 3 to a 4. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. E, Gibson Aff., at ¶ 4, Ex. 2.) In Ingram's final performance evaluation as a Gas System Technician in May 2000, he received the highest overall proficiency rating of 5 on a scale of 1 to 5. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 23.)
According to the electronic grievance record on this matter, Ingram had complained to the HR staff that the lower proficiency rating was unsupported. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. E, Gibson Aff, at ¶ 4, Ex. 2.) The HR staff "informed the employee that comments regarding work relations with supervision were, in our opinion, justified," but asked supervision to provide supporting documentation for the comments regarding productivity. (Id. at Ex. 2.) The evaluation was revised when Ingram's supervisors were unable to provide supporting documentation. (Id. at ¶ 4, Ex. 2.)
The disciplinary and performance problems that culminated in Ingram's termination from BGE began in 2001. On May 3, BGE employee Mark Powers saw Ingram sleeping in a work area during the day, and reported this to Ingram's supervisor, Lee Cavey. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. M; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 2, Lynne Dep., at 119-20; id. at Ex. 4, Cavey Dep., at 104-06.) Several days later, on May 8, Ingram approached Powers and made some comments to him about this incident. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. M; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 135-36.) Powers testified that he interpreted these comments as a threat for having reported on Ingram. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 7, Powers Dep., at 123, 127-28.) Cavey and Lynne also understood the comments to constitute a threat, and Ingram himself subsequently acknowledged that he understood how the comments could be perceived as a threat. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. G, Cavey Dep., at 119-21; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 2, Lynne Dep., at 101-103, 109-11; id. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 137.) As a result of this threat to Powers, Ingram received a formal Corrective Action Report ("CAR") and was placed on probation for six months. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. M.)
Ingram compared Powers' conduct in reporting on Ingram to a hunting dog that keeps following the wrong trail, and eventually is shot by his owner. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. M; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 135-36.)
Ingram alleges that Cavey cursed and slammed his hand on his desk during a meeting with Ingram about this incident. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 18-19 n. 39; id. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 9.) Cavey testified that he could not remember whether he had cursed at Ingram. (Id. at Ex. 4, Cavey Dep., at 125.)
During the summer of 2001, BGE implemented a company-wide "Performance Change Process Initiative," aimed at identifying employees who were "low performers" and placing them on a formal Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"). (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 6, Sullivan Dep., at 17-18; Defs.' Mem. at Ex. I, Maseth Dep., at 177-79.) Members of BGE's HR department met with supervisors to discuss which employees should be labeled as low performers, based on general criteria and guidelines developed by the HR staff. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 6, Sullivan Dep., at 27-34, 37-39, 44-63.) Following one or two meetings, supervisors in the Gas Measurement Section identified Neil Ingram and Charlie Flinn, a white employee, as low performers. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. C, Lynne Aff., at ¶ 5.) The supervisors' discussion about Ingram cited his May 11 CAR, past conflicts with supervision, failure to take responsibility for his actions, costly performance errors, and lack of a CDL license. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 33.) The final list of low performers was approved prior to the end of July 2001. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. O, Bucholz Aff., at ¶ 3.)
Susan Maseth, formerly the General Supervisor of Gas Measurement, testified that all employees who were identified as "low performers" were to be placed on formal PIPs. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. I, Maseth Dep., at 186-87.) According to Kaye Sullivan, an HR employee, BGE performed a study which showed that the selection process under the initiative did not have an adverse impact on racial minorities. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 6, Sullivan Dep., at 98-100.)
The supervisors also identified Wayne Gibbs, an African-American employee, as a low performer, but Gibbs was never placed on a PIP because he was experiencing health problems and voluntarily resigned in January 2002. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. J, Cavey Aff, at ¶ 9.)
Lynne presented Ingram's proposed PIP to him on August 21, 2001, along with his annual evaluation in which Ingram received an overall proficiency rating of 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 165-66; id. at Ex. 36.) The evaluation stated that Ingram had turned in inaccurate time sheets and meter tickets, ignored testing procedures during field meter testing, demonstrated continuous hostility towards certain personnel, and remained aloof at unit meetings. (Id. at Ex. 36.) Ingram's PIP listed actions that he could take to improve his performance, such as focusing on the accuracy of his paperwork, seeking opportunities to develop positive relationships with all section personnel, and actively participating in unit meetings. (Id.) At the August 21 meeting, and at follow-up meetings with various members of supervision and the HR department on August 29 and September 6, Ingram disputed the specific critiques in his performance evaluation and refused to agree to the recommended PIP. (Id. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 169-71, 179-85; id. at Ex. 37, 38.) Ingram continued to raise allegations of race discrimination at these meetings. (Id. at Ex. 37, 38.)
