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In the Matter of Jemar J

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Aug 4, 2003
307 A.D.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)

Opinion

2001-09111

Argued June 17, 2003.

August 4, 2003.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Lubow, J.), dated September 20, 2001, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated August 7, 2001, made upon the appellant's admission, finding that he had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months.

Monica Drinane, New York, N.Y. (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F. X. Hart and Tahirih M. Sadrieh of counsel), for respondent.

Before: NANCY E. SMITH, J.P., DANIEL F. LUCIANO, HOWARD MILLER, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.


DECISION ORDER

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant with the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, as the period of placement has expired ( see Matter of Sam G., 294 A.D.2d 363; Matter of Jacqueline S., 284 A.D.2d 398); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

There is no merit to appellant's contention that he was in custody at the time he made various statements to the police. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable person of the appellant's age, who was innocent of any crime, would not have believed that his freedom was significantly restricted (see Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213; Matter of Robert H., 194 A.D.2d 790; Matter of Valerie J., 147 A.D.2d 699; Matter of Chad L., 131 A.D.2d 760) . Consequently, Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436) were not required, and suppression of the statements was properly denied. In any event, the exigency of the situation justified police inquiry concerning the location of the gun without the benefit of Miranda warnings (see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649; People v. Melvin, 188 A.D.2d 555; cf. Matter of John C., 130 A.D.2d 246).

The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.

SMITH, J.P., LUCIANO, H. MILLER and ADAMS, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

In the Matter of Jemar J

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Aug 4, 2003
307 A.D.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
Case details for

In the Matter of Jemar J

Case Details

Full title:IN THE MATTER OF JEMAR J. (ANONYMOUS), appellant

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Aug 4, 2003

Citations

307 A.D.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
762 N.Y.S.2d 894

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