Industrial Gen. v. Sequoia Pacific Sys.

9 Citing cases

  1. Industrial General Corp. v. Sequoia Pacific Systems Corp.

    44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995)   Cited 55 times
    Finding no fiduciary duty between product developer and parts' supplier, despite developer's "overall ‘management’ role" in supplier's transaction with contract manufacturer, where developer did not direct the terms of the transaction, but merely "directed [supplier] to deal directly with [manufacturer]"

    The district court, essentially agreeing with the jury, found that Plastek was in a position of "trust and dependence" relative to Sequoia and that Sequoia had acted "unfairly in failing to disclose the fact that Moog was an unreliable customer." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D.Mass. 1994). The district court entered judgment in favor of IGC for $80,100.

  2. Arthur D. Little Intern., Inc. v. Dooyang Corp.

    995 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1998)   Cited 19 times
    In Arthur D. Little Int'l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 995 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1998), the defendant challenged the attorneys' fees requested under M.G.L.A. 93A in part on the grounds that § 11 provided for fees only for work on the CPA claim and not for work on other claims or on the defendant's counterclaims.

    "As a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D.Mass. 1994) (citing Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 112, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982)), rev'd on other grounds, 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995); see also DiMarzo v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 106, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim, and attorneys' fees may be assessed for all "phases" of litigation.

  3. Sorenson v. HR Block, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 99-10268-DPW (D. Mass. Sep. 1, 2005)

    But "[a]s a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequioa Pac. Systems, 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994),rev'd and remanded on other grounds by 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995). "'In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim and attorney's fees may be assessed for all phases' of litigation."

  4. Polycarbon Industries, Inc. v. Advantage Engineering

    260 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Mass. 2003)   Cited 4 times
    Awarding $160,349.85 in fees and costs on a 93A claim in which plaintiffs received double damages of $520,000

    Prior case law recognizes that "[a]s a rule, when a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 112, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982)), rev'd on other grounds, 44 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1995); see also DiMarzo v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 106, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). "In fact, 93A claims are typically based on an underlying common law claim and attorneys' fees may be assessed for all phases" of litigation.

  5. In re Estate of King

    455 Mass. 796 (Mass. 2010)   Cited 27 times
    Explaining that G. L. c. 215, § 45, separately authorizes "costs" and "expenses," latter of which includes attorney's fees under historical Probate Court practice

    See Chase v. Pevear, 383 Mass. 350, 374 (1981); Paone v. Gerrig, 362 Mass. 757, 760-761 (1973). Cf. Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 (D. Mass. 1994) (reducing award of fees in case which "presented no novel legal issues or complex facts" and was "disturbingly overlawyered"); Rex Lumber Co. v. Action Block Co., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 521 (1990) (reducing award of fees under G.L. c. 93A because trial was on "straightforward contract case with a single issue dividing the parties"). It is essential, however, for a judge to evaluate the pertinent factors in the context of examining the attorney's description of the services actually provided, the hours spent, and the hourly rate charged.

  6. Borne v. Haverhill Golf

    58 Mass. App. Ct. 306 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 39 times
    Concluding $424,000 emotional distress award not excessive

    Robbins v. Robbins, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 582 (1983). See Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 n. 12 (D.Mass. 1994). There have been cases in which an award of fees required reference to factors that would not have been illuminated by observing the trial.

  7. Clamp-All v. Foresta

    53 Mass. App. Ct. 795 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 68 times
    Awarding $165,033.95 in fees and costs on 93A claim in which plaintiff received damages of $723,906

    It is well settled, however, that "where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary." Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 177 (1999), quoting from Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D.Mass. 1994). See Arthur D. Little Intl., Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 995 F. Supp. 217, 224 (D.Mass. 1998), and cases cited.

  8. Hanover Insurance Company v. Sutton

    46 Mass. App. Ct. 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 111 times
    Holding that when a "single chain of events" or "common core of facts" links a non-Chapter 93 A claim with a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary

    We recognize that, "[f]or services to be compensable under Chapter 93A, there must be a relationship 'between the depth of the services provided and what is at stake.'" Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. Corp., 849 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Mass. 1994), quoting from Morse v. Mutual Fed. Sav. Loan Assn., 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1283 (D. Mass. 1982). However, "[a]s a rule, where a single chain of events gives rise to both a common law and a Chapter 93A claim, apportionment of legal effort between the two claims is not necessary. . . . [Nonetheless], effort expended on an unsuccessful common law claim brought in concert with a successful Chapter 93A claim should not be compensated" Id.

  9. Hopkins v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No

    No. 950053 (Mass. Cmmw. Aug. 5, 1998)

    Since the defendant has breached its duty to the plaintiff of fair dealing and since the plaintiff and defendant do not stand in privity with one another, the plaintiff's claim against Liberty sounds more in tort than in contract. See, Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac. Sys. (1994, DC Mass.) 849 F. Supp. 820, 827 n. 14, revd on other grounds, remanded 44 F.3d 40. Accordingly, it is appropriate to apply the 12% interest rate for tort claims, as provided in G.L. 231, 6B.