Opinion
No. 109,584.
2013-11-8
Linda INGRAHAM and Marcia Pike, Appellees, v. Sherrie A. FISCHER, Individually and as Custodian for Christian D. Fischer and Caleb D. Fischer Under the Kansas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, Appellant.
Appeal from Ford District Court; E. Leigh Hood, Judge. John T. Bird and Carol M. Park, of Glassman, Bird, Schwartz & Park, L.L.P., of Hays, for appellant. Michael A, Doll, of Doll Law Firm, LLC, of Dodge City, for appellees.
Appeal from Ford District Court; E. Leigh Hood, Judge.
John T. Bird and Carol M. Park, of Glassman, Bird, Schwartz & Park, L.L.P., of Hays, for appellant. Michael A, Doll, of Doll Law Firm, LLC, of Dodge City, for appellees.
Before BRUNS, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
There is a legal maxim that states if you sit on your rights, you can lose them, often with unfortunate results. Sadly, this is true in the present case. In a wonderful act of generosity, Monty D. Hull executed a deed conveying 50 percent of his mineral interests in certain real property to the sons of family friends for the purpose of providing for their education. Two years later he died, and Hull's real property was distributed among his beneficiaries, including his cousins Laura Ingraham and Marcia Pike. Among the real property distributed was the land associated with the previously conveyed mineral interests. Regrettably, not until nearly 5 years after Hull's death, in 2012, did Sherrie Fischer, the mother of the boys, record the deed. Ingraham and Pike moved to quiet title based on a statute that voids any conveyance of mineral interests that is neither recorded within 90 days nor listed for taxation. At summary judgment, the district court agreed with Ingraham and Pike and quieted title in their favor. Fischer appeals this ruling. As there is no evidence in the record that the mineral interests were ever listed for taxation, we agree with the district court's ruling that Fischer was required to record the deed within 90 days of its execution and, therefore, must affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
Fischer is the mother of twin children, Christian and Caleb Fischer. On or about December 5, 2005, Hull executed a deed, transferring 50 percent of his mineral interests in certain real property in Ford County, Kansas, to Fischer as Christian and Caleb's custodian under the Kansas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, K.S.A. 38–1701 et seq. Hull intended the mineral interests to serve as a gift to support the boys' educations.
Hull died in 2007, and his will was admitted to probate. On June 29, 2007, the Ford County District Court ordered partial distribution of Hull's estate. In determining the real property interests of Hull's beneficiaries, the district court assigned the real property embraced by the 2005 mineral deed to two of Hull's first cousins, Ingraham and Pike.
On July 11, 2012, Fischer recorded the 2005 deed with the Ford County Register of Deeds. Ingraham and Pike filed a petition to quiet title on November 7, 2012. They claimed that because Fischer had failed to record the mineral deed within 90 days of its execution pursuant to K.S.A. 79–420, the conveyance was void. Fischer answered, and Ingraham and Pike moved for summary judgment. The district court agreed with Ingraham's and Pike's assessment of the situation, ruling that the conveyance from Hull was void and quieting title in their favor.
Fischer timely appeals.
Did the District Court Err in Finding K.S.A. 79–420 Applies and, Therefore, Hull's Conveyance to the Fischer Children Was Void?
In appealing the district court's determination, Fischer essentially argues that the district court should have determined the case under K.S.A. 58–2223, which applies to unrecorded deeds in general, instead of relying on K.S.A. 79–420. Ingraham and Pike refute this argument and contend that, as the more specific statute, K.S.A. 79–420 applies and renders the conveyance void.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows both that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 296 Kan. 943, 962, 298 P.3d 250 (2013). A motion for summary judgment must be denied if reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion drawn from the evidence. 296 Kan. at 962. Where there is no factual dispute, appellate review of an order regarding summary judgment is de novo. David v.. Hett, 293 Kan. 679, 682, 270 P.3d 1102 (2011).
The statute applied by the district court in this case, K.S.A. 79–420, provides in relevant part: “When such [mineral] reserves or leases are not recorded within 90 days after execution, they shall become void if not listed for taxation.” This statute appears in the taxation chapter of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Jeanes v. Bank of America, 296 Kan. 870, 873, 295 P.3d 1045 (2013).
Our Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted K.S.A. 79–420 several times since its initial passage in 1911. In Shaffer v. Kansas Farmers Union Royalty Co., 146 Kan. 84, 96, 69 P.2d 4 (1937), the court interpreted the function and structure of the statute, stating:
“Obviously the statute had a public purpose in view, namely, the proper listing of property for taxation. Aside from the fact that the legislature used the word ‘void,’—presumably knowing its meaning, it is uniformly held that when a word is used in the statute having a public policy in view, which requires the strict interpretation of the word, it will be construed in its strict sense [citation omitted] as meaning a nullity.”