On September 14, Ingram and members of supervision and the HR department held a final meeting to discuss his evaluation and the proposed PIP. Prior to this meeting, senior managers at BGE had determined that Ingram should be terminated if he continued to refuse to accept his PIP. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B, Sullivan Aff., at ¶ 9;id. at Ex. O, Bucholz Aff, at ¶ 5; id. at Ex. P, Doyle Aff., at ¶ 5.) Ingram testified that he was told at this meeting that he would be terminated if he continued to refuse to commit to the proposed PIP. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 187-88.) Ingram continued to refuse to sign on to the proposed PIP, and at the close of the September 14 meeting, he was suspended; on September 17, his employment with BGE was terminated.
The defendants' position is that Ingram was terminated because he refused to commit to his PIP, which had been designed by his supervisors to address identified deficiencies in his performance. The formal CAR recommending Ingram's termination, dated September 14, cited the incident between Ingram and Mark Powers on May 11, an altercation between Ingram and BGE employee Mike Doyle on September 10, Ingram's "deliberate and willful refusal to accept and make the required improvements indicated in his Proficiency, his continued lack of respect for Supervision and co-workers, and his continuous non-adherence to Section procedures," as well as the fact that Ingram was still "on probation for a previous Corrective Action that pertained to the same behavior." (Id. at Ex. 42.)
On September 10, Ingram and Doyle, a white co-worker, were involved in an argument over a pipe wrench in which the two men exchanged words. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 163-64.) Lynne states that he recorded Ingram and Doyle's descriptions of the incident, and placed this documentation in both of their supervisor's files. (Defs.' Reply at Ex. S, Lynne Aff., at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)
In addition to some of the comments made in response to various performance evaluations, Ingram cities several instances when he raised issues of alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in the Gas Measurement Section to BGE management. Ingram testified that during his time as a Gas System Technician he complained to Lynne that Joe Douglass was not providing him with adequate training in the new position, and that Douglass had mistreated another African-American employee, Willie Farmer. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 60-61, 71-74.) Ingram states that he told Lynne that he believed that Douglass' actions were racially motivated. (Id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff, at ¶ 12.) Ingram also states that when he became an IC Technician in 2000, he voiced concerns to Lynne that he was the only African-American in the group. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Around this time, Ingram states that he complained to Lynne that a white co-worker, Robert Undutch, was not providing him with sufficient training or assistance in the new position, and that Ingram believed this was racially motivated. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Also in 2000, Ingram and Freddie Smith met with Supervisor Lee Cavey to discuss Mark Powers' discriminatory treatment of African-American employees in the section, and Ingram separately complained to Cavey about Powers' physical harassment of Smith. (Id. at ¶ 20-21; id. at Ex. 4, Cavey Dep., at 72-73.) Finally, around August 1, 2001 Ingram wrote a "Letter to Management" alleging that minority opinions were not respected in the Gas Measurement Section, and that employees who spoke up faced retaliation. (Id. at Ex. 35.)
Lynne testified that he does not recall these specific complaints, and that Ingram never made complaints regarding Douglass that were racial in nature. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 2, Lynne Dep., at 308-10,312-13.)
Ingram initially gave this letter to a contract employee at BGE to present to Susan Maseth anonymously, but he presented the letter himself at the August 29 and September 6 meetings between Ingram and members of supervision and the HR department. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 205, 244-45.) Kaye Sullivan testified that she spoke with Ingram about this letter, but that he was unable to identify any specific instances of racial discrimination for FIR to investigate further. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. N, Sullivan Dep., at 119-20.)
