Summary
finding that “[t]he ADA applies to all activities of the City of Wichita, including its policies and practices relating to enforcement of handicap parking ordinances” and focusing specifically on whether Wichita had enforced those ordinances in a discriminatory way
Summary of this case from Van Velzor v. City of BurlesonOpinion
No. 00-1190-WEB.
March 15, 2002
Memorandum and Order
Plaintiff filed this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") challenging the City of Wichita's policies and practices with respect to enforcement of the City's handicapped parking ordinances. The matter is now before the court on the City of Wichita's motion to dismiss.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff Independent Living Resource Center, Inc. ("ILRC"), is a Kansas non-profit corporation. It was established as a center for independent living as defined by the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 796f-4. Among other things, ILRC promotes the equal access of individuals with disabilities to public facilities. The defendant City of Wichita is a public entity within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
Plaintiff claims that the City of Wichita is discriminating against individuals with disabilities by "utiliz[ing] criteria and methods of administration that have the effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the defendant's program with respect to individuals with disabilities contrary to 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(ii), to-wit: the program and ordinances of the defendant to enforce the parking ordinances relating to handicapped parking spaces. . . ." Doc. 1, ¶ 11. In particular, plaintiff contends the following policies of the City operate to discriminate against individuals with disabilities: a) the City's written criteria for the "Snap-It" program, which permit Snap-It volunteers to refer for prosecution evidence of violations of some city handicapped parking ordinances but not others; b) by failing to maintain an adequate database on repeat offenders of such ordinances, by failing to check the database for repeat offenders, and by purging such records on a regular basis; c) by permitting individuals to sign affidavits declaring that they have a valid license or placard permitting them to park in handicap spaces, but refusing to make signing a false affidavit a violation of City ordinance and by failing to present perjury cases to the District Attorney for prosecution; and d) by refusing to permit volunteers to present charges for prosecution where the charge is based on Section 11.52.020(26) relating to altered and unlawful use of handicap placards. Id. The complaint alleges that "qualified individuals with disabilities, including individuals who are members of or served by the association known as the ILRC, continue to and will in the future suffer damage by virtue of the discrimination of the defendant. . . ." Doc. 1, ¶ 10. Plaintiff seeks an injunction prohibiting the defendant from continuing to violate the ADA and "requiring the defendant to adopt a policy of enforcement of the laws regarding handicapped parking spaces which is consistent with the objective of restricting the use of handicapped parking spaces to those legally entitled thereto." Id., ¶ 13.
The Snap-It program was adopted pursuant to Municipal Code Section 11.52.025. That section is entitled "Enforcement of Section 11.52.020(25)," and provides in part that the director of human services is authorized to establish a program to utilize volunteers to survey parking lots in the city for the purpose of photographing motor vehicles parked in violation of section 11.52.020(25), and that the program shall include a system of providing violator information to the Wichita police department which will then issue parking citations based upon such information. It also states that the provisions of the section shall be in addition to all other enforcement provisions of the code.
Section 11.52.020(25) referred to above generally prohibits parking in a designated handicapped parking space without the appropriate items and parking in such a manner as to block access to a designated handicapped parking space, access ramp or access area. See Doc. 4, Attachment.
II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The City argues the complaint should be dismissed for two reasons. First, it contends ILRC lacks standing because it has not alleged that ILRC itself suffered any injury from the City's actions. Similarly, it argues plaintiff lacks standing because the ILRC is not a disabled person, and the ADA only confers a private cause of action upon disabled persons. Additionally, the City argues that ILRC does not have standing to sue in a representative capacity because plaintiff has not alleged that it has members or that its members have suffered harm as a result of defendant's actions.
Secondly, the City argues the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City maintains that plaintiff has failed to allege, insofar as the City's program of enforcement of handicapped parking ordinances is concerned, that any disabled person has been discriminated against on account of disability. Moreover, the City argues that the relief requested by plaintiff — including injunctive relief directing the City to enforce its ordinances in a specific manner — is precluded by the doctrine of separation of powers because plaintiff is effectively asking the court to write its own legislation. The City believes plaintiff is asking the court to substitute its judgment concerning appropriate prosecutorial discretion for the discretion traditionally afforded to the executive branch of government.
III. Standards Governing a Motion to Dismiss.
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969)).
The trial court has some discretion in such a situation to require the plaintiff to clarify its complaint by amendment or to require submission of evidence in the form of affidavits. See e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501.
Similarly, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In considering a motion to dismiss, "[a]ll well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true" and all reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the plaintiff. Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). The question is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether it is entitled to offer evidence in support of its claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
IV. Discussion.
A. Standing.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the exercise of the federal judicial power to cases and controversies. The doctrine of standing serves to identify cases and controversies that are appropriate for exercise of the judicial power. To satisfy Article III standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Id.
