The district court, essentially agreeing with the jury, found that Plastek was in a position of "trust and dependence" relative to Sequoia and that Sequoia had acted "unfairly in failing to disclose the fact that Moog was an unreliable customer." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D.Mass. 1994). The district court entered judgment in favor of IGC for $80,100.
"As a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D.Mass. 1994) (citing Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 112, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982)), rev'd on other grounds, 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995); see also DiMarzo v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 106, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim, and attorneys' fees may be assessed for all "phases" of litigation.
But "[a]s a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequioa Pac. Systems, 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994),rev'd and remanded on other grounds by 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995). "'In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim and attorney's fees may be assessed for all phases' of litigation."
Prior case law recognizes that "[a]s a rule, when a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 112, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982)), rev'd on other grounds, 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995); see also DiMarzo v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 106, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). "In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim and attorneys' fees may be assessed for all phases" of litigation.
See Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 374 (1981); Paone v. Gerrig, 362 Mass. 757, 760-761 (1973). Cf. Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 (D. Mass. 1994) (reducing award of fees in case which "presented no novel legal issues or complex facts" and was "disturbingly overlawyered"); Rex Lumber Co. v. Action Block Co., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 521 (1990) (reducing award of fees under G.L. c. 93A because trial was on "straightforward contract case with a single issue dividing the parties"). It is essential, however, for a judge to evaluate the pertinent factors in the context of examining the attorney's description of the services actually provided, the hours spent, and the hourly rate charged.
Robbins v. Robbins, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 582 (1983). See Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 n. 12 (D.Mass. 1994). There have been cases in which an award of fees required reference to factors that would not have been illuminated by observing the trial.
It is well settled, however, that "where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 177 (1999), quoting from Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D.Mass. 1994). See Arthur D. Little Intl., Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 995 F. Supp. 217, 224 (D.Mass. 1998), and cases cited.
We recognize that, "[f]or services to be compensable under Chapter 93A, there must be a relationship 'between the depth of the services provided and what is at stake.'" Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994), quoting from Morse v. Mutual Fed. Sav. Loan Assn., 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1283 (D. Mass. 1982). However, "[a]s a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary. . . . [Nonetheless], effort expended on an unsuccessful common law claim brought in concert with a successful Chapter 93A claim should not be compensated" Id.
Since the defendant has breached its duty to the plaintiff of fair dealing and since the plaintiff and defendant do not stand in privity with one another, the plaintiff's claim against Liberty sounds more in tort than in contract. See, Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. (1994, DC Mass.) 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 n. 14, revd on other grounds, remanded 44 F.3d 40. Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply the 12% interest rate for tort claims, as provided in G.L. 231, 6B.