The court further parsed the public policy of this statute in Hushaw v. Kansas Farmers Union Royalty Co., 149 Kan. 64, 74, 86 P.2d 559 (1939), and determined that the statute existed to insure that property embracing the valuable “vast reservoirs of oil and gas” in Kansas were registered on the tax roll. The court reasoned that the statute “compel[led] disclosure of the true ownership of such minerals as they [were] from time to time transferred” by rendering the conveyance void if not recorded within 90 days or listed for taxation. 149 Kan. at 74. The court continued, stating the statute was “not the forfeiture of a vested title, but a condition precedent to the vesting of title in the transferee.” 149 Kan. at 74.
In its most recent case concerning this aspect of K.S.A. 79–420, our Supreme Court in Becker v. Rolle, 211 Kan. 769, 773, 508 P.2d 509 (1973), reiterated these principles. There, like in the instant case, the dispute centered on an unrecorded and unlisted one-half mineral interest. After reviewing prior cases construing the statute, the court reiterated that “[f]ailure to comply with the statute renders the instrument void ... because a condition precedent to the vesting of title in the transferee ha[s] not been met.” 211 Kan. at 774.
Fischer argues, however, that K.S.A. 79–420 should not apply to this case because it is a taxation statute. Instead, Fischer insists the district court should have used K.S.A. 58–2223 in determining the effect of the unrecorded deed from Hull. K.S.A. 58–2223, which appears in the chapter of the Kansas Statutes Annotated concerning personal and real property, provides in its entirety: “No such instrument in writing shall be valid, except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be deposited with the register of deeds for record.”
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that when two statutes are in conflict, a more specific statute will control over a general one. In re Tax Exemption Application of Mental Health Ass'n of the Heartland, 289 Kan. 1209, 1215, 221 P.3d 580 (2009). In fact, our Supreme Court has often repeated this principle, stating:
“ ‘[S]tatutes complete in themselves, relating to a specific thing, take precedence over general statutes or over other statutes which deal only incidentally with the same question, or which might be construed to relate to it. Where there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject, and another dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific legislation controls in a proper case.’ [Citations omitted.]” 289 Kan. at 1215.
Both K.S.A. 58–2223 and K.S.A. 79–420 address, at least in part, unrecorded deeds. However, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that the portion of K.S.A. 79–420 that addresses unrecorded conveyances is focused solely on those deeds dealing with mineral interests—the “such reserves or leases” referenced in the statute's final sentence. In contrast, K.S.A. 58–2223 concerns any kind of instrument in that chapter, including those that convey real estate, interests created by oil and gas leases, interests created by wind farm leases and easements, and any other conveyance affecting real estate. See K.S.A. 58–2221. Although mineral interests clearly fit into that general description, our Supreme Court precedent demands the more specific statute, K.S.A. 79–420, control.
Additionally, our Supreme Court has repeatedly applied K.S.A. 79–420 to cases involving mineral interests regardless of whether the interests' taxation was at issue. See, e.g., Becker, 211 Kan. at 769 (quiet title action). The court has also created narrow exceptions to K.S.A. 79–420 in certain situations, such as finding that the 90 days did not begin to run until the conditions set by the parties were met and the deed released from escrow. See Ochs v. Blankenship, 192 Kan. 423, 430, 388 P.2d 626 (1964).
It is clear from these decisions that K.S.A. 79–420 applies to all unrecorded mineral interests and that our Supreme Court knows how to carve out exceptions to its application when such an exception is warranted. We are obligated to follow our Supreme Court precedent unless there is some reason to believe that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. See State v. Singleton, 33 Kan.App.2d 478, 488, 104 P.3d 424 (2005). There is no indication that our Supreme Court is departing from its stance that K.S.A. 79–420 applies to all actions involving unrecorded mineral interests. As such, the district court did not err in applying K.S.A. 79–420 in the instant case.
Fischer also argues that, although it is uncontroverted that the deed was not recorded within 90 days, Ingraham and Pike failed to show that the property was not listed for taxation; without that showing, the district court could not determine that the conveyance was void. Fischer bases this argument on past Kansas cases considering whether an otherwise unrecorded mineral interest was sufficiently listed for taxation under K.S.A. 79–420. See, e.g., Ford v. Willits, 9 Kan.App.2d 735, 746–47, 688 P.2d 1230 (1984), aff'd237 Kan. 13, 697 P.2d 834 (1985). Fischer essentially contends that because listing a property for taxation can validate a conveyance under the statute, Ingraham and Pike were required to prove that Fischer had not done so.
However, the law of summary judgment clearly states that the party opposing summary judgment cannot rely solely on allegations in its pleadings but must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–256(e)(2). Although Fischer alleged additional facts in her response to the motion for summary judgment, she provided no indication that the property was listed for taxation. In fact, Fischer did not even raise the taxation issue at the district court level. Fischer failed to meet her burden by not demonstrating that a genuine issue remained. Therefore, the district court properly quieted title in favor of Ingraham and Pike.
Affirmed.