Given the liberal standard of review governing a motion to dismiss, the court must reject defendant's argument that ILRC lacks standing to pursue the claim. Contrary to the City's assertion, the complaint contains allegations relating both to ILRC's associational standing and to the harm allegedly suffered by its members. The complaint alleges that qualified individuals with disabilities "who are members of . . . the association known as the ILRC, continue to and will in the future suffer damage by virtue of the discrimination by the defendant. . . ." Doc. 1, ¶ 10. Although defendant correctly points out that these allegations are short on specifics, and the precise nature of the alleged injury is not spelled out, the court concludes that dismissal of the complaint is not warranted. "At the pleading stage, general allegations of injuries resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we `presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The facts alleged by ILRC, if true, suggest that ILRC's members have suffered harm due to the alleged discrimination, that they would have standing to sue in their own right, that the interests at stake are germane to ILRC's purposes, and that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Accordingly, the City has not shown it is entitled to dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.
By contrast, in response to a summary judgment motion the plaintiff can no longer rest on such "mere allegations," but must set forth specific facts in support of the allegations. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
B. Failure to State a Claim.
For the reasons that follow, the court likewise concludes that if all the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are accepted as true, plaintiff has stated a claim for relief against the City.
Plaintiff's claim is based upon Title II of the ADA, which deals with discrimination against individuals with disabilities as it pertains to public services. The Act applies to public entities including state and local governments, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and provides in part that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act, to which the courts refer in construing the ADA, defines "program or activity" to include all of the operations of a department, agency, or other instrumentality of a state or local government. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b). Thus, the ADA applies to all activities of the City of Wichita, including its policies and practices relating to enforcement of handicap parking ordinances.
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
Regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice to implement and interpret Title II include a prohibition on discrimination stating in part that "a public entity may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration . . . (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the public entity's program with respect to individuals with disabilities. . . ." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(ii). Plaintiff's complaint tracks this regulatory definition, alleging that the City has discriminated by utilizing criteria and methods of administration that have the effect of substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the city's program to enforce the parking ordinances relating to handicapped parking spaces. Doc. 1, ¶ 11. Accepting these allegations as true, as the court must on a motion to dismiss, the allegations are sufficient to state a claim against the City for discrimination under the ADA.
In its reply brief, the City argues "there is no identified program and no criteria or method of administration which precludes handicapped individuals from fully participating in the program." Doc. 7 at 5. Plaintiff's complaint, liberally construed, does not allege that qualified individuals with a disability are denied participation in the City's program of enforcement; rather, it alleges that they are denied the benefits of the program.
The court also rejects the City's argument that plaintiff's claim is precluded because the relief sought would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Among other relief, the complaint requests an injunction "prohibiting the defendant from continuing to violate the ADA. . . ." Doc. 1, ¶ 13. Even assuming some of the relief sought by plaintiff is beyond the power of the court to grant, an injunction prohibiting the City from continuing to violate the ADA would clearly be an appropriate remedy if a violation were shown. Accordingly, the City is not entitled to dismissal of the complaint on that basis.
As the above discussion shows, at the pleading stage the court must accept as true all of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, including the allegation that the City's policies and administration relating to enforcement of the handicap parking ordinances have "substantially impair[ed] accomplishment of the objectives of the defendant's program" with respect to individuals with disabilities. Whether or not plaintiff can produce evidence to support this allegation is another matter. The court points this out because plaintiff's response suggests it intends to prove this allegation by showing that if the City were to apply less restrictive criteria to the Snap-It volunteers, this would lead to greater enforcement of the ordinances, or by showing that the City's current method of enforcement permits violators who sign a false affidavit to escape punishment. Even if true, however, such facts would not show a substantial impairment of accomplishment of the City's program of enforcement. Plaintiff might be able to prove "substantial impairment" by showing that the City's handicap parking ordinances go essentially unenforced, or that the City enforces other ordinances but regularly ignores enforcement of handicap parking ordinances, thereby denying individuals with disabilities the benefits of enforcement that other individuals receive. But the record, such as it is, suggests that exactly the opposite has occurred. The pleadings indicate the City has supplemented its own enforcement of handicap parking ordinances by authorizing volunteers to assist under the Snap-It program. One apparent objective of the City's program is to benefit individuals with disabilities by augmenting the City's enforcement and thereby enhancing compliance with the handicap parking laws. The City's program has other legitimate objectives as well, however, such as ensuring that volunteers act appropriately in documenting violations, ensuring that any citations issued are meritorious and supported by adequate evidence, and ensuring that the rights of persons accused of violating the ordinances are protected. Limitations on the volunteers' actions or the types of evidence prosecutors will accept do not substantially impair the City's program for enforcement merely because other policies might result in greater enforcement. "Defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment" of the City's program means just what it says. It will require proof that the City's enforcement of handicap parking ordinances has been substantially, if not completely, thwarted by the City's policies. The court has some question whether plaintiff can produce such evidence, given the obvious fact that the City has augmented its own enforcement by authorizing volunteers to refer certain cases for prosecution. But as the court noted above, the question on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether it can prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Under that standard, the City's motion to dismiss will be denied.
V. Conclusion.
The City of Wichita's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.