The foregoing statute was enacted because of unethical and sometimes corrupt practices on the part of insurance agents. Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 204 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tenn.App. 1947), cert. den., petition for reh. den., 185 Tenn. 434, 206 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1947).
However, in the cases in which it has been so construed, the insurance companies had voluntarily issued policies after they had received applications. See T.H. Hayes Sons v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 194 Tenn. 35, 250 S.W.2d 7 (1952); Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947). T.C.A. ยง 59-1238, requires all insurance companies licensed to write automobile liability insurance in Tennessee to participate in the Assigned Risk Plan. Under its provisions, insurance companies must issue a policy or binder after they receive an application, regardless of the identity of the party who processed it.
This rule applies to cases involving coverage under an insurance policy. See, e.g., Bailey v. Life Casualty Insurance Co., 35 Tenn. App. 574, 250 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.App. 1951); Bill Brown Construction Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1991); Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827, 829 (1947); Maryland Casualty Co. v. McTyier, 150 Tenn. 691, 266 S.W.2d 767 (1924). To bolster its argument, American Credit relies on a Tennessee statute.
Id. (citing Bill Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1991) (discussing former Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 56-6-147, the predecessor to Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 56-6-115(b)); Ralph v. Pipkin, 183 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tenn. App. 2005); Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947)). Acuity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye was decided based on Tennessee law.
T.C.A. ยง 56-705 has been construed liberally in favor of the insured in order to effect its remedial purpose. Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947). However, we are unaware of any case construing it to permit an applicant to disavow instructions given to an agent to correct information which the applicant supplied pursuant to the requirements of a policy, where the agent faithfully and accurately carried out those instructions.
Bill Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1991) (discussing former Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 56-6-147, the predecessor to Tenn. Code Ann. ยง 56-6-115(b)); Ralph v. Pipkin, 183 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tenn. App. 2005); Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, 204 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. App. 1947). Defendants contend Sunbelt had actual knowledge and information in its business records concerning three matters: (1) the application for the fire insurance policy should have been made in the name of two insureds, Darrell Frye as owner of the building and Lafonne Frye doing business as the owner of Trinity Learning Center; (2) Darrel Frye had a prior fire loss on May 1, 2005; and (3) there was an existing mortgage on the real property held by Gravitt.
Royal is correct in pointing out that no Tennessee case has construed the statute in a context similar to the one presented here. Indeed, research by the court reveals that this statute was intended to protect consumers by binding insurance companies to the representations of local, sometimes unethical, solicitors. SeeIndustrial Life & Health Insurance v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn.App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947)(decision under prior statute). Furthermore, the overlap in nomenclature between insurance law and privilege law should not be allowed to cloud the inquiry.
ce thereof be regarded as an agent of the company issuing the policy, and not the agent of the insured, and all provisions in the application and policy to the contrary are void and of no effect whatever; but this section shall not apply to licensed fire insurance brokers." We believe that it is correct to say that this statute has been given effect in three separate ways: (1) it creates an agency relation, so far as the insured is concerned, between one who solicits an application for a policy and the insurance company that issues the policy pursuant to the application although no such relation actually exists (Maryland Casualty Co. v. McTyier, 150 Tenn. 691, 266 S.W. 767, 48 A.L.R. 1168 (1924) and Maryland Casualty Co. v. F.B. Hunter Co., 8 Tenn. App. 516 (1928)); (2) it creates a power in the soliciting agent generally to waive policy provisions and this is true even if there is a provision in the policy to the contrary (Industrial Life Health Ins. Co. v. Trinkle, Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947), aff'd 185 Tenn. 434, 206 S.W.2d 414 (1947)); and (3) it renders legally effective some express or implied agreements made by such solicitors prior to the issuance of the policy although the parol evidence rule would otherwise have operated to make such agreements ineffective. (See cases hereinafter cited and discussed.)
See also, to the same effect, Hulbert v. National Life Accident Insurance Co., Inc., La.App., 151 So. 87; Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Pulliam Motor Co., 4 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 912; and Industrial Life Health Insurance Co. v. Trinkle, Tenn.App. 1947, 204 S.W.2d 827. Here the undisputed testimony of both doctors familiar with the case, and of a disinterested officer of another insurance company, is unanimous that the disclosure by Mr. Pipes of a history of kidney disease, with the presence of albumen, should have been sufficient to put any reasonable underwriter on notice that further investigation should be made.
The statute . . . is thus liberally construed in the insured's favor. 15 Tenn. Jurisprudence, Insurance, ยง 9 at 180-81 (1984); quoting Industrial Life Health Insurance Co. v. Trinkle, 30 Tenn. App. 243, 204 S.W.2d 827 (1947). Therefore, "[a]n agent acting within the scope of his apparent authority, though exceeding his authority, binds his principal."