As pertinent here, a charging lien gives an attorney a lien on any judgment that "the attorney obtained or assisted in obtaining in favor of the client." In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990).
As the hearing board noted, there are two kinds of attorney's liens in Colorado and both are statutory. In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990). The first is the "charging lien" created by section 12-5-119, 5A C.R.S. (1991), which statute states in part as follows:
) Given the nature and course of the proceedings before it, the bankruptcy court made no clear error and did not abuse its direction in sanctioning Appellants as it did, or in asserting jurisdiction and authority to do so.e. Disregarding a "Lawful Lien" Appellants' final argument is that the pre-petition attorney fees at issue are properly the subject of a lawful attorney's lien, which the bankruptcy court wrongfully ignored in: (1) its imposition of sanctions; and (2) its prior order that the litigation proceeds be deposited into the court's registry, so as to be distributed in accordance with the Plan. (Br. at 21 — 22.) Appellee deftly responds that Appellants' lien was not lawful, citing Colorado v. Carvell (In re Estate of Benney), 790 P.2d 319 (Colo. 1990). Benney sets forth the following helpful and instructive description of Colorado law as to attorney's liens:
People v. Smith, 830 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1992); In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990). The charging lien is created by section 12-5-119, 5A C.R.S. (1991), "and grants an attorney a lien on claims or choses in action . . . on any judgment that the attorney obtained or assisted in obtaining in favor of the client, and on any legal claim filed by the attorney for fees due from the client."
There are only two kinds of attorney's liens in Colorado and both are statutory: the "retaining lien" and the "charging lien." In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990). The retaining lien gives the attorney the right to retain the client's papers until the general balance due for legal services has been paid. Id.; § 12-5-120, 5A C.R.S. (1991).
Section 12-5-119. Our supreme court, in In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990) (footnote omitted), stated: The charging lien . . . grants an attorney a lien on claims or choses in action (such as, for example, the client's claim against another for money due on a contract or on an unpaid promissory note payable to the client), on any judgment that the attorney obtained or assisted in obtaining in favor of the client, and on any legal claim filed by the attorney for fees due from the client.
But, also as the court found, any work specifically related to ethics proceedings and not related to the EEOC proceedings should not be included in the award of attorney's fees. Cf. In re Estate of Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1990) (stating that lien includes fees incurred to obtain judgment, but does not include fees for legal work not related to judgment). Thus, it was within the district court's discretion to make the 20% reduction, and the court "adequately explained its reasons for so doing."
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 to determine the relative priority of the parties' interests in the interpled funds, and we find no basis for Coates's assertion that the court misapplied or exceeded its jurisdiction thereunder. We conclude that the district court appropriately determined that Marc was not a client of Coates; that Coates did have a valid charging lien under § 12-5-119 for its services relating to Kristi's Probate Judgment, but that the amount of that lien "is limited to securing the payment of the reasonable value of [those] attorney fees," People v. Carvell (In re Estate of Benney), 790 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). We further conclude that the undisputed evidence supports the district court's findings as to the amount of Coates's reasonable fees related to obtaining the Probate Judgment.
BF's charging lien, however, created under Colo.Rev. Stat. § 12-5-119, "is limited to securing the payment of the reasonable value of attorney fees in the particular matter then being handled by the attorney." People v. Carvell (In re Estate of Benney), 790 P.2d 319, 323 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). Even if a charging lien could affect the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to disallow fees, a proposition that seems dubious, BF's lien did not extend to the pre-petition fees earned in the prior representation and could not in and of itself have prevented the bankruptcy court from disallowing those fees.
The charging lien satisfies the attorney's equitable claim for services rendered to the client. In re Benney, 790 P.2d 319, 322 (Colo. 1990). "A party who acts so as to satisfy or comply with a judgment or decree assumes the risk of rendering his or her appeal moot if such action is done voluntarily."