Other employees in the Gas Measurement Section also raised complaints of alleged racial discrimination to BGE management during this same period. In July 1999, BGE's HR department held a team building session in which employees in the Gas Measurement Section raised complaints about racial discrimination within the section. (Id. at Ex. 3, Maseth Dep., at 25-26.) Also at some point during this period, Ingram and three other African-American employees, Freddie Smith, Wayne Gibbs, and Bobby Ireland, met with Susan Maseth, their General Supervisor at the time, to complain about differential treatment of African-American and white employees in the Gas Measurement Section. (Id. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 109-10; id. at Ex. 3, Maseth Dep., at 56-57, 63-66.) As a result of these concerns, the HR department conducted a section investigation in which all employees were interviewed and asked general questions about the work climate, conflicts, and perceptions of unfairness within the section. (Id. at Ex. 5, Pines Dep., at 132, 135-36; id. at Ex. 27; Defs.' Reply at Ex. W, Pines Aff., at ¶ 3; id. at Ex. I, Maseth Dep., at 44-45.) Based on the results of this investigation and on the prior complaints, BGE management decided to move Ports out of his supervisory position. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 3, Maseth Dep., at 21-22, 24-25.)
Both African-American and white employees accused Supervisor James Ports of practicing favoritism within the section, and retaliating against employees who dissented. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 27; Defs.' Reply at Ex. W, Pines Aff., at ¶ 4-6, Ex. 1-3.) Some African-American employees reported that white employees in the section received preferential treatment, some white employees reported that African-American employees received preferential treatment, and some employees in both groups denied that there were any problems of racial discrimination in the section. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 27, 28; Defs.' Reply at Ex. W, Pines Aff, at ¶ 4-6, Ex. 1-3.)
Ingram commenced this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.) ("Title VII"), alleging that he suffered racial discrimination, and that BGE retaliated against him for opposing BGE's racially discriminatory policies and practices.
ANALYSIS
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club. Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility," Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial."Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
Ingram claims that he was subject to race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because he did not present any direct evidence of race discrimination or retaliation, his claim is evaluated under the familiar burden-shifting scheme articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greea, 411 U.S. 792. 802-05 (1973). See also Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework);Brvantv. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the required elements of a prima facie claim of employment discrimination are the same under section 1981 and Title VII). As a general matter, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff must show that: "(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] was performing [his] duties in a satisfactory manner; (3) [he] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) [he] was treated differently [from] similarly situated individuals outside of [his] protected class." Nichols v. Harford County Bd. of Educ., 189 F. Supp.2d 325, 340 (D. Md. 2002); see also Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649-50 (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training, the plaintiff must show that: "(1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the defendant provided training to its employees; (3) the plaintiff was eligible for the training; and (4) the plaintiff was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination"); cf Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that in order to establish a prima facie case of disparate disclipline, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) "that the prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class;" and (3) "that the disciplinary measures enforced against him were more severe than those enforced against those other employees"). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that "(1) [he] engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the asserted adverse employment action." Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863 (4th Cir. 2001).
There is no dispute that Ingram, as an African-American, qualifies as a member of a protected class. (Defs.' Mem. at 23.)
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.Nichols. 189 F. Supp.2d at 340. If the defendant articulates such an explanation, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a pretext for impermissible discrimination. Murray v. United Food Commercial Workers Union. Local 400, 229 F. Supp.2d 465, 470 (D. Md. 2002). Although the burden of production shifts, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout all stages, see Burns v. AAF McQuav, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1996), and the plaintiff must present admissible evidence that is more than self-serving opinions or speculation. See McCain v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d 568, 574 (D. Md. 2000). In sum, the McDonnell Douglas framework is not a rigid or mechanized scheme, but rather `"a means to fine-tune the presentation of proof and, more importantly, to sharpen the focus on the ultimate question-whether the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him].'" Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. Educ. Radio. Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1995).
I.
Ingram filed this lawsuit on August 28, 2002. In Maryland, the statute of limitations for employment discrimination suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is three years. See Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1983). Therefore, any claims related to incidents occurring before August 28, 1999 are time-barred for purposes of Section 1981. Under Title VII, Ingram had a maximum of 300 days from the occurrence of an alleged discriminatory act to file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Ingram filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC on October 9, 2001. Therefore, any claims related to incidents occurring before December 13, 2000 are time-barred for purposes of Title VII.
