Industrial Com. v. McKenna

4 Citing cases

  1. Coors Co. v. Grenfell

    121 P.2d 669 (Colo. 1942)   Cited 6 times

    Subsequently the district court for the City and County of Denver vacated the award of the Industrial Commission and remanded the case to the commission with directions to make an award in favor of the claimant, from which award and judgment the matter comes to this court on writ of error. No written opinion of the district court appears in the record showing the basis of its action, but the insurer and employer's brief charges that in the arguments of counsel before the district court, two cases — Industrial Commission v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (decided in 1937), and Industrial Commission v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (decided in 1940) — were mentioned by the District Judge as the controlling cases and as justification for his judgment. Claimant's brief does not deny this statement.

  2. T T Ranch v. Bourn

    173 Colo. 267 (Colo. 1970)   Cited 8 times
    In T T Loveland Chinchilla Ranch v. Bourn, 173 Colo. 267, 477 P.2d 457, the Supreme Court held that the findings of the commission were not applicable in light of an amended statute, and it reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration.

    heart attack to be compensable it must have been the result of overexertion during the course of the employment. Jasinski v. Ginley-Soper Const. Co., 170 Colo. 52, 458 P.2d 754 (1969); Industrial Comm. v. Bysom, 166 Colo. 502, 444 P.2d 627 (1968); Denver v. Phillips, 166 Colo. 312, 443 P.2d 379; Blood v. Industrial Comm., 165 Colo. 532, 440 P.2d 775 (1968); Evans v. Denver, 165 Colo. 311, 438 P.2d 698 (1968); Baca County School Dist. v. Brown, 156 Colo. 562, 400 P.2d 663 (1965); Industrial Comm. v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962); Huff v. Aetna Insurance Co., 146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart, 136 Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494 (1957); Industrial Comm. v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957); Industrial Comm. v. InternationalMinerals and Chem. Corp., 132 Colo. 256, 287 P.2d 275 (1955); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Comm., 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d 296 (1951); Black Forest Fox Ranch, Inc. v. Garrett, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943); Industrial Comm. v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458 (1940); Industrial Comm. v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937); U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d 895 (1935); and Ellerman v. Industrial Comm., 73 Colo. 20, 213 P. 120 (1923). The 1963 enactment provided as follows:

  3. Black Forest Fox Ranch, Inc. v. Garrett

    134 P.2d 332 (Colo. 1943)   Cited 8 times

    Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 89 Colo. 440, 3 P.2d 799. Certain comments in the opinion in Peterson v. Stitzer, 100 Colo. 521, 527, 68 P.2d 561, cited by claimants, with reference to the relative weight which should have been accorded the testimony of certain experts answering hypothetically in contradiction of witnesses with personal knowledge of the matter in dispute in that case, cannot be given the effect of announcing a rule eliminating the medical testimony in the case at bar adverse to claimants' theory because the expert witnesses so testifying had not examined deceased in his lifetime. The circumstance that the evidence in the case at bar was in conflict with respect to the vital question, of whether the death of the employee was causally related to his exertions during employment, makes the cases of Industrial Commission v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812, and Industrial Commission v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458, inapplicable here, since it clearly appears from the opinions therein, as well as the one in Coors Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, supra, that in such cases it was uncontroverted that overexertion arising out of and in the course of the respective decedents' employment brought on the fatal heart attacks. The judgment of the district court is reversed.

  4. Skjoldahl v. Industrial Com

    113 P.2d 871 (Colo. 1941)   Cited 6 times

    The evidence of the medical experts of the employer was in part based upon this testimony as well as the lay testimony with respect to just what had happened when claimant suffered the alleged injury. Counsel for claimant admit that the diagnoses made by their medical witnesses of claimant's condition presents "a rare case." That expert medical testimony given in a hearing before the Industrial Commission constitutes substantial, credible evidence is indicated in the opinions in the following cases: Elleman v. Industrial Commission, 100 Colo. 120, 66 P.2d 323; Schwab v. Industrial Commission, 103 Colo. 244, 85 P.2d 723; Montgomery Ward Co. v. Industrial Commission, 105 Colo. 22, 94 P.2d 689; Industrial Commission v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104 P.2d 458. The very able argument presented by counsel for claimant on the complex medical problems involved is enlightening, but our duty is limited to the ascertainment of whether the findings of the commission are based upon competent evidence.