The Supreme Court denied the appellant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim against him. There can be more than one proximate cause of a motor vehicle accident and, thus, the proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative fault as a matter of law (see Rodriguez v Klein, 116 AD3d 939; Incle v Byrne-Lowell, 115 AD3d 709; Shui-Kwan Lui v Serrone, 103 AD3d 620, 621; Pollack v Margolin, 84 AD3d 1341, 1342). "Evidence that one driver ran' a stop sign does not preclude a finding that comparative [fault] on the part of the other driver contributed to the accident" (Luke v McFadden, 119 AD3d 533, 533).

943 N.Y.S.2d 111;Singh v. Singh, 81 A.D.3d 807, 808, 916 N.Y.S.2d 527;Goemans v. County of Suffolk, 57 A.D.3d 478, 479, 868 N.Y.S.2d 753;Rossani v. Rana, 8 A.D.3d 548, 549, 779 N.Y.S.2d 211). Moreover, the driver with the right of way is entitled to anticipate that the driver subject to the traffic control device would obey the traffic law ( see Gallagher v. McCurty, 85 A.D.3d 1109, 1110, 925 N.Y.S.2d 897;Pollack v. Margolin, 84 A.D.3d 1341, 1342, 924 N.Y.S.2d 282;Martin v. Ali, 78 A.D.3d 1135, 1136, 912 N.Y.S.2d 610). A driver traveling with the right of way may be entitled to summary judgment if he can demonstrate that the driver subject to the traffic control device proceeded through the intersection and failed to yield the right of way ( see Figueroa v. Diaz, 107 A.D.3d 754, 755, 967 N.Y.S.2d 109;Barbato v. Maloney, 94 A.D.3d 1028, 1029, 943 N.Y.S.2d 204). However, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident ( see Rodriguez v. Klein, 116 A.D.3d 939, 983 N.Y.S.2d 851;Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 A.D.3d 709, 981 N.Y.S.2d 617;Cox v. Nunez, 23 A.D.3d 427, 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604). Evidence that one driver “ran” a stop sign does not preclude a finding that comparative negligence on the part of the other driver contributed to the accident ( see Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 A.D.3d at 709, 981 N.Y.S.2d 617;Cox v. Nunez, 23 A.D.3d at 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604). Therefore, “ ‘a driver who lawfully enters an intersection ... may still be found partially at fault for an accident if he or she fails to use reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle in the intersection’ ” ( Sirot v. Troiano, 66 A.D.3d 763, 764, 886 N.Y.S.2d 504, quoting Siegel v. Sweeney, 266 A.D.2d 200, 202, 697 N.Y.S.2d 317;see Antaki v. Mateo, 100 A.D.3d 579, 580, 954 N.Y.S.2d 540;Amalfitano v. Rocco, 100 A.D.3d 939, 940, 954 N.Y.S.2d 644;Exime v. Williams, 45 A.D.3d 633, 633, 845 N.Y.S.2d 450). “A driver is required to see that which through proper use of his or her senses he or she should have seen” ( Williams v. Hayes, 103 A.D.3d 713, 714

The Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant driver seeking summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from comparative fault (seeGobin v. Delgado, 142 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 38 N.Y.S.3d 63 ; Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 A.D.3d 709, 710, 981 N.Y.S.2d 617 ). "Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause" ( Kalland v. Hungry Harbor Assoc., LLC, 84 A.D.3d 889, 889, 922 N.Y.S.2d 550 ; seeGobin v. Delgado, 142 A.D.3d at 1135, 38 N.Y.S.3d 63). Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff's negligence in pulling out of a curbside parking spot was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the defendant was free from comparative fault (seeEspinoza v. Coco–Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 121 A.D.3d 640, 641, 993 N.Y.S.2d 721 ).

