Opinion
Case No. 16-32385 HCD Adv. Proc. No. 17-3016
05-22-2018
In the Matter of: ARNETTA LYNN BROWN Debtor STATE OF INDIANA ex rel. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Plaintiff v. ARNETTA LYNN BROWN Defendant
Chapter 7
DECISION and ORDER
At South Bend, Indiana, May 22, 2018.
Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the plaintiff State of Indiana ex rel. Indiana Department of Workforce Development (IDWD), filed a Motion to Reconsider and for Relief From Memorandum of Decision and Order issued by this court on September 18, 2017 (September 18 decision). That decision denied the IDWD's motion for default judgment against defendant Arnetta Lynn Brown (Brown) and dismissed this adversary proceeding. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies the IDWD motion.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 makes Civil Rule 60 applicable in bankruptcy cases.
Procedural and Factual Background
The court has previously determined that it has proper jurisdiction in this adversary proceeding. See September 18 decision. The IDWD has not challenged that determination. In the September 18 decision the court reviewed and discussed the facts that serve as the basis for this adversary proceeding. Since those underlying facts remain unchanged, the court will not reiterate the entirety of those findings in this decision and order.
The September 18 decision denied an IDWD default judgment motion because the court found the IDWD could not present a prima facie case that it was entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment excepting Brown's debt to it from discharge. The IDWD based its complaint to except its debt from discharge on two sections of the Bankruptcy Code, § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(7). Included in the IDWD's own submissions was Brown's sworn statement that IDWD employees told her she did not have to report earnings on her unemployment benefit application. Because IDWD employees instructed Brown that she did not need to report this information, this court found that the IDWD could not establish that Brown intended to deceive the IDWD when she did not report employment information on her benefit applications. The record presented to the court by the IDWD completely undermines its assertion that Brown had an intent to deceive it, an indispensable element under § 523(a)(2)(A), when she did not include such information on her benefit applications. There is no issue concerning this essential material fact. Since the IDWD cannot prove Brown's subjective intention deceive the IDWD at the time she applied for benefits, this court determined that further litigation would be pointless. The court denied the IDWD default judgment motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
Issues Presented
In the motion for relief now before the court the IDWD raises two issues. First, whether this court must give collateral estoppel effect to IDWD administrative determinations about benefit overpayments. Second, whether penalties assessed under state law, I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b), come within the bankruptcy discharge exception in § 523(a)(7). The court will address these issues separately.
Standard of Review
The IDWD asks this court for relief from an order dismissing this adversary proceeding. "Rule 60(b) does not authorize a motion merely for reconsideration of a legal issue ... Where the motion is nothing more than a request that the [bankruptcy] court change its mind ... it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)." United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1982). This Rule addresses "mistakes attributable to special circumstances and not merely erroneous applications of law." Russell v. Delco Remy Division of General Motors Corp. 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). Rule 60(b) motions are addressed to this court's sound discretion. See, e.g., United Central Bank v. KMWC 845, LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). An argument that the court committed legal error does not fit the narrow purpose of Rule 60(b). In re Ring, 266 Fed.Appx. 492, 493 (7th Cir. 2008). Because legal errors are not specified in Rule 60, such an argument is forbidden. Marques v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 286 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of "extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005); Blue v. IBEW Local Union 159, 676 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2012) (Extraordinary relief is granted only in exceptional circumstances).
Discussion
The IDWD motion posits two rationales for relief from the court's September 18 decision. First, the IDWD argues that collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, prevents this court from disturbing the IDWD's administrative decision that Brown failed to disclose or falsified facts that would have disqualified Brown from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Second, the IDWD argues that the civil penalties imposed by Indiana law are excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(7). The court will address each argument in turn. Analytical Framework
In an adversary proceeding to except a debt from a bankruptcy discharge, the court is guided by several fundamental principles. The party seeking to establish an exception to discharge has the burden of proof. Goldberg Securities, Inc. v. Scarlata, 979 F.2d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1992). The creditor must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991). A creditor's failure to establish any one fact necessary for an exception to discharge is outcome determinative. In re Cooper, 2011 WL 722537, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2011) ("To prevail on a § 523(a)(2)(A) complaint, all three elements must be established."). To foster the fundamental purpose of providing a fresh financial start to debtors, exceptions to discharge must be strictly construed against a creditor and liberally in favor of a debtor. Muhammad v. Sneed, 543 B.R. 848, 858 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). See also In re Paul, 266 B.R. 686, 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001); In re Fenner, 558 B.R. 877, 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016).