In his complaint, Ingram asserted that he is entitled to application of the continuing violation doctrine as to all of the violations alleged. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff may rely on incidents occurring before the statute of limitations period if those incidents "can be related to a timely incident as a `series of separate but related acts' amounting to a continuing violation." Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 620 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jenkins v. Home Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). In his memorandum, however, Ingram clarified that he is not pursuing any separate claims for relief based on any adverse actions that took place earlier than August 1999. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 33 n. 65.) Among the specific acts cited by Ingram that occurred prior to August 1999 are: (1) BGE's initial decision to promote Kevin Eisenacher to the position of Senior Gas Meter Mechanic in 1994, (2) the informal disciplinary warning issued to Ingram relating to his altercation with Ken Bosley in September 1997, (3) the notes taken by Robert Lynne in February and March 1998, memorializing several incidents involving Ingram, (4) performance evaluations issued to Ingram in March 1998 and August 1998, and (5) denials of cross-training and the opportunity to attend training seminars, some of which may have occurred prior to August 1999. Any separate claims relying on these incidents are time-barred. Of course, Ingram still may rely on these incidents as background evidence in support of his other claims. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113(2002).
Even if the informal disciplinary actions and performance evaluations cited by Ingram were not outside of the statutory period, they could not support independent claims of racial discrimination, because they do not amount to adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Thompson. 312 F.2d at 651-52 (noting that disciplinary actions and performance evaluations do not constitute adverse employment actions where they do not result in a loss of pay or other adverse consequences for the employee). Ingram has failed to establish that he lost any pay or otherwise suffered any adverse consequences as a result of these incidents. (Cf. Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B., Sullivan Aff, at ¶ 3.)
II.
Ingram alleges that he was treated differently from his white co-workers during his employment at BGE in the following ways: he was denied training opportunities that were provided to his white co-workers (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 9-10), he was denied promotions or similar employment opportunities that were granted to his white co-workers (Id. at 12), he was subjected to harsher discipline (id. at 8-9), he received inaccurate and unfair performance appraisals (id. at 10-11), he was subjected to racial harassment (id. at 7-8), and he was unlawfully terminated because of his race and in retaliation for raising issues of race discrimination with management (id. at 12-13). Each of these claims will be considered in turn.Ingram states that he was denied the opportunity to undergo cross-training and to attend training seminars, while these opportunities were provided to white employees such as Joe Douglass, Scott Stella, Ron Craft, Charles Hill, Bob Bowers, and Kathy Siepp. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 10; id. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 242-44, 256-59.) Ingram has not set forth specific facts, however, establishing that BGE provided training, or that he was eligible for any such training, both of which are required elements for a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training. See Thompsoa, 312 F.3d at 649-50. Absent from the record are any specific facts about the kind of training opportunities provided by BGE, the employees who were eligible to participate, any specific seminars or training opportunities that were denied to Ingram, and the specific timeframe when other employees were provided with these opportunities. The vague facts alleged by Ingram also are not sufficient to show that he was denied training "under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination," the final required element of a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training. Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649-50. The white employees identified by Ingram as comparators occupied positions different from his at various times during his employment, and many of them held more senior positions. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B, Sullivan Aff, at ¶ 6-7.) The simple fact that these employees were provided with specific training opportunities, while an African-American employee working in a different area (and often in a lower-ranking position) was not provided with the same opportunities is not sufficient evidence from which to infer racial discrimination. Without more specific facts and evidence, Ingram cannot establish a prima facie claim of discriminatory denial of training.
The lack of specific allegations regarding the timing of these denials of training also makes it impossible to determine if these claims are time-barred, which they would be if they occurred prior to August 1999.
Even Joe Douglass occupied a higher position than Ingram as Senior Gas System Technician until this position was eliminated around March 1998. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B, Sullivan Aff, at ¶ 4.)
Ingram states that the decision in 1999 to keep Joe Douglass in the position of Gas System Technician, rather than Ingram, was racially discriminatory. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 122-24;id. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 12; id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff., at ¶ 18.) Ingram has not established that he was treated differently from similarly-situated employees outside of his protected class, however, as required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Nichols. 189 F. Supp.2d at 340. The only two employees being compared in this situation were Ingram and Douglass, and the two cannot be deemed to be similarly-situated with regard to the position at issue. Ingram does not dispute that Douglass had served in the position of Gas System Technician for approximately four years longer than Ingram, and that Douglass was a Senior Gas System Technician for many of these years, a title that Ingram never held. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B, Sullivan Aff, at ¶ 4.) Even if Ingram could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, BGE has advanced several legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the choice of Douglass over Ingram, citing Douglass' longer experience and stronger skills. (Id. at Ex. J, Cavey Aff, at ¶ 5; id. at Ex. K, Jackson Aff., at ¶ 4.) Beyond his own self-serving assertions that he was better qualified for the position, Ingram has not presented any evidence to establish that the reasons offered by BGE are pretext for racial discrimination. See Evans v. Techs. Applications Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that an employee's "unsubstantiated allegations and bald assertions concerning her own qualifications and the shortcomings of her co-workers" are insufficient to rebut an employer's articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting another employee).