In opposition, the defendants submitted the affidavit of the defendant driver, which provided a conflicting version of the facts surrounding the accident. Under these circumstances, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault (see generally Incle v Byrne-Lowell, 115 AD3d 709; Singh v Thomas, 113 AD3d 748; Ortiz v Hub Truck Rental Corp., 82 AD3d 725; Anyanwu v Johnson, 276 AD2d 572). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 and that such violation was the sole proximate cause of the accident. “There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident” ( Cox v. Nunez, 23 A.D.3d 427, 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604;see Rodriguez v. Klein, 116 A.D.3d 939, 983 N.Y.S.2d 851;Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 A.D.3d 709, 709, 981 N.Y.S.2d 617;Adobea v. Junel, 114 A.D.3d 818, 819, 980 N.Y.S.2d 564). Therefore, a proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing his or her freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law ( see Lanigan v. Timmes, 111 A.D.3d 797, 798, 975 N.Y.S.2d 148;Shui–Kwan Lui v. Serrone, 103 A.D.3d 620, 621, 959 N.Y.S.2d 270;Gause v. Martinez, 91 A.D.3d 595, 596, 936 N.Y.S.2d 272;Pollack v. Margolin, 84 A.D.3d 1341, 1342, 924 N.Y.S.2d 282).

In the Appellate Division, Second Department, evidence that one driver ran a stop sign does not preclude finding that comparative negligence on the part of the other driver contributed to the accident (see Luke v McFadden, 199 A.D.3d 533 [internal punctuation omitted]; citing, Incle v Byrne-Lowell, 115 A.D.3d 709, 710 [2nd Dept 2014][defendant moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of freedom from comparative fault). It is unclear, however, whether that is the state of the law in the Appellate Division, First Department (see Sanchez v Lonero Transit, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 417 [1st Dept 2012][in granting summary judgment only assuming, arguendo, that comparative negligence was relevant in a stop sign case]).

Under these circumstances, Mainhart has failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of comparative fault. (Incle v Byrne-Lowell, 115 A.D.3d 709 [2d Dept 2014]). There is a question of fact regarding whether Mainhart was able to bring her vehicle to a stop without striking Milano before she was struck by Sotil-Cabanillas and a question of fact regarding whether Plaintiff was struck from the rear more than one time.

Firstly, counsel asserts that the defendant did, in fact, stop at the stop sign and did attempt to yield the right of way as he was inching up slowly into the intersection. Counsel also asserts that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see Incle v Byrne-Lowell, 115 AD3d 709 [2d Dept. 2014]; Cox v Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2d Dept. 2005]). Plaintiff argues that there is evidence of comparative negligence on the part of Mr. Nieves in that Mr. Nieves failed to see the Hanif vehicle in the intersection, failed to yield, and failed to use reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Firstly, counsel asserts that the defendant did, in fact, stop at the stop sign and did attempt to yield the right of way as he was inching up slowly into the intersection. Counsel also asserts that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 AD3d 709 [2d Dept.2014] ; Cox v. Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2d Dept.2005] ). Plaintiff argues that there is evidence of comparative negligence on the part of Mr. Nieves in that Mr. Nieves failed to see the Hanif vehicle in the intersection, failed to yield, and failed to use reasonable care to avoid the collision. Thus, defendant asserts that Mr. Nieves has not established his freedom from comparative negligence.

Firstly, counsel asserts that the defendant did, in fact, stop at the stop sign and did attempt to yield the right of way as he was inching up slowly into the intersection. Counsel also asserts that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see Incle v. Byrne–Lowell, 115 AD3d 709 [2d Dept.2014] ; Cox v. Nunez, 23 AD3d 427 [2d Dept.2005] ). Plaintiff argues that there is evidence of comparative negligence on the part of Mr. Nieves in that Mr. Nieves failed to see the Hanif vehicle in the intersection, failed to yield, and failed to use reasonable care to avoid the collision. Thus, defendant asserts that Mr. Nieves has not established his freedom from comparative negligence.