In reviewing state law relevant to this adversary proceeding, this court follows the interpretation announced by Indiana courts when applying the state's unemployment law. Indiana courts liberally construe the law "to effectuate its humane purposes and resolve any doubts in the application of terms in favor of the employee." Young v. Hood's Gardens, Inc., 24 N.E. 3d 421, 425 (Ind. 2015); Poynter v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment and Training Services, 546 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ind. App. 1989) (The statute "should be liberally construed in favor of the employee.").
This state court interpretative approach mirrors the way in which federal courts approach bankruptcy discharge exceptions. That is, exceptions to discharge are to be construed strictly against a creditor and liberally in favor of a debtor. In re Trentadue, 837 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2016).
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)
Here the IDWD first argues that collateral estoppel precludes this court from disturbing the IDWD's administrative decision that Brown knowingly failed to disclose material facts that would have disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits. The equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of underlying facts in bankruptcy court provided that the same issues involved had previously been actually litigated. Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, applies if the following factors are all present: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in a prior action, (2) the issue was actually litigated, (3) determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment, and (4) the party to be estopped was fully represented in the prior action. Levinson v. United States, 969 F.2d 260, 264 (7th Cir. 1992). Under Indiana law, the same elements are necessary for collateral estoppel apply. Jones v. Indiana Finance Co., 180 B.R. 531, 533 n. 3 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (citing cases).
The court notes the related principle, res judicata or claim preclusion, prevents claims "that were or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding." See Levinson, 969 F.2d at 264. Res judicata is not applicable here as dischargeability was never previously litigated.
Contrary to the assertions of the IDWD, this adversary proceeding is not about relitigating whether Brown owes a debt to the IDWD. The issue here is dischargeability in bankruptcy, an issue that was not part of the IDWD administrative determination that Brown owed a debt to the IDWD. While resolution of the question of dischargeability requires a reference to Indiana law, as discussed below, the ultimate answer concerning dischargeability rests in federal law. Based on the factual determination of indebtedness made in the Indiana administrative proceedings, this court does not question whether Brown has a debt to the IDWD. However, the issue of nondischargeability of that debt is a matter of federal law governed by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code. The state court administrative proceedings did not address dischargeability. Issue preclusion does not bar this court from addressing the question of dischargeability.
See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, clause 4, which expressly grants to Congress authority to enact bankruptcy laws; Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U.S. 343, 344 (1933) ("The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction, and that court's possession and control of the estate cannot be affected by proceedings in other courts, state or federal."). See also Grogan, 498 U.S. at 284.
Section 523(a)(2)(A) discharge exception
This adversary proceeding concerns whether the court should except Brown's debt to the IDWD from her bankruptcy discharge under § 523(a). To except Brown's debt from discharge, the IDWD must satisfy the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Excepting a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) requires that the IDWD establish the following: (1) Brown made a false statement or omission of fact concerning her employment status; (2) Brown (a) knew the statement or omission was false or she made it with reckless disregard for its truth and (b) she made the statement or omission with an intent to deceive; and (3) the IDWD justifiably relied on Brown's statement or omission. Ojeda v. Goldberg, 599 F.3d 712, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2010). To prevail the IDWD must establish all elements under § 523(a)(2)(A). The failure of the IDWD to establish any one component required for a discharge exception is outcome determinative. In re Wolf, 519 B.R. 228, 246 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing cases).
Under the facts of this adversary proceeding, the relevant inquiry for dischargeability purposes is whether Brown intended to deceive the IDWD at the time she submitted benefit applications. Although the Indiana Code § 22-4-13-1(c) addresses the knowing failure to disclose, or the falsification of a material fact as the basis for a determination of ineligibility for benefits, the Indiana statute does not require an intent to deceive as playing any part in a decision regarding eligibility for unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Indiana Department of Workforce Development v. Senders, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5711, *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2011) ("The Indiana statutes, which provide a means of recouping overpayments obtained by false statement or by the failure to disclose a material fact, see Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1(c), do not require a showing of the defendant's intent to deceive or the creditor's reliance and injury, and the IDWD did not make such a proof."); Indiana Department of Workforce Development v. Davis, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5579, *11-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 22, 2013) ("The plaintiff did not direct the court to any provision or case imposing a showing of fraudulent intent under the state unemployment benefits statutes, and the court has found none. The court concludes that the element of intent to deceive is not essential to a recovery under Indiana Code § 22-4-13-1(c) but is required under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code."); Indiana Department of Workforce Development v. Selleck, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5574, *10 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2013) ("The statute requires a finding of a knowingly false representation or omission of a material fact, but it lacks any language requiring examination of the claimant's intent to deceive. The court concludes that the element of intent to deceive is not essential to a recovery under Indiana Code § 22-4-13-1(c) but is required under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.").