Ingram points to two incidents during the statutory period when he alleges that he was subjected to disparate discipline: the CAR that Ingram received on May 11, 2001 for his threatening comments to Mark Powers, and the informal notes placed in Ingram's supervisor's file regarding his altercation with Mike Doyle on September 10, 2001. (Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 8-9.) With regard to the September 10 incident, it appears from the record that both Ingram and Doyle received the same disciplinary response for this incident-contemporaneous notes signed by their supervisors were placed in both of their supervisor's files. (Defs.' Reply at Ex. S, Lynne Aff., at ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Ingram, therefore, has failed to establish "that the disciplinary measures enforced against him were more severe than those enforced against other employees," the third element of a prima facie case of disparate discipline. Cook, 988 F.2d at 511.
Ingram alleges that Doyle was not disciplined for this incident, while Ingram was, but this allegation does not appear to be based on personal knowledge and is not supported by any other evidence in the record.
As to the May 11 incident, Ingram points to two specific circumstances in which a white employee threatened another employee and, according to Ingram, was not disciplined for this conduct. First, Ingram states that Charlie Hill, a white employee, cursed and raised his fist at Wayne Gibbs, an African-American employee, and was not disciplined. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 9.) However, BGE has produced evidence that Hill received a formal CAR for this incident, a punishment comparable to the CAR that Ingram received for his threatening remarks to Powers. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. H, Powers Dep., at Ex. 11.) Thus, Ingram again cannot establish the third element of a prima facie case of disparate discipline, that his punishment was more severe than the punishment imposed on another employee. See Cook, 988 F.2d at 511.
Again, Ingram's contrary allegation that Hill was not disciplined for this incident does not appear to be based on personal knowledge and is not supported by any other evidence in the record.
Ingram also states that Lee Cavey cursed at Ingram and slammed his fist on his desk during a meeting, and was not disciplined for this conduct. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 9.) This claim fails to meet the second element of a prima facie case of disparate discipline, "that the prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class." Cook, 988 F.2d at 511. Although "the reality [is] that the comparison will never involve precisely the same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of circumstances," id. Cavey's conduct cannot be deemed of comparable seriousness to Ingram's threatening remarks. Ingram does not suggest that he felt threatened as a result of the incident with Cavey, or that other employees interpreted Cavey's conduct as threatening, and Ingram states that Cavey immediately apologized for his behavior. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 9.) By contrast, Mark Powers reported that he felt threatened by Ingram's comments, Powers immediately reported the incident to a supervisor, two supervisors interpreted Ingram's comments to Powers as threatening, and Ingram initially refused Powers' request to further explain what he meant and did not apologize to Powers for two days. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. M.) Given these facts, the two incidents do not involve comparable harm to others or culpability by the offender, and thus cannot be deemed of comparable seriousness. See Settle v. Baltimore County, 34 F. Supp.2d 969, 992 (D. Md. 1999) (considering the gravity of the harm and the culpability of the offender in determining seriousness). Even if the incident involving Cavey was comparable to Ingram's threatening remarks to Powers, it is typically not permissible to infer the existence of disparate discipline by comparison with one single prior event. See Cook, 988 F.2d at 512.
Ingram charges that his performance evaluations were unfair, citing two evaluations within the statutory period that he received in October 1999 and August 2001. With regard to his October 1999 evaluation, Ingram cannot satisfy the third element of a prima facie case of discrimination, because an unfavorable performance evaluation by itself does not constitute an adverse employment action, unless it results in material adverse consequences for the employee such as loss of pay or benefits, demotion, reduced opportunities for promotion, or discharge. See Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp.2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that a poor performance rating does not itself constitute an adverse employment action, but becomes relevant evidence if it is relied upon for another adverse action); see also Thompson, 312 F.3d at 652 (noting that a poor performance evaluation did not constitute adverse employment action because the plaintiff lost no pay and maintained the same position). Ingram has failed to introduce any evidence that he suffered any tangible adverse consequences as a result of his October 1999 performance evaluation, and BGE's personnel records indicate that Ingram maintained the same position and pay level during this period. (See Defs.' Mem. at Ex. B, Sullivan Aff, at ¶ 3.)
