Indeck-Yerkes Energy Services, Inc. v. Public Service Commission

10 Citing cases

  1. Florida Power Corp. v. Garcia

    780 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 2001)   Cited 13 times
    Determining whether former administrative hearing before Public Service Commission on an earlier petition to determine jurisdiction "had a preclusive effect as applied to its later determination of jurisdiction to entertain a substantially similar petition for declaratory statement"

    [e.s.] Crossroads, p. 5 See Orange Rockland Utilities, No. 96-E-0728, 1996 WL 707459 (stating, specifically, that, "[a]s was recently reaffirmed, it is within our authority to interpret our power purchase contract approvals, and that jurisdiction has been upheld by the courts") (citing Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of State of N.Y., 164 A.D.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)). While Panda involved a standard offer contract, FPC interprets the Florida Supreme Court's opinion to provide that the Commission has jurisdiction to clarify its orders and to construe its rules in order to ensure that contracts and payments thereunder do not exceed avoided cost.

  2. Wheelabrator Lisbon v. Department of Public Utility

    283 Conn. 672 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 23 times
    Upholding the DPUC's jurisdiction to interpret the Agreement

    First, we are unable to accept the plaintiffs characterization of the issue before us as one of pure contractual intent. See Indeck-Yerkes Energy Services, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 164 App. Div. 2d 618, 621, 564 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1991) (meaning of contract between cogeneration facility and utility "is not [issue] of pure interpretation of the language of the agreement"). As we have indicated, the department's approval of the 1991 agreement was premised on the department's determination that the plaintiff was a resource recovery facility, as defined by General Statutes § 22a-207 (9), that sought pricing under the avoided cost rate provisions of § 16-243a.

  3. Luyster Creek, LLC v. New York State Public Service Commission

    82 A.D.3d 1401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    Where such a rational basis exists, we "will not substitute [our] judgment for that of the [PSC] regarding the issue of public interest, the determination of which has been committed to the expertise of the [PSC]" ( Matter of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 34 AD2d at 72). Here, we find both a rational basis and adequate record support for the PSC's conclusion that the development of the property as an envelope manufacturing facility was an "essential factor" in its 2002 determination that the transfer was in the public interest ( see Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 164 AD2d 618, 622-623).

  4. Philadelphia v. Niagara Power

    207 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 10 times

    For the 17 contracts with stated estimates, defendant is obligated to purchase and plaintiffs are obligated to sell electricity in such quantities which are not unreasonably disproportionate to the stated estimates within the contracts (see, Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 77, at 197; see also, UCC 2-306). While the estimates are not absolute maximum quantities beyond which the contracts do not apply, as defendant contends, neither may plaintiffs modify their outputs beyond the normal range commercially consistent with the capacity estimates used in the contracts, as they contend (see, Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v. Public Serv. Commn., 164 A.D.2d 618). Plaintiffs may not under the contracts increase their electrical output beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties as quantified by the stated estimates(see, Orange Rockland Utils. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 59 A.D.2d 110, 116).

  5. Fulton Cogeneration v. Niagara Mohawk Power

    84 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996)   Cited 77 times
    Holding that summary judgment is appropriate where the "language of the contract is unambiguous, and reasonable persons could not differ as to its meaning"

    Representations in purchase agreements as to the size and type of a facility are a key underlying source of information regarding the amount of non-utility generation available. Indeck-Yerkes Energy Services, Inc., NYPSC Case No. 88-E-114, Declaratory Ruling at 3 (Sept. 14, 1988) (emphasis added), aff'd, 164 A.D.2d 618, 564 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dept. 1991). If the capacity estimate were not material, Fulton would be allowed to deliver electricity without regard to timing. For example, Fulton could deliver all 392,000 megawatts of energy during one part of the year (by using a higher capacity level) and deliver none during the remainder.

  6. Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

    908 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)   Cited 9 times

    Such "front-loaded" contracts are not unusual in this setting, and are often used precisely because they allow the QF to finance the construction and operation of the facility in the early years of the contract. See, e.g., Indeck-Yerkes Energy v. PSC, 164 A.D.2d 618, 620, 564 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1991); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. PSC, 138 A.D.2d 63, 67, 530 N.Y.S.2d 626 (3d Dep't 1988). Such contracts have been upheld by the courts and by FERC notwithstanding the recognized risk that the prices set by the contract may at times exceed the utility's actual avoided costs.

