In light of the ALJ's findings that decedent Marion Trainer had furnished part of Gwendolyn Brown's financial support, and in other respects "treated her as a daughter", the Board held that Gwendolyn Brown was a child in relation to whom Marion Trainer stood in a relation of in loco parentis for at least one year prior to his death. In defining the term "in loco parentis" the Board looked to Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Shea, 410 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1969), and Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.Miss. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). The Board properly read this Court's opinion in Texas Employers' to mean that the LHWCA's definition of "child", "in accord with the policy of the Act as a whole, must be liberally construed in favor of coverage 'and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.'"

PER CURIAM: This appeal is taken from an order of the district court, 322 F. Supp. 1229, denying a petition to enjoin an award by the United States Employees' Compensation Commission under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. The deputy commissioner, after an evidentiary hearing, found, inter alia, that the children of the decedent Patrick Wright were acknowledged illegitimate children dependent upon the deceased within the meaning of 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(14) and therefore entitled to receive death benefits.

Where such a vacuum of authority exists, reference must be made to state law. See Murphy v. Houma Well Servie, 409 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir. 1969); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Marshall, 102 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1939); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1971). As a maxim of federal statutory construction mandatory reference to state law in categorizing the status of a person traces its development to Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, 240 U.S. 489, 36 S.Ct. 458, 60 L.Ed. 762 (1916).

The circuit court is the intermediate appellate court in an appeal of the Commission's fact-finding. Bynum's Dependents, 247 Miss. at 664, 157 So.2d at 399; see also Sonford Prods. Corp. v. Freels, 495 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1986) (to avoid unnecessary expense and delay, Supreme Court may grant an appeal from Commission interlocutory order); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.Miss. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1971) (issues presented to circuit court for disposition must have been raised before Commission or they will be deemed waived); Sawyer v. Head, 510 So.2d 472 (Miss. 1987).

The main objective sought to be accomplished by use of these various interpretations is to uphold legislation that mandates a child be supported by the biological father. B V O, 50 N.J. 93; 232 A.2d 401 (1967), Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp v Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229, 1241 (SD Miss, 1970), King v King, 544 S.W.2d 795 (Tex Civ App, 1976). Although the Michigan act adds an additional element, that of "unmarried", to the definition of an illegitimate child, "unmarried" and "out of wedlock" are not so substantially different that a construction of unmarried to include not lawfully married to the father of the child unduly strains the statutory language.