In any event, Ingram has failed to establish the remaining two elements of a prima facie case of discrimination for the October 1999 evaluation, that he was performing his duties in a satisfactory manner and that he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class. See Nichols, 189 F. Supp.2d at 340. Ingram offers only his own self-serving assertions that his performance during this period was satisfactory, and this is not sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960. Further, Ingram has not produced any evidence regarding the performance evaluations received by his white co-workers during the same period, and thus cannot establish that he was subjected to differential treatment.
Ingram's August 2001 performance evaluation arguably constitutes an adverse employment action, because it formed part of the basis for his ultimate termination. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at 652 (suggesting that a poor performance rating is actionable when an employer subsequently uses the evaluation as a basis for detrimentally altering the employee's terms or conditions of employment). However, Ingram's claim of discrimination on the basis of this evaluation fails for the same reasons noted above — Ingram has offered no evidence beyond his own conclusory statements to establish that he was performing his duties in a satisfactory manner, or that he was subjected to differential treatment.
Ingram's challenge to this August 2001 performance evaluation should be distinguished from his allegation that he was unlawfully terminated because of his race, a much broader claim that is considered infra.
In his prior filings in this lawsuit, Ingram claimed that he was subjected to racial harassment during his employment with BGE, creating a hosfile work environment. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 10-11.) To support this claim, Ingram essentially relied on the whole range of incidents alleged in his filings, and in particular stated that his supervisors over-scrutinized his work, unfairly disciplined him, gave him unfair performance evaluations, and verbally assaulted him on two occasions. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 8.) In his memorandum, Ingram does not set forth any specific facts or legal arguments in support of his prior claim of racial harassment. Nonetheless, the court has considered this claim, and concludes that Ingram has failed to establish a prima facie case.
To establish a prima facie claim for hosfile work environment based on race, a plaintiff must show that he was subjected to harassment, and that "(1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2) the harassment was based on his race ; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer." Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998). To satisfy the second element, Ingram must "set forth specific evidence to show that the incident was not merely negative or motivated by dislike from a supervisor, but that it was motivated improperly by race." Nicole v. Grafton School, Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 475, 483 (D. Md. 2002). The evidence presented by Ingram is insufficient to show that the alleged incidents of harassment were based on race. None of the incidents cited by Ingram were overtly racial in nature, and Ingram has presented no specific facts beyond his own conclusory statements to establish that the incidents were based on race, or that he was treated less favorably than white employees. See, e.g., Causey, 162 F.3d at 801-02 (finding no indication that alleged incidents of harassment were based on race, where the alleged derogatory comments were not racial and the plaintiff could not show differential treatment of similarly situated employees). The mere fact that Ingram, an African-American, experienced conflicts with white supervisors and employees is not sufficient to establish that these conflicts were based on race. See Hawkins v. PepsiCo. Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2000) ("Law does not blindly ascribe to race all personal conflicts between individuals of different races . . . Instead, legally sufficient evidence is required to transform an ordinary conflict . . . into an actionable claim of discrimination.").
Furthermore, the incidents cited by Ingram were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute an actionable hosfile work environment, the third element of a prima facie case. To determine whether alleged harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive, the court looks to all of the surrounding circumstances, including "(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with [the] employee's work performance."Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris v. Forklift Svs., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Ingram points to only a handful of incidents over a period of many years, none of which were physically threatening or humiliating, or otherwise sufficiently severe or abusive to constitute a hosfile work environment. Compare Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 867-70 (affirming grant of summary judgment against claim of hosfile work environment, where the plaintiff complained that she was subjected to a lower performance evaluation, temporary withdrawal of her use of a state vehicle, hyper-scrutiny of her requests for sick leave and her expense forms, denials of requests to attend seminars, and other "office unpleasantries" over a one-and-a-half year period), with Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182, 184-86 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment against claim of unlawful racial harassment, where the plaintiff complained that his white supervisor used racial slurs and epithets and made racially derogatory comments, directed to the plaintiff and others, on an almost daily basis).