As relevant here, I.C. § 22-4-13-1(c) reads as follows.
Any individual who knowingly: (1) makes, or causes to be made by another, a false statement or representation of a material fact knowing it to be false; or (2) fails, or causes another to fail, to disclose a material fact; and as a result thereof has received any amount as benefits to which the individual is not entitled under this article, shall be liable to repay such amount ... to the department for the unemployment insurance benefit fund ...
"Determining whether a debtor had the requisite intent under § 523(a)(2)(A) is a factual, subjective inquiry decided by examining all of the relevant circumstances, including those that took place when the debt occurred." In re Hanson, 470 B.R. 808, 821 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2012). The factual record in this adversary proceeding does not support a finding that intent to deceive was ever considered, let alone determined, in the Indiana administrative proceedings. Those administrative proceedings all predate Brown's bankruptcy petition. This court is limited by the plain wording of the Indiana statute and cannot read into the statute a missing term. Intent to deceive, an essential component to an exception to discharge under § 523(a), does not have to be established under I.C. § 22-4-13-1(c) or § 22-4-13-1.1. The IDWD has not convinced the court that it must equate "knowing" as used in the Indiana Code with the intent element under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. This court cannot infer that Brown had an intent to deceive the IDWD when she failed to provide information that IDWD employees instructed that she did not have to include.
Because intent to deceive when she submitted benefit applications was not a material issue in Brown's administrative adjudication, the IDWD's misplaces its assertion of collateral estoppel as a bar to this court making an independent decision concerning dischargeability. The concept of collateral estoppel is not applicable and does not preclude this court from making a decision about the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a). The issue here, dischargeability, is not the same as the issue involved in the Indiana administrative determination — benefit overpayments. The issue of bankruptcy dischargeability was not actually litigated in the Indiana administrative proceedings, and a determination in the state administrative proceedings concerning bankruptcy dischargeability was not essential to the final administrative determination concerning unemployment benefits. The IDWD has not demonstrated that collateral estoppel prevents this court from assessing the dischargeability of Brown's indebtedness.
While in some circumstances a court might infer an intent to deceive from the act of omitting to report employment and earnings, the facts here do not justify such an inference. Brown did not report information about employment and earnings because IDWD employees told her that she did not have to report it. By acting on IDWD instructions, the court can only infer that Brown had no intent to deceive at the time she submitted benefit applications. She was simply following directions given to her. Under the facts in this adversary proceeding, the IDWD cannot meet its burden under § 523(a)(2)(A) to establish Brown's scienter at the time she submitted benefit applications, a necessary element for a discharge exception. This inability to prove intent to deceive was the basis for this court's September 18 decision. See, e.g., Matter of Sheridan, 57 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 1995) (Inferences as to intent are discretionary with the trial court). The IDWD has not presented any exceptional circumstances in its motion to reconsider to support relief from the court's September 18 decision. Dismissal of the IDWD § 523(a)(2)(A) claim was proper.
Section 523(a)(7) discharge exception
The IDWD asks the court to except from discharge the civil penalties assessed by Indiana Code § 22-4-13-1.1(b). Under this section, an individual is subject to civil penalties "for each instance in which the individual knowingly fails to disclose or falsifies any fact that if accurately reported to the [IDWD] would disqualify the individual for benefits." For the first instance the penalty is 25% of the benefit overpayment. For the second instance, the penalty is 50% of the benefit overpayment. For the third and each successive instance of a benefit overpayment, 100% of the overpayment.
The record here does not show the state has filed any criminal action against Brown for the recovery of improperly paid unemployment benefits. Indiana Code title 22 pertains to labor and safety. Within this topic article 4 addresses the state's unemployment compensation system, and section 13 addresses improper payments. Indiana criminal law is found in title 35 of the Indiana Code.