  7. Philadelphia Corp. v. Niagara Mohawk P. Corp.

    282 A.D.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    Turning to the remaining argument, defendant maintains that by installing one large turbine with a 1.656 mW capacity rather than three smaller turbines with a 1.2 mW capacity as set forth in the contract, plaintiff has operated in bad faith and is not entitled to the full contract rate on its excess production. It is true that the issue of a plant's nameplate capacity is a material issue subject to standards of commercial reasonableness. We also agree that the postcontract change in capacity at plaintiff's plant gives good cause to closely examine this issue (see, Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v. Public Serv. Commn. of State of N.Y., 164 A.D.2d 618; see also, Fulton Cogeneration Assocs.v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 84 F.3d 91, 99). However, this contention was thoroughly examined at trial and even defendant's own expert proof confirmed that nameplate capacity is only one factor in determining output, especially in a run of the river plant, and, furthermore, an increase in nameplate capacity results only in the potential of increased output over time.

  8. Matter of United Water v. Public Ser. Comm

    252 A.D.2d 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    was merely a ministerial provision of the settlement agreement and that lack of compliance did not justify the "penalty" imposed by respondent. We reject petitioner's contention that common-law contract principles are dispositive with respect to judicial review of respondent's interpretation of the time restrictions contained in the settlement agreement ( see, Matter of Kessel v. Public Serv. Commn., 193 A.D.2d 339; cf., Matter of Owners Comm. on Elec. Rates v. Public Serv. Commn., 194 A.D.2d 77). The relevant inquiry is whether respondent had a rational basis to support its denial of petitioner's request for deferred revenue reconciliation as a means to recover the $200,000 in lost revenue due to the late rate filing and its designation of June 21, 1996 as the effective date for the year two rate increase ( see, Matter of Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 87 N.Y.2d 17; Matter of Abrams v. Public Serv. Commn., 67 N.Y.2d 205; Matter of Kessel v. Public Serv. Commn., supra; Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v. Public Serv. Commn., 164 A.D.2d 618). Furthermore, respondent's determination is entitled to deference and may not be vacated unless petitioner demonstrates that the determination lacked a rational basis ( see, Matter of Abrams v. Public Serv. Commn., supra). It is undisputed that the multiyear settlement agreement provided that "each of the annual company filings envisioned under this Agreement shall be made no later than February 1, and that new rates shall go into effect on May 1". Respondent had a rational basis for its determination since the time allotted in the agreement (i.e., Feb. 1, 1996 to May 1, 1996) was necessary to review and implement the requested revenue adjustment by the proposed effective date, and to ensure an adequate opportunity for other parties to oppose or question the rate increase.

  9. Kessel v. Public Service Commission

    193 A.D.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 8 times

    Reduced to its essentials, petitioners' arguments relative to the interpretation issue are that the PSC's restriction of Clause Two to only the 1989 tax and pension savings is contrary to the parties' contemporaneously expressed intent, and that its interpretation of Clause Seven as according it discretion to award certain revenues as earnings is violative not only of the parties' intent, but also of the entire premise of regulation by incentive that moratorium plans were designed to achieve. Initially, it is to be noted that resolution of this issue does not involve interpretation of the extension agreement through application of common-law contract principles as certain of petitioners argue, but only whether a rational basis exists to support the PSC's interpretation (see, Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v Public Serv. Commn., 164 A.D.2d 618, 621-622; Matter of New York State Cable Tel. Assn. v New York State Pub. Serv. Commn., 125 A.D.2d 3, 6). In our view, the requisite rational basis exists here.

  10. Xiox Corp. v. Public Service Commission

    190 A.D.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 4 times

    Plainly, this language imposes no obligation upon the PSC to acquiesce in or to compel the execution of a contract whose rates are not "just and economically reasonable" to the consumer or are otherwise objectionable. Furthermore, even if the portion of Opinion 91-2 relied upon by petitioner could be considered a binding rule, the PSC has concluded that it does not apply to the situation at hand, an interpretation that is not unreasonable given the language of the opinion, and which must therefore be upheld (see, Matter of Indeck-Yerkes Energy Servs. v Public Serv. Commn., 164 A.D.2d 618, 623). When the section of Opinion 91-2 dealing with LRACs is read in its entirety, it is evident that it was intended to address the problem created by the ordinary, yearly replacement of LRACs and not the extraordinary predicament present here, where an LRAC schedule was withdrawn because it was found to be fatally flawed — the PSC misperceived the impact that the then-recent invasion of Kuwait would have on oil and gas prices — even for the time period during which it was intended to be in use.