In re Rupa

12 Citing cases

  1. In re Kauble

    308 A.3d 247 (N.H. 2023)

    In construing RSA 461-A:13 in particular, we must also "be mindful of our case law addressing when grandparent visitation is constitutionally permissible." In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 315, 13 A.3d 307 (2010); see also id. at 318, 13 A.3d 307 ("State and federal courts have long recognized that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children." (quotation omitted))

  2. In re DeSantis

    No. 2021-0294 (N.H. Nov. 16, 2022)

    We have held that the trial court must weigh the first two statutory factors more heavily than the remaining factors, according due deference to a fit parent's judgment as to the best interests of the child as part of the court's determination of the child's best interests. In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 318 (2010).

  3. In re P.B.

    167 N.H. 627 (N.H. 2015)   Cited 4 times

    See, e.g., In re Athena D., 162 N.H. 232, 234, 27 A.3d 744 (2011) (adoptive parents); In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 312, 13 A.3d 307 (2010) (natural parent); Dufton, 158 N.H. at 786, 973 A.2d 271 (natural parent); O'Brien, 141 N.H. at 436, 684 A.2d 1352 (natural parent). Furthermore, we have long recognized that the rights of parents are natural, essential, and inherent rights to which great judicial deference must be accorded.

  4. In re Chrestensen

    172 N.H. 40 (N.H. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    RSA chapter 461-A provides the trial court with authority to determine "parental rights and responsibilities." See RSA 461-A:3, :6 (amended 2018); In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 319, 13 A.3d 307 (2010). The term "parental rights and responsibilities" is defined to mean "all rights and responsibilities parents have concerning their child."

  5. In re Petition of Willeke

    169 N.H. 802 (N.H. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, the petitioners conclude that the trial court's failure to "consider the availability" of its parens patriae power to order great-grandparent visitation was error. They also argue that the principles of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion), adopted by this court in In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 317–18, 13 A.3d 307 (2010), "[a]re [n]ot [o]ffended" by the court's exercise of that parens patriae power. (Bolding omitted.)

  6. In re G.G.

    166 N.H. 193 (N.H. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    We also encourage trial courts to make express findings of fact with regard to the factors upon which they rely so as to facilitate appellate review. SeeIn the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 318, 13 A.3d 307 (2010) (regarding factors to determine award of grandparent visitation). The concurrence expresses concern that by listing factors for the court to consider when deciding whether to compel the child's testimony, we are suggesting that a respondent must make a threshold showing that examination of the child will, to some degree, challenge the child's credibility.

  7. In re Woolsey

    164 N.H. 301 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that, to be deductible for purposes of determining "self-employment income" under RSA 458–C:2, IV, business expenses must be "actually incurred and paid" and "reasonable and necessary" for producing income

    We conclude that it is similarly improbable that the legislature intended the term "self-employment income" in RSA 458–C:2, IV to mean the gross receipts of a sole proprietorship when a portion of that money is payable to others as legitimate business expenses, and is therefore unavailable for the payment of child support. See In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 319, 13 A.3d 307 (2010) (noting that "[w]e interpret a statute to lead to a reasonable result" (quotation omitted)). Our prior cases recognize the importance of the availability of income to the obligor for child support.

  8. In re Reena D.

    163 N.H. 107 (N.H. 2011)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that a clear-and-convincing standard of proof applies to the guardian's burden in a proceeding to terminate a guardianship established by consent

    Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054; see In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d at 783–84. We agree with these courts and conclude that in the context of RSA 463:15, V and our obligation to construe it so that it comports with state and federal constitutional requirements, see In the Matter of Rupa & Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 317, 13 A.3d 307 (2010), the guardian opposing terminating the guardianship bears the burden of proving “that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision” is “necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor” and that terminating the guardianship will “adversely affect the minor's psychological well-being.” RSA 463:15, V; see In re Guardianship of Nicholas P., 162 N.H. 199, 205, 27 A.3d 653 (2011) (rejecting claim that guardianship is de facto termination of parental rights and holding that Troxel requires only that trial court give parent's decision presumption of validity).

  9. State v. Addison

    161 N.H. 300 (N.H. 2010)   Cited 8 times

    Therefore, in construing the requirement under RSA chapter 500-A that prospective jurors be drawn at " random," we decline to adopt an " equal odds" definition of the term. Accordingly, we hold that the method of selecting potential grand and petit jurors for this case did not violate the [161 N.H. 311] statutory randomness requirement. Because we find no statutory violation, it is not necessary that we undertake the second part of the analysis, which considers whether any violations resulted in substantial noncompliance with the statute.

  10. In re Claire C.

    No. M2019-00986-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2020)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that a great uncle and great aunt did not meet the definition of a grandparent in the grandparent visitation statute and explaining that "the statute does not authorize a court to determine that a petitioner qualifies as a 'de facto grandparent' based upon his or her relationship with a child"

    "Grandparent visitation statutes must be narrowly construed in order to comport with the state and federal constitutions, because they are in derogation of the parents' fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., In Matter of Rupa, 161 N.H. 311, 317, 13 A.3d 307 (2010). Thus, while the language in Tennessee's statute permits the court to verge slightly beyond the three enumerated subsections defining 'grandparent,' the Constitution requires us to do so with great prudence.