This latter objection is based on § 1 of the Bill of Rights. If the qualified right or privilege of public speaking which the ordinance recognizes is one which all citizens have an equal right to exercise, and if the true construction and effect of the ordinance be such as to confer on the chief of police a personal and arbitrary power to determine who may and who may not exercise it, then the ordinance is void, and its prohibition cannot be lawfully enforced by fine. State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 33 A. 519; State v. Porter, 94 Conn. 639, 110 A. 59; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 111 A. 209. We take these two questions in order.
It is fundamental that" `[t]he power conferred [upon administrative agencies] to make regulations for carrying a statute into effect must be exercised within the powers delegated . . . and it cannot be extended to amending or adding to the requirements of the statute itself.'" Loglisci v. Liquor Control Commission, 123 Conn. 31, 37, 192 A. 260 (1937); Page v. Welfare Commissioner, 170 Conn. 258, 262, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976); Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 329, 111 A. 209 (1920). In Fusco-Amatruda Co. v. Tax Commissioner, 168 Conn. 597, 604, 362 A.2d 847 (1975), we held that" `[n]o administrative or regulatory body can modify, abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statute specifically grants it that power.' State ex rel. Huntington v. McNulty, 151 Conn. 447, 449, 199 A.2d 5.
"There is attached to every ordinance, charter or resolution adopted by or affecting a municipality the implied condition that these must yield to the predominant power of the state when that power has been exercised. See 6 McQuillin [Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.)] 21.32. This is in keeping with our law that a municipality, as a creature of the state `can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted it or such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation.' New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 152 Conn. 563, 566, 210 A.2d 449 (1965); see Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 314, 206 A.2d 428 (1965); Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 292, 206 A.2d 433 (1964); Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 328-29, 111 A. 209 (1920)." Bencivenga v. Milford, 183 Conn. 168, 173, 438 A.2d 1174 (1981).
See 6 McQuillin, op. cit., 21.32. This is in keeping with our law that a municipality, as a creature of the state "can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted it or such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation." New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 152 Conn. 563, 566, 210 A.2d 449 (1965); see Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 314, 206 A.2d 428 (1965); Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 292, 206 A.2d 433 (1964); Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 328-29, 111 A. 209 (1920). Brief reference to certain provisions of the State Building Code and the Milford Housing Code serves to indicate that the trial court should have decided the preemption claim.
Lacava v. Carfi, 140 Conn. 517, 519, 101 A.2d 795 "As a creature of the state, a municipality can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted to it or such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation." New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 152 Conn. 563, 566, 210 A.2d 449; Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 314, 206 A.2d 428; Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 292, 206 A.2d 433; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 328, 111 A. 209; Crofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 300, 32 A. 365. "(General Statutes] Sec. 7-134. LOCKUP.
As a creature of the state, a municipality can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted it or such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation. Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 314, 206 A.2d 428; Bredice v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 292, 206 A.2d 433; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 328, 111 A. 209; Crofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 300, 32 A. 365. Each defendant bases its claim of authority to enact the ordinance in controversy on the Home Rule Act (General Statutes, c. 99), which authorizes a municipality to "provide for the health of . . . [its] inhabitants . . . and to do all things necessary or desirable to secure and promote the public health." General Statutes 7-194, subdivision (44).
This power does not reside in the local board. Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 329, 111 A. 209; Loglisci v. Liquor Control Commission, 123 Conn. 31, 37, 192 A. 260; Abshire v. School District No. 1, 124 Mont. 244, 247, 220 P.2d 1058; State v. Board of Education, 139 Ohio St. 427, 441, 40 N.E.2d 913. In the O'Connor case, the question upon which our advice is sought is improperly phrased.
Reasonable regulation of the size and area of buildings and of the type of material used in them and the method of construction has long been recognized as legally proper. Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403; State ex rel. Rowell v. Boyle, 115 Conn. 406, 411, 162 A. 26; Young v. West Hartford, 111 Conn. 27, 31, 149 A. 205; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 329, 111 A. 209. In fact, Zoning, which has now become widespread, rests upon the reasonable exercise of this police power in the public interest.
In order to render admissible such delegation of legislative power, However, it is necessary that the statute declare a legislative policy, establish primary standards for carrying it out, or lay down an intelligible principle to which the administrative officer or body must conform, with a proper regard for the protection of the public interests and with such degree of certainty as the nature of the case permits, and enjoin a procedure under which, by appeal or otherwise, both public interests and private rights shall have due consideration." See also State v. Darazzo, 97 Conn. 728, 734, 118 A. 81; Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 330, 111 A. 209. We consider the two acts separately in the light of this well-recognized rule.
" The overwhelming weight of authority supports this rule. See, in addition to the citations in the Stoddard case, Ingham v. Brooks, 95 Conn. 317, 329, 111 A. 209; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Bizzell v. Goldsboro, 192 N.C. 348, 358, 135 S.E. 50; Juneau v. Badger Co-operative Oil Co., 227 Wis. 620, 629, 279 N.W. 666; Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241, 246, 89 N.E. 245; Samuels v. Couzens, 222 Mich. 604, 607, 193 N.W. 212; State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 301, 193 P. 845; 11 Am. Jur. 947; note, 92 A.L.R. 400. The act in question sets up no sufficient guide for the exercise of the discretion reposed in the mayor and we are constrained to hold that it is for this reason unconstitutional.