Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1454.
November 3, 2004
ORDER
Presently before this Court is Defendants' Homewood Corporation and Homewood Sales Corporation (collectively, "Defendants"), unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.19). Plaintiffs Chad Ingalls and Scott Ferral (collectively, "Plaintiffs") have brought this products liability action against Defendants and others on negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty theories. Plaintiffs claim to have been injured by a DB-75 circuit breaker while performing maintenance on the product on or about November 26, 2000. Defendants contend that they have never sold, distributed, fabricated and/or manufactured the DB-75 circuit breaker.
Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion on May 19, 2004. The filing was accompanied by a Certificate of Service, which indicated that the motion papers were served by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, upon Plaintiff's Counsel Jay Fulmer, Esq. Plaintiffs have not opposed Defendants' submissions as of this date.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs unopposed summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
Moreover, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the movant's initial Celotex burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). That is, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Further, mere conclusory allegations or denials taken from the pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment. Schoch v. First Fidelity, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the entire record must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the evidence. Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988).
In this case, because Plaintiffs have failed to file a response, we need only examine the pleadings, including the complaint and the evidence attached to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for consideration of the instant motion. Kuhn v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 814 F.Supp. 450, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd 16 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 1993).
Defendants argue that: (1) they are not successors in interest to the switchgear division of Westinghouse Corporation; (2) they have no connection to the product at issue, thus have no duty to the plaintiffs under a negligence theory; (3) they cannot be held strictly liable because there is no connection to the product; and (4) they never warranted the product because there is no connection to it.
To support its contentions, Defendants have provided the purchase agreement between Westinghouse Corporation and the Defendants. Defendants maintain that the purchased assets did not include a DB-75 circuit breaker. (See Exhibit G, attached to the instant motion). In further support, Defendants have provided a Stipulation of Release agreement between itself and other defendants (Eaton Corp., BNFL Nuclear Services, Viacom, Inc., and Westinghouse) in this matter. The stipulation agreement, provides:
"Defendants, Homewood Products Corporation and Homewood Sales Corporation did not manufacture, design, repair, sell, distribute, promote, and fabricate the DB-75 circuit breaker, the product alleged to case Plaintiffs' injuries. Therefore, it is hereby stipulated between counsel and their respective parties that [Defendants] are hereby dismissed from the above captioned matter." (See Exhibit I).
Moreover co-defendant Eaton Corporation, in its Answer, admitted to ownership, maintenance, control, and all liability from the DCBU unit of Westinghouse Corporation that manufactured and sold the DB-75 circuit breaker at issue. (See Exhibit J).
Plaintiffs have failed to establish essential elements of their products liability claims against the Defendants. Plaintiffs lack of evidence, due to nonresponse, entitles Defendants to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
AND NOW this 3rd day of November, 2004, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that the Motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims and cross-claims against the Defendants Homewood Products Corporation and Homewood Sales Corporation are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.