This statute provides an exemption from unemployment taxation, and in applying the predecessor to § 8-70-131(1)(a), our supreme court held that a student employed at the school at which he was enrolled was not eligible for unemployment benefits, Hyde v. Industrial Commission, 195 Colo. 67, 576 P.2d 541 (1978), but a student employed elsewhere was entitled to benefits. Industrial Commission v. Redmond, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623 (1973). In construing an unambiguous statute to determine the intent of the General Assembly, it is improper to go beyond the accepted meaning of the words. City County of Denver v. Howard, 622 P.2d 568 (Colo. 1981).
These principles are applicable to claimant as a part-time employee. Cf. Industrial Commission v. Redmond, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623 (1973). We conclude that under the analysis set forth in Denver Post, Inc. v. Department of Labor Employment, supra, claimant was "partially unemployed."
While full-time school attendance may, under some circumstances, result in a denial of unemployment compensation benefits, see Industrial Commission v. Bennett, 166 Colo. 101, 441 P.2d 648 (1968), that status standing alone does not automatically make one ineligible for unemployment benefits. Industrial Commission v. Redmond, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623 (1973); Couchman v. Industrial Commission, 33 Colo. App. 116, 515 P.2d 636 (1973). Regulation 4231.31 should be amended to conform to the requirements of the cases cited above.
(See Sanchez v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1977), 20 Cal.3d 55, 569 P.2d 740, 141 Cal.Rptr. 146.) Nor did it determine that a labor market for the services which plaintiff was willing to provide was unavailable. (See Myers v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1975), 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 281, 330 A.2d 886; Industrial Com. v. Redmond (1973), 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623.) Even though a claimant's physical condition may prevent her from continuing at her present employment, a labor market may exist for the type of work which she is able to do and for which she is available. John S. Barnes Corp. v. Board of Review (1965), 55 Ill. App.2d 102, 204 N.E.2d 20.
Couchman v. Industrial Commission, 33 Colo. App. 116, 515 P.2d 636. The initial burden is on the claimant to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for benefits. Von Poppenheim v. Morgan, 9 Ore. App. 495, 497 P.2d 866; Loew's Inc. v. California Employment Stablization Comm., 76 Cal. App. 2d 231, 172 P.2d 938. [2] The essential question in each case is whether the claimant's availability for suitable work is so restricted — in relation to the condition of the surrounding labor market — that he cannot be deemed to have met the eligibility requirements of ability to, and availability for, work. Industrial Commission v. Redmond, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623. See Bayly Manufacturing Co. v. Department of Employment, 155 Colo. 433, 395 P.2d 216. Here the type and hours of work sought by the claimant were so limited that she was not "able and available" for all suitable work within the meaning of the statute.
Therefore, benefits were properly computed. See Industrial Commission v. Redmond, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623. Similarly, since there was evidence in the record that there was a labor market, albeit limited, for the employees' skills, we cannot disturb the Commission's findings on that point.
The Colorado court remanded the Couchman case to the board for a full consideration of the facts. See also Redmond v. Indust. Comm., 32 Colo. App. 134, 509 P.2d 1277, modified ___ Colo ___, 514 P.2d 623 (1973). In Callaghan we noted that Wiley Unempl. Compensation Case, 195 Pa. Super. 256, 171 A.2d 810 (1961), was one in which benefits were allowed although the claimant was attending college.
Therefore, claimant's status as a student does not in itself make him unavailable for employment within the meaning of the statute. See Redmond v. Industrial Commission, 32 Colo. App. 134, 509 P.2d 1277, modified, 183 Colo. 14, 514 P.2d 623; Wiley v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 195 Pa. Super. 256, 171 A.2d 810. [2] The fact that claimant has restricted his employment to particular hours of the day or to a specific shift must be considered within the context of the particular labor market in which he is seeking employment before a valid conclusion can be reached as to whether he has made himself unavailable for employment.