At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, Family Court was required to order the "least restrictive available alternative" set forth in Family Ct Act § 352.2 (1) that was consistent with respondent's needs and best interests, as well as the need for protection of the community (Family Ct Act § 352.2 [a]; see Matter of Melissa W., 26 AD3d 682, 683; Matter of Jonathan D., 297 AD2d 400, 402). We note that "`the statute does not require that less restrictive alternatives actually be tried and fail before more restrictive alternatives can be imposed'" ( Matter of Jason SS., 301 AD2d 900, 902 [citation omitted]; see Matter of Jonathan D., 297 AD2d at 402). Here, given the evidence in the record that respondent has a long history of committing offenses, victimized more than two children, used threats and physical force against his victims, at-tempted to engage his younger brother in sexually assaulting one of the victims, is at a moderate to high risk for recidivism and has no empathy for his victims or insight into his conduct, we cannot say that Family Court erred in determining that placement in a residential facility is the least restrictive alternative consistent with both respondent's needs and the needs of the community ( see Matter of Melissa W., 26 AD3d at 683; Matter of Jason SS., 301 AD2d at 902; Matter of Jonathan D., 297 AD2d at 402; Matter of Manuel W., 279 AD2d 662, 663; Matter of Nathan S., 198 AD2d 557, 558).
We also reject respondent's contention that Family Court abused its discretion by failing to consider less restrictive alternatives before ordering respondent's placement with OCFS. Once respondent was held to have violated a condition of his probation, Family Court was authorized to revoke the order of probation ( see Family Ct Act § 360.3). Upon revoking respondent's probationary status, the court was required to issue a new dispositional order consistent with Family Ct Act § 352.2, which requires the court to "order the least restrictive available alternative . . . which is consistent with the needs and best interests of the respondent and the need for protection of the community" (Family Ct Act § 352.2 [a]). However, it is well settled that "[t]his mandate does not require that less restrictive options set forth in the statute must fail before imposition of a stricter alternative" ( Matter of Sean U., 9 AD3d 562, 563; see Matter of Zachary A., 307 AD2d 464, 465; Matter of Jason SS., 301 AD2d 900, 902). Here, respondent was placed on probation due to an admitted act of criminal mischief which involved kicking his father's vehicle.
Family Ct Act § 352.2(2) provides that where, as here, a "designated felony act" (Family Ct Act § 301.2) has not been committed, the disposition should be the least restrictive available, "consistent with the needs and the bests interests of the respondent and the need for the protection of the community." This, however, does not mean that less restrictive options must first be attempted and fail before a stricter alternative is imposed (see Matter of Jason SS., 301 A.D.2d 900, 902; Matter of Anthony M., 142 A.D.2d 731, 732). In light of the previous person in need of supervision proceedings involving respondent, his prior school disciplinary problems and other factors considered by Family Court, including the lack of parental discipline, we cannot say that Family Court abused its discretion by placing respondent with the Office of Children and Family Services for one year (see Matter of Windell YY., 249 A.D.2d 621, 621-622;Matter of Errol D., 241 A.D.2d 732, 733, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 810).