Finally, Ingram argues that he was unlawfully terminated from BGE on September 17, 2001 because of his race. Ingram has failed to establish that he was performing his duties in a satisfactory manner, the second element in a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. See Nichols, 189 F. Supp.2d at 340. BGE has provided substantial evidence that Ingram was not performing up to the legitimate expectations of his employer, including deposition testimony from his supervisors, documented performance and disciplinary concerns expressed by his supervisors over many years, several documented violations of company policy for which Ingram received informal or formal disciplinary warnings, and Ingram's repeated refusals to agree to his proposed PIP. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. D, Lynne Dep., at 49-50, 52-56, 67-98, 160-66, 404-11, Ex. 2, 10; id. at Ex. H, Powers Dep., at 75-80, 84-88; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 14, 15, 17, 22, 33, 36-40, 42.) In response, Ingram attempts to dispute the specific critiques cited by his supervisors, and offers his own conclusory statements that he was performing his job satisfactorily. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 144-48, 152-55, 158-60, 162-65.) Ingram's own subjective opinion of his performance is not sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 960; Chyu v. Md. Dep't. of Health Mental Hygiene, 198 F. Supp.2d 678, 683 (D. Md. 2002).
Ingram also has failed to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, that he was treated differently from similarly situated white employees. See Nichols, 189 F. Supp.2d at 340. Among the bases cited for Ingram's termination are his threatening remarks to Mark Powers and the subsequent CAR, his documented paperwork and performance problems, and his continued refusal to commit to his proposed PIP. Ingram cannot identify any other BGE employee, African-American or white, who experienced comparable problems and was not subject to similar consequences. As discussed, Ingram has failed to identify any BGE employees who engaged in misconduct of comparable seriousness to his own threat to Powers and were not disciplined. Ingram cannot identify any other BGE employees who experienced similar performance and disciplinary problems, and he has not submitted the performance evaluations of any other BGE employee for comparison, other than Charlie Flinn. Flinn, a white IC Technician, also is the only other BGE employee identified in the record who was labeled as a low performer and placed on a PIP. Because he agreed to commit to his proposed PIP, however, Flinn is not similarly situated with respect to Ingram.
Like Ingram, Flinn received an overall proficiency rating of 3 on his August 2001 annual evaluation. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 34.) Flinn agreed to his PIP, however, and received the highest overall proficiency rating of 5 on his next annual evaluation in August 2002. (Id. at Ex. 2, Lynne Dep., at 415-19; Defs.' Mem. at Ex. D, Lynne Dep., at Ex. 30.) Flinn remains employed with BGE.
As the final ground for his claim of discriminatory discharge, Ingram broadly alleges that white employees were not disciplined or negatively evaluated for comparable behavior. However, when questioned at his deposition, Ingram essentially admitted that these allegations were based on speculation and conjecture rather than personal knowledge. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 1, Ingram Dep., at 152-53, 158-60.)
Even if Ingram could establish a prima facie case, BGE has advanced a number of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Ingram's termination, many of which are documented in the record. (Defs.' Mem. at Ex. D, Lynne Dep., at 49-50, 52-56, 67-98, 160-66, 404-11, Ex. 2, 10;id. at Ex. H, Powers Dep., at 75-80, 84-88; Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 14, 15, 17, 22, 33, 36-40, 42.) Again, Ingram has failed to introduce any evidence beyond his own conclusory statements and allegations to suggest that the cited reasons are pretext for racial discrimination.
III.
Ingram also alleges that he was retaliated against for raising issues of racial discrimination with BGE management. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 12, Pl.'s Resp. to Interrogs., at 6-7, 9.) As stated, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that "(1) [he] engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the asserted adverse employment action." Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863. Ingram has established the first two elements of his prima facie case. There is ample evidence in the record that Ingram engaged in protected activity during his employment with BGE, by informally raising allegations of racial discrimination with his supervisors and members of BGE's HR department. See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an employee engaged in protected activity by complaining to her superiors that she had not been promoted because of racial discrimination). In his memorandum, Ingram cites three adverse employment actions within the statutory period that he claims were the result of retaliation by BGE: (1) the May 11, 2001 CAR for Ingram's threatening remarks to Mark Powers, (2) the decision around June or July 2001 to label Ingram as a low performer and place him on a PIP, and (3) Ingram's ultimate termination from BGE on September 17, 2001. Ingram's termination constitutes an adverse employment action, and the first two events arguably meet this test, because they formed part of the basis for his termination. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at 652 (suggesting that an incident may be actionable as an adverse employment action when the employer subsequently relies on the incident as a basis for detrimentally altering the employee's terms or conditions of employment).
