Summary
considering motions for summary judgment on claimant's seaman status in limitation proceeding, though Jones Act claims were also raised in stayed state court proceeding
Summary of this case from In re Prosper Operators, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-3767, Section "N"(4)
June 27, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
O'Meara, Inc., as owner/operator of the M/V Chief files this action pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act. 46 U.S.C. § 183, et seq. Before the Court is O'Meara's Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking to dismiss the Jones Act claim of Phillip O. Burnson, Jr. on the ground that he is not a seaman. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2001, Phillip O. Burnson, Jr. filed a petition in Louisiana State Court against O'Meara, seeking damages under the Jones Act for injuries allegedly sustained when he fell from a ladder attempting to repair a salt-water conversion tank while working for O'Meara on October 22, 2000. O'Meara brought this limitation action on December 17, 2001.
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
Summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). O'Meara has not met this burden.
The Jones Act provides a remedy for any "seaman" injured in the course of his employment. 46 U.S.C. § 688. A plaintiff is a Jones Act seaman if (1) his duties contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) he has a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial both in duration and in nature. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). The Fifth Circuit strongly discourages summary judgment on the question of whether claimant meets this test. See Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 917 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Bernard v. Binnings Const. Co. Inc., 741 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 508 U.S. 907 (1993). The question of seaman status should be removed from the trier of fact only "in rare circumstances." Id. at 888. Indeed, "even marginal Jones Act claims should be submitted to the jury." Id.; see also Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1995) (determination of seaman status is "generally one of fact"); Williams v. Weber Management Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 1039, 1040 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[t]he issue of Jones Act seaman status is left to the jury except in the rare circumstance where the underlying facts are undisputed and the record reveals no facts from which reasonable persons could draw conflicting inferences."); Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (determination of seaman status is "an inherently factual question"); Harbor Tug Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554 (1997) ("it often will be inappropriate to take the question from the jury"); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991) (Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion."); Chandris Inc., 515 U.S. at 369 (if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff is a seaman, summary judgment is inappropriate).
In this case, O'Meara argues that Burnson is not a seaman because, as a roustabout assigned to a fixed platform, he used the M/V Chief only to transit to and from his platform job. Burnson, on the other hand, argues that the vessel formed an essential part of his job duties and that he routinely contributed to the vessel's navigation. Moreover, the deposition testimony submitted by both sides demonstrate a genuine dispute as to the percentage of Burnson's time that was spent on the vessel and the extent to which he contributed to its navigation. Thus, genuine issues of material fact exist, which preclude the granting of summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that O'Meara's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.