By using "and" in § 523(a)(7), Congress requires the penalty be not only "payable to" but also "for the benefit of" a governmental unit for a discharge exception. The court understands that Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); see also In re Habert, 576 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
A full reading of the Indiana statute convinces the court that the civil penalties under I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b) do not meet both the "payable to" and "benefit of" elements required to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(7). Reading I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b) in light of § 523(a)(7), the court is convinced under the facts of this adversary proceeding that statutory civil penalties the IDWD seeks to impose on Brown do not satisfy the elements required for a discharge exception.
Congress has already confronted the types of fines, penalties and forfeitures that are to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(7) and, in doing so, has determined that only those that are "payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit" qualify. In this regard, the language of the statute is unambiguous. A debt is nondischargeable only if both criteria are met.In re Strutz, 154 B.R. 508, 510 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993) (emphasis in the original).
In its brief the IDWD argues that it is entitled to judgment against Brown "in the amount of the overpayment and penalties as a matter of law." It posits that, because the statutory civil penalties under I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b) are payable to a governmental unit and are not compensation for pecuniary loss, § 523(a)(7) provides an independent basis to except the debt from discharge. The IDWD references a prior decision of this court excepting civil penalties from discharge under § 523(a)(7) where its claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) failed.
The IDWD's construction of I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b), as well as this court's reading of this same section in an earlier case, look at § 22-4-13-1-1.1(b) in isolation. Both readings fail to recognize the fundamental principle of statutory construction calling for a court to interpret a statute in a way that will give effect to all of its different parts. A single sentence ought not be read in isolation. See, e.g., Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); NuPulse, Inc. v. Schlueter Co., 853 F.2d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); USS, a Division of USX Corp. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 527 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. App. 1988) ("In construing words in a single section of a statute, we must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act in order to ensure the spirit and purpose of the act is carried out."). Neither the IDWD's argument nor the court's earlier reading encompassed a consideration of the terms of I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(d).
Section 22-4-13-1.1(d) reads as follows.
(d) Interest and civil penalties collected under this chapter [for improper benefit payments] shall be deposited as follows:
(1) Fifteen percent (15%) of the amount collected shall be deposited in the unemployment insurance benefit fund established under I.C. 22-4-26-1.
(2) The remainder of the amount collected shall be deposited in the special employment and training services fund established under I.C. 22-4-25-1.
By statute, civil penalties the IDWD wants this court to except from discharge are deposited into funds that Indiana has established for the payment of benefits to unemployed individuals. Section 22-4-13-1.1(d) references two funds. The unemployment insurance benefit fund, I.C. § 22-4-26-1, is used "only for the payment of unemployment compensation benefits." Section 22-4-13-1.1(d) also cites the special employment and training services fund, I.C. § 22-4-25-1. This special employment and training fund is part of Indiana's unemployment compensation system, and like the unemployment insurance benefit fund, the state uses the fund for benefit payments. No Indiana governmental unit retains a financial benefit for itself from either fund. Indiana is only an intermediary whose role is to hold the funds pending disbursement to the ultimate intended beneficiaries, unemployed individuals.
In a recent case involving the securities safe harbor, the Supreme Court instructs that the court should look to the ultimate beneficiaries and ignore intermediary (conduit) parties when analyzing a financial transaction. See Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883, 893 (2018). The court finds this analytical focus instructive in analyzing the question presented by the IDWD.
Functionally, the civil penalty imposed by I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b) serves to reimburse and replenish these funds. The court agrees with the dischargeability analysis of such funds by Chief Judge Kelley in In re Hansen, 576 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2017). In Hansen, the state imposed a penalty on the debtor for failure to maintain workers' compensation coverage for employees. While that penalty was payable to the state, the monies could be used only for payments to injured employees. This parallels the situation here where Brown's penalty goes to unemployment trust funds. "[C]ourts should not interpret 'benefit' in § 523(a)(7) to include 'generalized positive public effect.' " Id. at 852. Although the Indiana civil penalty is "payable to" the state, the statute is clear that the ultimate beneficiary of the monies held in the funds are the individuals receiving unemployment benefits. The court views as telling the ultimate beneficiary rather than any intermediary handling funds. As such, the civil penalty does not meet the § 523(a)(7) discharge exception requirement as a debt "for the benefit of" a governmental unit.
