In other words, immunity from suit is granted to the employer, its agent, or employee for an injury caused during the course of employment. Incandela v. Giannini (1993), 250 Ill. App.3d 23, 27. Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances, an otherwise shielded employer may become liable in tort if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as an employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed upon him as employer. ( Ocasek v. Krass (1987), 153 Ill. App.3d 215, 217.)
was manager of corporate-owned restaurant business that employed plaintiff, even though individual defendant was owner of property where restaurant business was located and where plaintiffs injury had occurred); Reynolds v. Clarkson, 263 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435, 636 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1994) (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to individual defendant who was president and chief operating officer of corporate-owned grain business that employed plaintiff, even though individual defendant had originally owned property where grain business was located and where plaintiffs injury had occurred and had sold, leased or otherwise transferred the property to the corporation); Stewart, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 565-66, 742 N.E.2d at 906 (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to individual defendants who were employees of company-owned fertilizer business that employed plaintiff, even though individual defendants owned property where fertilizer business was located and where plaintiffs injury had occurred); Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill. App. 3d 23, 29, 619 N.E.2d 844, 850 (1993) (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to individual defendant who was agent of corporate-owned construction business that employed plaintiff, even though individual defendant was beneficial owner of property where construction work was being done and where plaintiffs injury had occurred); Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 273 Ill. App. 3d 27, 32, 652 N.E.2d 410, 414 (1995) (dual-capacity doctrine did not apply to individual defendants who were officers of corporate-owned concrete business that employed plaintiff, even though individual defendants were beneficial owners of the property where the business was located and where plaintiffs injury had occurred). As in many of the cited cases, the duties of the defendants in the present case as property owners are so intertwined with their duties as employees and owners of the business (as to Randall) that the two capacities cannot be separated.
A complaint should not be dismissed under section 2-619 because it is barred under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act unless it appears that no set of facts under the pleadings can be proved which would allow the plaintiff to recover. Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill. App. 3d 23, 26 (1993). Where there are disputed issues of fact, however, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Incandela, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 26.
It acts as a form of insurance, providing for “liability without fault on the part of the employer in return for relief from the prospect of large damage claims based on common-law negligence.” Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill.App.3d 23, 26–27, 189 Ill.Dec. 143, 619 N.E.2d 844 (2d Dist.1993); see also Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill.2d 322, 326, 69 Ill.Dec. 351, 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983). By contrast, recovery of future earnings in a tort action is one manner, in addition to recovery for damages for pain and suffering and medical expenses, in which an injured plaintiff may be made whole.
The proper test for determining whether the doctrine applies is not whether a separate legal theory of liability can be brought against the same legal person as the employer, but rather whether the controversy involved separate legal personae. See, e.g., Sharp, 69 Ill.Dec. at 353, 447 N.E.2d at 788; Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill. App.3d 23, 189 Ill.Dec. 143, 619 N.E.2d 844, 849 (1993) (mere ownership of premises does not trigger employer's liability in tort); see generally 23 A.L.R.4th 1151 § 5 (1983 Supp. 1993). The evidence does not support the court's finding that DiPietro maintained a separate legal persona.
Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31. A complaint should not be dismissed under section 2-619 of the Code unless it appears that no set of facts under the pleadings can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill. App. 3d 23, 26 (1993) (citing People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Services, Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d 843, 860 (1991)). In ruling on the motion, the trial court must take all facts properly pleaded as true.
The precedential value of Marcus is doubtful. In Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill.App.3d 23, 189 Ill.Dec. 143, 619 N.E.2d 844 (1993), this court declined to follow Marcus. In addition, other courts have called Marcus into doubt.
Where, however, the duties of the employer under both capacities are intertwined to the extent that its conduct in the second capacity cannot be deemed to generate obligations unrelated to those flowing from its as an employer, the dual doctrine is inapplicable. Incandela v. Giannini, 250 Ill.App.3d 23, 27-28, 189 Ill.Dec. 143, 619 N.E.2d 844 (1993); see also McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.2d 352, 357, 53 Ill.Dec. 207, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981). In count III of his second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured while operating a trim press owned by his employer, Callen.
On appeal from a dismissal with prejudice under section 2-619, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true. ( Elliott v. LRSL Enterprises, Inc. (1992), 226 Ill. App.3d 724, 727.) Our job is to view the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and to determine if the complaint alleges any set of facts upon which relief may be granted. ( Incandela v. Giannini (1993), 250 Ill. App.3d 23, 26.) We look at the complaint de novo, in light of all the pertinent factual and legal circumstances.