However, the Supreme Court, in the context of compensability, has construed the definition of objective findings to be satisfied by indications of injury or disease that have the characteristic or capability of being verified through observation, measurement or reproduction regardless of whether the indications actually were observed, measured or reproduced by anyone other than the claimant. SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or 92, [ 58 P3d 814] (2002)."
SAIF asserts that, in the absence of "objective medical evidence," no award of chronic condition impairment is authorized. SAIF reasons that Kane's statement that there is no objective evidence of impairment means that Kane's opinion concerning chronic condition impairment does not satisfy claimant's burden of proof. Claimant responds that, as the Supreme Court held in SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or 92, 97, 58 P3d 814 (2002), what the statute requires is medical evidence supported by "objective findings," which consist of findings that are "reproducible, measurable, or observable." In this case, claimant contends, Kane's report clearly includes such findings, and the board's finding to that effect is supported by substantial evidence.
¶28 Such a reading is consistent with the term "objective finding" as applied in other cases. See Broadhead v. Federal Express Corp. , No. 2:05-CV-806, 2007 WL 951544, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2007) (recognizing that long-term disability plans governed by ERISA define "objective findings" as "signs which are noted on a test or medical exam and which are considered significant anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities which can be observed apart from the individual's symptoms" and may include, "Medical examination findings; Test results; X-ray results; observation of anatomical physiological or psychological abnormalities"); see also SAIF Corp. v. Lewis , 335 Or. 92, 58 P.3d 814, 815 (2002) (noting that "[o]bjective findings in support of medical evidence are verifiable indications of injury or disease that may include, but are not limited to, range of motion, atrophy, muscle strength and palpable muscle spasm. Objective findings do[ ] not include physical findings or subjective responses to physical examinations that are not reproducible, measurable or observable" (cleaned up) ).
Under that definition, a doctor may rely on a claimant's subjective symptoms, so long as those symptoms are verifiable. The statute specifies that symptoms such as range of motion, atrophy, muscle strength, and palpable muscle spasm are verifiable. In addition, although the definition excludes "subjective responses to physical examinations that are not reproducible, measurable or observable," the Supreme Court has held that it includes physical findings and subjective responses to physical exams that are either reproducible, measurable, or observable. SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or 92, 99, 58 P3d 814 (2002). The court also held that, where a doctor bases a medical opinion on a patient's symptoms, the doctor need not personally reproduce, measure, or observe those symptoms.
What both the state and the Court of Appeals have failed to fully embrace, however, is the fact that the legislature has expressly defined the term "wildlife" as it is used within the wildlife statutes. Consequently, we first must examine that definition. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 336 Or 284, 289, 82 P3d 619 (2003) (inquiry into former jeopardy claim first focused on legislature's definition of operative offense); SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or 92, 97, 58 P3d 814 (2002) (where legislature statutorily had defined phrase at issue, court's analysis focused on statutory definition). The task before us is one of statutory construction; consequently, we employ the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,610-12,859 P2d 1143 (1993).
Upon consideration by the court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or. 92, 58 P.3d 814 (2002).
Upon consideration by the court. The decision of the Court of Appeals ( 178 Or. App. 413) is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or. 92, 58 P.3d 814 (2002).
Feigenbaum was permitted to learn about claimant's symptom presentation (pain in his back wrapping around to his chest) from claimant himself, and he was permitted to use the reports available and his expertise to formulate his conclusion about what caused claimant's need for treatment. See SAIF v. Lewis , 335 Or. 92, 101, 58 P.3d 814 (2002) (explaining that a doctor may rely on his or her interview of a patient to produce adequate objective medical findings). Put another way, he was not required to independently verify everything that claimant told him about his symptoms. Because the board's reliance on Feigenbaum's objective medical findings was reasonable, substantial evidence supported its conclusion.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or. 92, 58 P.3d 814 (2002).
Reversed and remanded. SAIF v. Lewis, 335 Or. 92, 58 P.3d 814 (2002).