The monies in these funds are not for use and benefit of the state of Indiana. While a small portion of the monies in the unemployment trust funds may be used to offset administrative costs, the funds clearly exist for the benefit of persons seeking unemployment benefits. Indiana cannot divert these monies for other purposes. See, e.g., Matter of Towers, 162 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 1998) (Holding that a civil restitution order won by the state on behalf of fraud victims and payable to those victims was dischargeable.)
The bankruptcy code generally, and § 523(a)(7) in particular, do not define "penalty." For an understanding of this term the court will look to state law. In Indiana, where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should apply its words and phrases in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. In interpreting a statutory provision, the court must be "mindful of both what it does say and what it does not say. Our goal is to effectuate the statute's reasonable, commonly understood meaning." Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. 2018). The commonly understood meaning of penalty is that it serves as a punishment for some misconduct. The record shows that although Brown did not report all her earnings, that omission was not knowing because she had been informed by the IDWD she did not have to include this information. Based the record here Brown could not have knowingly failed to disclose information because she was instructed she did not have to. This record does not support a finding of misconduct where Brown did what she was told.
In the case of monies collected as civil penalties and directed to the payment of unemployment benefits, the court cannot find a benefit to the state of Indiana falling within the § 523(a)(7) discharge exception. The IDWD's position leads to a conclusion that any amount "owed to" a governmental unit for any of a wide variety of civil fines or penalties must automatically "benefit" the governmental unit and cannot be discharged under § 523(a)(7), regardless of the beneficiary. The mechanical and unthinking application of § 523(a)(7) the IDWD urges this court to adopt ignores the teachings of Young and Poynter to construe state law in favor of the employee. Such an expansive reading would effectively prevent any civil debt to a governmental unit might have some correctional aspect from ever being discharged.
The penalties the IDWD wants to except from discharge in this adversary proceeding are civil debts. Debts assessed as part of a criminal prosecution resulting in a conviction are a different matter. --------
The IDWD interpretation also distorts the meaning and rehabilitative purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. The court is unwilling to adopt such a broad and indiscriminate application of § 523(a)(7) discharge exceptions. The IDWD has not shown the court that a penalty may be imposed for a knowing failure to disclose where the facts show Brown was advised she did not have to report. Imposing a sanction on Brown for failing to do something she was told was unnecessary is completely inappropriate.
In its September 18 decision this court determined that the IDWD claim of nondischargeability for penalties depends upon the nondischargeability of the underlying debt, and because that claim failed under § 523(a)(2)(A) the court determined that the claim for penalties under § 523(a)(7) must also fail. The September 18 decision is in accord with this court's prior cases involving the IDWD and the question of dischargeability of penalties assessed due to benefit overpayments. See, e.g., Senders, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5711, at *7 (After finding an amended motion for default judgment did not support a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A), the court stated "since the claim of nondischargeability of the state law penalties depends upon the nondischargeability of the underlying debt, the court finds that the claim under § 523(a)(7) also fails."); Indiana Department of Workforce Development v. Quaglio, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5581, *16 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2013) (Holding that without proof that the debt itself under § 523(a)(2)(A) is nondischargeable as a matter of law, "no fine or penalty upon that debt can be held nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7)."); Indiana Department of Workforce Development v. Garwick, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5575, *13 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2013) (Same)). The court finds the IDWD has not met its burden under Rule 60(b).
Conclusion
The IDWD has not shown the existence of exceptional circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6) to justify relief from this court's September 18 decision. The facts of this case show the IDWD cannot meet its burden of proof to present a prima facie case under § 523(a)(2)(A). Dismissal of that claim was proper. With respect to its § 523(a)(7) claim, the IDWD has not shown, under the facts of this adversary proceeding, that the civil penalties imposed under I.C. § 22-4-13-1.1(b) are the kind of debt properly excepted from Brown's discharge. The IDWD's disagreement with the court's September 18 decision is not an exceptional circumstance.
For the reasons discussed above, the court DENIES the Indiana Department of Workforce Development's Motion to Reconsider and Relief From Memorandum of Decision and Order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ HARRY C. DEES, JR.
HARRY C. DEES, JR., JUDGE
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
This section looks to the accuracy of the information provided in an application for benefits. Intent to deceive is not explicitly required by Indiana.