Subsequent to Spence's filing of his Petition for Reinstatement, Spence satisfied the signature requirement of State Bar Rule 4-301 (c) (i) and a hearing was conducted by a special master at which Spence acknowledged unequivocally that he erred by signing his client's name to the affidavit in question and at which 17 witnesses appeared to testify on Spence's behalf. Recognizing that Spence had the burden of establishing his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof, see In the Matter of Henritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 S.E.2d 383) (1981), and that "each petition for reinstatement is unique and presents facts and factors distinct from other such petitions," see In the Matter of Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 366 ( 320 S.E.2d 541) (1984), the special master recommended, in a report filed December 12, 1997, that Spence's Petition be granted. The Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board also recommends that Spence's Petition be granted and, the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants has approved Spence's application for certification of fitness to practice law.

"Once an attorney's unfitness has been demonstrated he must establish his rehabilitation by clear and convincing proof before the reinstatement will be allowed." In the Matter of Henritze, 247 Ga. 620, 622 ( 278 S.E.2d 383) (1981). While we have held that our function in reviewing a recommendation of the State Disciplinary Board differs from our function in reviewing court decisions, the ultimate decision is ours.

See, e.g., In re Batali, 98 Wn.2d 610, 657 P.2d 775 (1983); Preston v. State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 643, 171 P.2d 435 (1946) (reinstatement 4 years after pardon); In re Koester, 217 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1969) (4 1/2 years after completion of parole); In re McGregor, 122 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1960) (11 years); In re Hester, 253 Ga. 365, 320 S.E.2d 541 (1984) (6 months); In re Henritze, 247 Ga. 620, 278 S.E.2d 383 (1981) (2 years 8 months); In re Johnson, 244 Ga. 109, 259 S.E.2d 57 (1979) (3 years 6 months); In re Keane, 102 Ill.2d 397, 466 N.E.2d 208 (1984) (4 years 4 months); In re Cohen, 83 Ill.2d 521, 416 N.E.2d 256 (1981) (5 years); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Inc. v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969) (2 years); In re Dimenstein, 36 Conn. Sup. 41, 410 A.2d 491 (1979) (6 years); Pharr v. Standing Comm., 32 Conn. Sup. 183, 346 A.2d 115 (1975) (5 years after pardon). C SUFFICIENCY OF PUNISHMENT