Examples include Ingram's meetings with various supervisors to complain about racially discriminatory treatment in the Gas Measurement Section, and the allegations of racial discrimination in his August 2001 letter to management. On the other hand, not all of Ingram's complaints to management were protected activity. For example, Ingram's reporting to management on Alberta Curbean's intoxication at work is not protected activity, because Ingram was not opposing a practice that is made unlawful under Title VII or Section 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (making it unlawful to retaliate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII]"); see also Adams v. Giant Food. Inc., 225 F. Supp.2d 600, 605-06 (D. Md. 2002) (stating that to establish a prima facie case for retaliation a plaintiff must, at a minimum, have held a reasonable good faith belief that the practice he opposed violated Title VII).
In their memorandum, the defendants assume that the May 11, 2001 CAR and the decision to label Ingram as a lower performer and place him on a PIP constituted adverse employment actions. (Defs.'Mem. at 25-26.)
Ingram relies exclusively on temporal proximity to establish a causal connection between these adverse employment actions and his protected activity, the third element of his prima facie case of retaliation. With regard to the May 11 CAR and the decision in June or July to label Ingram as a low performer and place him on a PIP, Ingram notes the following protected activity: (1) in March 2000, he affixed comments to his performance evaluation complaining about racial discrimination (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at Ex. 22); (2) at some time in 2000, he told Lynne that he was concerned about being the only African-American in the IC Technician group (id. at Ex. 44, Ingram Aff, at ¶ 22); (3) in 2000, he made comments to Cavey on two separate occasions raising charges of racial discrimination (id. at ¶ 20-21); and (4) on multiple occasions after he became an IC Technician (in May 2000), Ingram complained to Lynne that Robert Undutch's refusals to train him or work with him were racially motivated (id. at ¶ 24). The lapse of more than one year between Ingram's March 2000 written comments and the alleged retaliatory acts does not permit an inference that they were causally connected. See Parkinson v. Anne Arundel Med. Ctr., 214 F. Supp.2d 511, 518 (D. Md. 2002) (stating that a lapse of more than one year between protected activity and an adverse action does not support an inference of causation); Church v. Maryland, 180 F. Supp.2d 708, 745-46 (D. Md. 2002) (same for lapse of 14 months). Without more specific evidence regarding the timing of Ingram's complaints to Lynne and Cavey, it is impossible to infer causation on the basis of temporal proximity alone. For example, if any of these complaints occurred in the first half of 2000, the lapse of time would be too long to establish causation. See id. On the other hand, any complaints that Ingram made in the second half of 2001 would be irrelevant, having occurred after the alleged retaliatory acts. Because Ingram has not set forth any additional facts regarding the timing of his complaints to Lynne and Cavey, and has not produced any other evidence to show that the alleged retaliatory acts in May and June or July 2001 were related to any protected activity, Ingram has failed to establish the third element of a prima facie claim of retaliation.
Ingram can establish a prima facie case of retaliation for his termination from BGE. Ingram engaged in protected activity on several occasions in the month prior to his termination, including his August 1, 2001 letter to management containing claims of racial discrimination, and various complaints made in the August 29 and September 6 meetings leading up to his termination. In this situation, the short time gap between these protected activities and Ingram's termination is sufficient to establish causation in a prima facie case for retaliation. See Kline v. Certainteed Corp., 205 F. Supp.2d 468, 474-75 (D. Md. 2002) (finding that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation, where she filed two EEOC complaints and was terminated within a three-month period).
However, BGE has advanced a number of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision to terminate Ingram, described above and documented in the record. Although Ingram disputes the merits of BGE's complaints regarding his performance with his own conclusory allegations, this alone is not sufficient to establish pretext. See Hawkins, 203 F.3d at 279-80. Again, Ingram has failed to introduce any additional evidence to suggest that the cited reasons are pretext for racial discrimination.
IV.
Ultimately, Ingram's claim of unlawful termination hinges on his own conclusory statements that he was performing his job satisfactorily, and thus he must have been terminated because of his race and in retaliation for his protected activities. Because Ingram has offered no additional evidence sufficient to support these claims, he has not satisfied his obligation to"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 525. The defendants' motion for summary judgment, thus, will be granted.
A separate Order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby Ordered that:1. defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 21) is GRANTED;
2. copies of this Order and the accompanying Memorandum shall be sent to counsel of record; and
3. the clerk of the court shall CLOSE this case.