In the Matter of Jamel C

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Orlando G.

    113 A.D.3d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

    Contrary to the appellant's contention, he was not deprived of a speedy fact-finding hearing, as required by Family Court Act § 340.1(1). The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in finding “good cause” to justify the initial adjournment of the fact-finding hearing (Family Ct. Act § 340.1 [4][a]; seeMatter of Randy K., 77 N.Y.2d 398, 400, 568 N.Y.S.2d 562, 570 N.E.2d 210; Matter of Jamell H., 219 A.D.2d 531, 631 N.Y.S.2d 680). Although it is unpreserved for appellate review, we reach, in the interest of justice, the appellant's challenge to the Family Court's second adjournment of the fact-finding hearing, which was for one day ( cf.CPL 470.05[2]; 470.15[1], [6][a] ). Contrary to the appellant's contention, special circumstances existed to warrant the Family Court's second adjournment of the fact-finding hearing ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 340.1[6]; Matter of Jamel C., 302 A.D.2d 457, 458, 755 N.Y.S.2d 97; cf.Matter of Nakia L., 81 N.Y.2d 898, 901, 597 N.Y.S.2d 638, 613 N.E.2d 544; Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408, 414–415, 522 N.Y.S.2d 89, 516 N.E.2d 1203; Matter of Paul W., 96 A.D.3d 426, 427, 945 N.Y.S.2d 684). These circumstances included the failure of the appellant's mother to appear in court, a fact of which the Family Court was not timely notified, the resulting need to appoint a guardian ad litem for the appellant, and the guardian ad litem's scheduling conflicts that prevented him from being present for a fact-finding hearing on the first adjourned date. RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and ROMAN, JJ., concur.

  2. In the Mtr. of Kevin D

    34 A.D.3d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 1 times

    Contrary to the appellant's contention, the presentment agency demonstrated good cause for an adjournment of the fact-finding hearing in order to secure the attendance of the complainant ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [a]; Matter of Andre P., 11 AD3d 617, 619; Matter of Barbara S., 253 AD2d 825; Matter of Paul K, 244 AD2d 490, 490-491; Matter of Bryant J., 195 AD2d 463, 464). Further, special circumstances existed warranting a successive adjournment ( see Family Ct Act § 340.1; Matter of Jamel C, 302 AD2d 457, 458). Accordingly, the appellant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

  3. In the Matter of Victor V

    30 A.D.3d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 6 times

    The appellant's out of court confession that he fired a gun at a certain time and place was corroborated by the hearing testimony of the 12-year-old victim that she was shot at the identical time and place ( see Family Ct Act § 744 [b]; Matter of Carmelo E., 57 NY2d 431, 433; Matter of David B., 259 AD2d 986; cf. Matter of Geraldine D., 85 AD2d 574). Adjournments of the fact-finding hearing were either waived by the appellant, the result of the appellant's request, or warranted by special circumstances ( see Matter of Jamar A., 86 NY2d 387, 391-392; Matter of Jamel C., 302 AD2d 457; Matter of Jermaine B., 249 AD2d 468).

  4. Klein v. Klein

    2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50106 (N.Y. App. Term 2005)

    Rios, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order and grant plaintiff Luise Klein's motion to vacate the judgment in the following memorandum: A review of the record does not support upholding the dismissal of the complaint but rather points to an improvident exercise of discretion by the court below in denying plaintiff's request for a brief adjournment of the damages phase of the bifurcated trial ( see generally Papoutsis v. NOV Trans. Corp., 309 AD2d 841; Brusco v. Davis-Klages, 302 AD2d 674; Matter of Jamel C., 302 AD2d 457; Mura v. Gordon, 252 AD2d 485; Halloran v. Spina Floor Covering, 185 AD2d 149). The record reveals that plaintiff Luise Klein requested a reasonable two-week adjournment due to the unavailability of her treating dentist who was leaving the state for the duration of a religious holiday, that granting a short continuance would not have been prejudicial to the defendants and that the request by plaintiff for the adjournment was made prior to any witnesses being called.

  5. Papoutsis v. NOV Trans. Corp.

    309 A.D.2d 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 1 times

    The defendants' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law were granted. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's denial of a continuance constituted an improvident exercise of discretion ( see Matter of Jamel C., 302 A.D.2d 457; Halloran v. Spina Floor Covering, 185 A.D.2d 149). It is clear from the record that the plaintiff exercised "diligence and good faith to secure the attendance of [the] witness" who was material and necessary to her case ( Halloran v. Spina Floor Covering, supra at 149). We note that consent of an adversary is not required for aid in enforcement of a subpoena ( see CPLR 2308; McNulty v. McNulty, 81 A.D.2d 581, 582).