Opinion
24A-MI-1204
12-06-2024
Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellant-Respondent v. Staci Metcalf, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCES BARROW SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE SHANA D. PAULA EIMERMAN LAW NOBLESVILLE, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Boone Superior Court The Honorable Matthew C. Kincaid, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 06D01-2307-MI-000997
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCES BARROW SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE SHANA D. PAULA EIMERMAN LAW NOBLESVILLE, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] The Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") substantiated an allegation that Staci Metcalf had abused her child (the "Child"). Metcalf petitioned for judicial review of this substantiation, but this petition was dismissed after Metcalf failed to timely file the agency record. Metcalf filed a motion for relief from judgment; the trial court granted her motion, vacating the dismissal. DCS now appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Metcalf's motion for relief from judgment.
[¶2] We reverse and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On March 1, 2022, DCS issued an assessment of alleged child abuse, substantiating an allegation of physical abuse by Metcalf against the Child; and on March 7, 2022, DCS initiated Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") proceedings for the Child. Following a factfinding hearing, the trial court dismissed the CHINS petition on August 19, 2022.
[¶4] On July 21, 2023, Metcalf filed a petition for judicial review of the substantiation of physical abuse. There was no further action in this cause until November 22, 2023, when DCS filed a motion to dismiss Metcalf's petition for judicial review, arguing that Metcalf failed to file a certified copy of the agency record within 30 days of filing her petition. On November 29, 2023, the trial court granted DCS's motion to dismiss. On February 21, 2024, Metcalf filed a motion for relief from judgement under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1), arguing that her failure to file the agency record was due to excusable neglect. On April 22, 2024, the trial court granted Metcalf's motion. DCS now appeals.
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, we have taken judicial notice of the trial court's November 22, 2023, dismissal as well as Metcalf's Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion because DCS did not provide file-stamped copies of these documents in its appendix. Copies were presented-they were not file-stamped.
Metcalf argues that we should dismiss this appeal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the trial court's grant of her Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion is not a final judgment. However, "[a] ruling or order of the court denying or granting relief, in whole or in part, by motion under subdivision (B) of this rule shall be deemed a final judgment." T.R. 60(C). We also note that Metcalf claims to have contemporaneously filed a motion to dismiss with her brief, Appellee's Br. at 9, but the Chronological Case Summary for this case and our records do not indicate that Metcalf filed any such motion. Additionally, Metcalf argues that DCS waived its arguments made on appeal, claiming that DCS failed to make these arguments at the trial court. However, in its response to Metcalf's Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion, DCS clearly argued that relief was unavailable because Metcalf failed to timely file the agency record with the trial court. Thus, we address DCS's argument on the merits.
Discussion and Decision
The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Granting Metcalf's Motion for Relief from Judgment
[¶5] DCS claims that the trial court erred by granting Metcalf's Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion. "A motion made under [Trial Rule] 60(B) is addressed to the equitable discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion." Allen Cnty. Plan Comm'n v. Olde Canal Place Ass'n, 61 N.E.3d 1266, 1268 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (quoting Brimhall v. Brewster, 864 N.E.2d 1148, 115253 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)). We will reverse only "when the judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment." Id. (citing Breneman v. Slusher, 768 N.E.2d 451, 461 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002)).
[¶6] Under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), "a trial court may relieve a party from a default judgment for 'mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect' if the party files a motion within one year of the judgment and alleges a meritorious claim or defense." Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652, 655 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1)). "To establish a meritorious claim or defense, a movant must show 'that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise.'" Allen Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 61 N.E.3d at 1269 (quoting Welton v. Midland Funding, LLC, 17 N.E.3d 353, 355 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014)). DCS argues that Metcalf failed to establish a meritorious claim because Metcalf cannot belatedly file the agency record. We agree.
DCS also argues that the mistake Metcalf made is not the type of mistake warranting relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(1). Metcalf's failure to establish a meritorious claim is dispositive, so we do not address DCS's argument about Metcalf's mistake.
[¶7] DCS points us to the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act ("AOPA") which provides the exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action. Ind. Code. § 4-21.5-5-1; Indiana Fam. &Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Meyer, 927 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. 2010) (citing I.C. § 4-21.5-5-1). Once a petitioner files for judicial review, AOPA requires the petitioner to file the agency record within 30 days. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-13(a) (2004). "Failure to file the record within the time permitted by this subsection, including any extension period ordered by the court, is cause for dismissal of the petition for review by the court, on its own motion, or on petition of any party of record to the proceeding." Id. § 4-21.5-5-13(b). Our Supreme Court has made it clear that "the statute does not excuse untimely filing or allow nunc pro tunc extensions." Meyer, 927 N.E.2d at 370 (citing I.C. § 4-21.5-5-13(b)). Metcalf filed her petition for judicial review on July 21, 2023; thus, Metcalf was required to file the agency record by August 20, 2023. Metcalf concedes that she "filed neither the agency record nor a request for an extension within thirty (30) days." Appellee's Br. at 14 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 12-13). However, Metcalf argues that the trial court could exercise its discretion in ruling on DCS's motion to dismiss. We do not agree.
This section of the AOPA was amended effective July 1, 2024. We use the version of the statute in effect at the time Metcalf filed her petition for judicial review.
[¶8] In Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Education, 20 N.E.3d 149 (Ind. 2014) [hereinafter TOPS], our Supreme Court addressed the question of whether dismissal is mandatory when a petitioner fails to timely file the agency record. In resolving a split in Indiana caselaw on the issue, the TOPS court established a "bright-line" rule making dismissal mandatory, holding "a petitioner for review cannot receive consideration of its petition where the statutorily-defined agency record has not been filed." TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155 (emphasis added); see also Allen Cnty. Plan Comm'n., 61 N.E.3d at 1269-70.
[¶9] Here, Metcalf admittedly failed to meet AOPA's 30-day requirement for filing the agency record. In fact, Metcalf did not file anything with the trial court in the 30 days following her petition for judicial review. Because Metcalf is not permitted to file the agency record late, the agency record will never be properly before the trial court in this case. See (citing TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155). Without the agency record, the trial court cannot rule on Metcalf's petition for judicial review. See TOPS, 20 N.E.3d at 155. Thus, we conclude that Metcalf failed to establish a meritorious claim, so the trial court abused its discretion in granting Metcalf's motion for relief from judgment. We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the trial court's judgment setting aside its dismissal of Metcalf's petition for judicial review.
[¶10] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.