Opinion
No. COA09-198.
Filed June 2, 2009.
Burke County Nos. 06J8, 9.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 17 November 2008 by Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Burke County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2009.
Stephen M. Schoeberle, for petitioner-appellee. Carol Ann Bauer, for respondent-appellant father. Pamela Newell Williams, for appellee guardian ad litem.
J.D.E.V., Jr. ("respondent") appeals from the order of the trial court terminating his parental rights to his daughters M.L.V., born in 2001, and Z.A.V., born in 2003. Respondent challenges the order on the basis the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that termination is in the best interests of the children. After careful review, we affirm the order of the trial court.
The findings of the trial court were undisputed. In summary, respondent and the children's mother ("Tammy") have a history of frequent domestic violence. Respondent smokes marijuana to "calmhis nerves" and has used methamphetamine. One hundred twelve marijuana plants were once found in respondent's residence. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent had pending criminal charges for driving while license revoked, speeding to elude arrest, resisting arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court specifically found respondent completed domestic violence and substance abuse counseling and parenting classes, but he has not been able to demonstrate the lessons learned. He has continued to engage in domestic violence and substance abuse after having completed such counseling. Therefore there is substantial likelihood that the neglect of the minor children would be repeated were the minor children to be returned to him.
Tammy is a pseudonym. Tammy relinquished her parental rights to the children on 6 October 2008 and is not a party to this appeal.
At the time of the termination hearing, the minor children were living in a licensed foster home. A prospective adoptive home had been identified where the children could continue therapy and attend their current school. The trial court found that "[t]he termination of [respondent's] parental rights [would] aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption." Accordingly, the trial court concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
Termination of parental rights cases involve two separate components. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). In the adjudicatory stage, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that at least one ground for termination exists by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2007); Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 908 . Once the trial court has determined that at least one ground for termination exists, the court moves on to the disposition stage, where it must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (a) (2007).
When a parent does not dispute the existence of statutory grounds for termination on appeal, as here, this Court only "considers whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the respondent's parental rights." In re C.W., 182 N.C. App. 214, 219, 641 S.E.2d 725, 729 (2007) (citation omitted). "An abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." Greene v. Hoekstra, 189 N.C. App. 179, 180, 657 S.E.2d 415, 41 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Repondent's sole argument on appeal is:
[Tammy] made it her goal to sabotage [respondent's] efforts to create a stable environment with a safe home for his [children]. [Respondent] was an attentive hard-working father who did not have time for [Tammy's] nonsense. . . .
The trial court should have recognized that it was [Tammy] not [respondent], who was keeping the family in a state of disarray. Rather than terminating the parental rights of [respondent], the trial court should have used its contempt power to impress upon [Tammy] that she needed to stay away from the children. By doing so, the best interests of the minor children would have been better served than by terminating the parental rights of their father. (R BR 12)
We disagree.
We first note the record before us contains no motion or order for contempt. The issue of contempt was not before the trial court and is not before this Court. Our only task sub judice is to determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
The determination of whether termination is in the best interests of the minor child is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110, which states that the trial court shall consider the following factors:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (a)(2007).
The trial court found as fact, undisputed by respondent:
4. The minor children are now 7 years old and 4 years old respectively. They are placed together at Southmountain Children's Home in a licensed foster home. A prospective adoptive home has been identified, and the minor children have begun visiting with the prospective adoptive parents. They are receiving therapy for separation and loss issues. Their prospective adoptive parents will continue such therapy and will continue the minor children in their current school to minimize such issues. The minor children, especially [M.L.V.,] continue to have a bond with their parents, but any reunification with [respondent] is not possible in the foreseeable future. The termination of his parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan of adoption.
[The court then concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
We find that the trial court properly considered and addressed each of the factors listed in section 7B-1110 (a), as it was required to do. We are not persuaded by respondent's attempts to shift the blame for the family's situation solely to the children's mother, nor do we give any credence to respondent's suggestion that the trial court erred in failing to go to greater lengths than it did to prevent the mother from contacting him. Respondent's argument that the trial court should have kept him and Tammy apart is especially disingenuous since he had been subject to domestic violence protective orders which ordered him to stay away from Tammy, yet they shared a residence. Since the trial court properly considered the statutory factors, and came to a decision based on its findings, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the best interests of the children are served by terminating respondent's parental rights. Accordingly, the order terminating the parental rights of respondent is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges JACKSON and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).