Opinion
No. 29481-8-II, Consolidated with 29733-7-II.
Filed: February 10, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Grays Harbor County. Docket No: 93-4-00067-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 08/28/2002.
Counsel for Appellant(s), William S. Newman (Appearing Pro Se), 7010 Blaine Road, Aberdeen, WA 98520.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Gregory B. Durr, Attorney at Law, Old World Bldg Ste 103, 100 S I St, Aberdeen, WA 98520-6502.
William S. Newman appeals a trial court order dismissing his complaint for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to devise real property that was part of his deceased mother's estate. Newman argues that (1) the trial court erred when it dismissed his request for specific performance; and (2) res judicata does not apply because his previous action for specific performance involved a different portion of his mother's real property. We affirm.
Newman originally filed two appeals. In Cause No. 28481-8-II, Newman appealed the trial court's August 28, 2002 order approving the sale of the Estate's real property. In Cause No. 29733-7-II, Newman appealed the trial court's October 28, 2002 order granting the Estate's motion to dismiss Newman's contract claim. This court consolidated these cases under Cause No. 28481-8-II.
Newman does not present this court with any issues or argument related to the August 28, 2002 order; accordingly, we decline to consider this portion of his appeal to the extent it differs from the issues Newman raises in the remainder of the appeal. RAP 10.3(a)(5); see also State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992) (an issue that lacks reasoned argument does not merit judicial consideration).
FACTS I. Prior Actions
Uneta Newman, Newman's mother, died intestate March 11, 1993. In 2000, after considerable litigation over the status of the estate, Newman filed an action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract to devise a portion of his mother's real property identified by the parties as the 'shop property.' The court consolidated this action with other actions Newman had filed, and the case went to trial in January 2001.
Grays Harbor County Superior Court Cause No. 00-2-00957-3.
These actions are not at issue in this appeal.
At trial, Newman argued that he had entered into an oral contract with his mother, in which she had agreed to bequest to him the shop property in return for monetary payments and various services. On the second day of trial, Newman moved for voluntary dismissal of his contract claim under CR 41(a)(1)(B). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Newman's claim without prejudice.
Approximately six months later, after much discussion and disagreement between the parties, Newman filed another complaint asking for specific performance of the alleged oral contract to devise. The Estate counterclaimed, asking the trial court to quiet title to the entire property in the Estate.
Grays Harbor County Superior Court Cause No. 01-2-762-5.
After Newman repeatedly failed to appear, apparently due to medical problems, the trial court dismissed Newman's contract claim with prejudice and quieted title to the entire property in the Estate. Newman appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to continue the trial. In a Ruling Affirming Judgment, we affirmed the trial court decision. See Wash. State Court of Appeals Ruling Affirming Judgment, Newman v. Durr, No. 28092-2-II (Oct. 10, 2002). The appeal mandated on December 17, 2002.
II. Current Action
On August 23, 2002, apparently in response to the Estate's motion to approve sale of the property, Newman filed yet another claim asking for specific performance of the alleged oral contract to devise. In his amended complaint, Newman now claimed an interest in all of his mother's real property except the shop property.
The Estate moved to dismiss, arguing that res judicata barred Newman's new claim in light of the court's prior decision quieting title to the entire property in the Estate. Newman objected, asserting that the current action did not involve the same subject matter because he had claimed an interest in only the shop property in the earlier action.
The Estate also referred to Newman's earlier contract claim the court dismissed without prejudice after Newman moved for voluntary dismissal.
The trial court granted the Estate's motion to dismiss, finding that res judicata barred Newman's new claim. Newman appeals, arguing, as he did below, that res judicata does not apply because his current claim relates to a different subject matter.
A commissioner of this court denied the Estate's motion on the merits in this appeal.
ANALYSIS
Courts apply the doctrine of res judicata to prevent repetitive litigation of claims or causes of action arising out of the same facts and to 'avoid repetitive litigation, conserve judicial resources, and prevent the moral force of court judgments from being undermined.' Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 113 Wn. App. 401, 410, 54 P.3d 687 (2002), review granted on other grounds, 149 Wn.2d 1071 (2003). Res judicata applies when: (1) there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior action between the same parties; and (2) the prior and present actions involve (a) the same subject matter; (b) the same cause of action; (c) the same persons and parties; and (d) the same quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Hisle, 113 Wn. App. at 410.
Newman argues that res judicata does not apply here because the subject matter of this action differs from the subject matter of the prior action. We disagree.
First, to the extent Newman is arguing that he is the true owner of the property, this issue was resolved when the trial court granted the Estate's quiet title action. Although Newman's prior contract claim related solely to the shop property, the Estate's quiet title counterclaim involved the entire property. Because the trial court made a final determination on the merits of the quiet title action, the ownership of the entire property was determined and the trial court's application of res judicata was appropriate.
Second, to the extent Newman is arguing that he had a contract right related to his mother's real property, excluding the shop property, the fact that he previously claimed a contract right to the shop property alone, and not to the remaining property, does not prevent the application of res judicata. Res judicata bars all grounds for recovery or defenses that the plaintiff could have asserted in the prior action, whether or not the plaintiff actually asserts these specific grounds. Newman had every opportunity to raise his contract claim to the remainder of his mother's property in order to defeat the Estate's quiet title action. That he failed to do so does not preclude the application of res judicata.
White v. Miley, 138 Wn. 502, 244 P. 986 (1926) states:
It is also a general rule that parties to an action must present all the facts and raise all the issues which may be relied upon for a recovery or as a defense; hence the judgment in a case will operate as an estoppel not only as to questions of fact and law which were raised and decided in the action in which the judgment was rendered, but also as to all grounds of recovery or defense which might have been, but were not, presented and passed upon.
138 Wash. at 509; Hisle, 113 Wn. App. at 410.
Because Newman fails to establish that the trial court erred in applying res judicata, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MORGAN, J., and HOUGHTON, J., concur.