In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition

30 Citing cases

  1. State v. Miscellaneous Fireworks

    132 Conn. App. 679 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    A show cause order does not necessarily transfer the burden of proof to the party against whom it has been served. In the case of In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 199 A. 436 (1938), the plaintiffs' names had been removed from a political enrollment list by the defendants. Id., at 275, 199 A. 436. A statutory provision provided that the defendants were required to appear and show cause why the names of the electors should not be restored to the list.

  2. Chambers v. Blickle Ford Sales, Inc.

    313 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1963)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that an enforcement hearing in lieu of a state scire facias action "accords with the spirit of the Rules and seems to be a sufficiently close adherence to state procedures"

    * * * The burden of proof thereon rests upon the plaintiff." Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 199 A. 436 (1938). The show cause order does not shift the burden of proof but is merely a method of summary procedure, like a summons.

  3. Caruso v. Bridgeport

    284 Conn. 793 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 6 times

    See General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (in proceeding under § 9-329a [a], "judge may [1] determine the result of such primary; [2] order a change in the existing primary schedule; or [3] order a new primary"). Where the procedure used by the plaintiff is of a special statutory nature, and by its use a judge is called upon to exercise a judicial power in an original matter; see In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 276, 199 A. 436 (1938); not only must the plaintiff pursue his remedy in strict conformity with the statute but the judge may go no further in extending relief than that outlined in the statute. See Salter v. Kaplowitz, 28 Conn. Sup. 85, 88, 250 A.2d 327 (1968); see also Washington v. Hill, 960 So. 2d 643, 646 (Ala. 2006) (statutory provisions governing election contest must be strictly observed and construed); Bohart v. Hanna, 213 Ariz. 480, 482, 143 P.3d 1021 (2006) (same); Kinzel v. North Miami, 212 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla.App. 1968) (same); Davis v. Plainfield, 389 N.J. Super. 424, 432-33, 913 A.2d 166 (2006) (same).

  4. Thalheim v. Greenwich

    256 Conn. 628 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 46 times
    Concluding that sanctioned attorney had been afforded "adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard" when trial court issued order requesting that he "show cause why [he] should not be sanctioned" and attorney received hearing

    This court previously has stated that "an order to show cause has simply the effect of notice of a motion." In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 282, 199 A. 436 (1938). In this case, the order to show cause put Thalheim on notice that the court believed he had no authority under the rules of practice to file an amicus curiae brief in the manner that he had done.

  5. Mitchell v. Flynn

    478 A.2d 1133 (Me. 1984)   Cited 11 times

    A notice of motion serves the same purpose of a show cause order. See United States v. Rollnick, 33 F. Supp. 863, 865 (M.D.Pa. 1940); In re Gilhuly, 124 Conn. 271, 279-283, 199 A. 436, 440-441 (1938); Stair v. Meissel, 207 Ind. 280, 284-289, 192 N.E. 453, 455-456 (1934); Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173, (Ky.App. 1978); see also 5 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1195 (1969); 56 Am.Jur.2d Motions, Rules and Orders § 34 (1971). A show cause order's effect of expediously bringing matters to issue, if necessary, may be obtained by securing an order pursuant to Rule 6(d) shortening the time for hearing on a motion.

  6. Brennan v. Johnson

    391 A.2d 337 (Me. 1978)   Cited 9 times

    Boyd v. Louisville Jefferson County Planning Zoning Comm'n., 313 Ky. 196, 230 S.W.2d 444, 446 (1949). The question presented upon the hearing is whether the defendant has so met that case that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden resting on him. Stair v. Meissel, 207 Ind. 280, 192 N.E. 453, 456 (1934); In Re Gilhuly, 124 Conn. 271, 199 A. 436, 440 (1938); Welter v. Sauk County Clerk of Court, 53 Wis.2d 178, 191 N.W.2d 852, 855 (1971). 29 M.R.S.A. § 2276 provides in pertinent part as follows:

  7. State v. Clemente

    166 Conn. 501 (Conn. 1974)   Cited 109 times
    Explaining division of power among branches, noting that some incidental overlap of powers is necessary for government to function but stating constitution requires branches to be kept separate in areas where they possess exclusive power

    In at least three cases this court firmly rejected arguments that procedural statutes which imposed judicial duties contravened the separation of powers provision of our constitution. In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 280, 199 A. 436 (special statutory proceeding in the nature of mandamus); Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 551-58, 120 A. 150 (Declaratory Judgment Act); Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker, 79 Conn. 348, 351-52, 65 A. 132 (statute shifting burden of proof). See also Ackerman v. Union New Haven Trust Co., 91 Conn. 500, 505, 100 A. 22 (judicial rule-making under the Practice Act), quoted by Justice Cotter in his dissent.

  8. Kiernan v. Borst

    144 Conn. 1 (Conn. 1956)   Cited 22 times
    Discussing the registrar's duty to restore a person to a political party roster when the person proves affiliation to the party

    The question presented on the hearing of a petition under 564d is whether the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to have his name restored. In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 277, 199 A. 436. On this issue the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff. Id., 281.

  9. State ex Rel. Gold v. Usher

    84 A.2d 276 (Conn. 1951)   Cited 6 times

    Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of a discretion which is vested in a public officer or board. In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 277, 199 A. 436. The question before the defendant, however, was not one that involved the exercise of his discretion. The plaintiffs had complied with all the statutory requirements with reference to the issuance of a certificate of approval by the commissioner of motor vehicles.

  10. Varanelli v. Luddy

    42 A.2d 656 (Conn. 1945)   Cited 5 times

    Most of the difficulties presented in this case have arisen out of the failure to follow proper procedure in presenting the issues to the court for determination. The present appeal illustrates that fact. Probably the shortest way to reach an end to this litigation is to restate the procedure in mandamus as outlined in our decisions. State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. New Britain, 111 Conn. 214, 217, 149 A. 677; In the Matter of Gilhuly's Petition, 124 Conn. 271, 282, 199 A. 436; State ex rel. Campo v. Osborn, 126 Conn. 214, 215, 10 A.2d 687; State ex rel. Hansen v. Schall, 126 Conn. 536, 538, 12 A.2d 767; State ex rel. McCarty v. Thim, 130 Conn. 710, 712, 37 A.2d 223. Upon an application to the court for the issuance of the writ, it may or may not order a rule to show cause directed to the respondents named in it and to other interested parties; the alternative writ is in itself an order to perform the act directed or to show cause to the contrary; ordinarily, therefore, no purpose is served by a rule to show cause issued on the original application for the writ; and it should be directed only when unusual circumstances suggest that the matter should be disposed of with all possible speed. If the court grants the application, the alternative writ issues. The respondent must then perform the act directed or appear and show cause why he does not do so, by proper pleading.