Opinion
No. 30332-9-II.
Filed: March 23, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Thurston County. Docket No. 03-6-00021-5. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 04/29/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Donna Lynn Holt.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Peter B. Tiller, Rock Pine, PO Box 58, Centralia, WA 98531-0058.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Elizabeth Petrich, Attorney at Law, 2415 South Evergreen Park Dr SW Bldg C, Olympia, WA 98502-6051.
J.M.Z. appeals an order revoking a 90-day order committing him to less restrictive treatment. Appellant argues that RCW 71.05.180 allows a county designated mental health professional (MHP) to detain someone for only 72 hours and that because a venue issue caused him to be detained for six days prior to his hearing, his detention was unlawful. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTS
On March 14, 2003, the Thurston County Superior Court found that J.M.Z. was suffering from a mental disorder and was gravely disabled. The court committed J.M.Z. but ordered a less restrictive treatment plan. The order required that J.M.Z. take his prescribed medication, live in approved housing, attend all scheduled appointments, and refrain from acts or threats of harm to himself, others, and property. The order also provided that a MHP could detain J.M.Z. for evaluation and treatment if J.M.Z. was not complying with these conditions. And it specified that "a hearing shall be held within five judicial days after said detention to determine whether [J.M.Z.] has not abided by the terms of this Order and whether this Order should be modified." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 29.
On April 22, 2003, a MHP detained J.M.Z. and filed a petition to revoke J.M.Z.'s less restrictive treatment. On April 24, 2003, a Thurston County Superior Court judge ordered a change of venue to Pierce County. On April 25, 2003, the Pierce County Superior Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction because it did not have a signed change of venue order. J.M.Z. was then discharged. Soon afterward, a MHP took J.M.Z. back into custody and had him transported to Saint Peter's Hospital in Thurston County.
On April 28, 2003, a different MHP filed a petition in Thurston County Superior Court to revoke J.M.Z.'s less restrictive treatment. On April 29, 2003, Thurston County Superior Court Commissioner Donna Holt denied J.M.Z.'s motion to dismiss and entered an order revoking the less restrictive treatment. The court specifically found that J.M.Z. "failed to comply with housing, medications and did not refrain from acts of harm to property." CP at 42.
ANALYSIS
J.M.Z. acknowledges that this matter is moot as the 90-day commitment order has expired. Nonetheless, he argues that this court should review this case because "the abuse of the statute by the state is significantly alarming to merit review in order to address the larger liberty issue." Br. of Appellant at 14. As this court recently noted:
[W]e may reach the merits of moot cases that involve matters of continuing and substantial public interest. Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 838, 676 P.2d 444 (1984). In making that determination, we consider "(1) the public or private nature of the question presented; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur." Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 838.
The need to clarify the civil commitment statutory scheme is an issue of continuing and substantial public interest. In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); [In re Det. of] Cross, 99 Wn.2d [373,] at 377, [ 662 P.2d 828 (1983)]. But challenges that turn on facts unique to a particular case and that are unlikely to recur will not support review. In re Det. of R.A.W., 104 Wn. App. 215, 221, 15 P.3d 705 (2001) (whether trial court had good cause to continue detainee's hearing involved facts unique to detainee's case and was unlikely to recur). In re Det. of W.R.G., 110 Wn. App. 318, 322, 40 P.3d 1177 (2002).
Because there is no evidence in the record that what occurred here has occurred regularly in the past, this case appears to present facts unique to itself and thus a private, not a public, question. Further, nothing before us shows a need for a clarifying authority to guide future public officers. And nothing before us indicates any likelihood that the unique scenario before us will recur. Thus, we find this matter moot and dismiss it as such.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
ARMSTRONG, J. and HUNT, C.J., concur.