Opinion
No. 2-057 / 00-2064
Filed November 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, BRUCE ZAGER, Judge.
The beneficiary of a will appeals a district court ruling invalidating a will on the grounds of undue influence. AFFIRMED.
James Cook of Dutton, Braun, Staack Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Terry Parsons, of Olsen and Parsons, Cedar Falls, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Albert Masterhan died at the age of ninety-two. His will left his entire estate to his caretaker, Marie Sanchez. Masterhan's sister, Doris King, objected to the will, claiming Masterhan: 1) lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed it and 2) was unduly influenced by Sanchez. The district court agreed with King on the second count and invalidated the will. On appeal, Sanchez claims the court's determination that Masterhan was subject to undue influence is not supported by substantial evidence. See In re Herm's Estate, 284 N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 1979) (holding district court findings on undue influence are binding if supported by substantial evidence). She also argues the court's finding of a confidential relationship between Masterhan and Sanchez was not supported by substantial evidence and was erroneously applied. We affirm.
I. Undue Influence
To establish undue influence, King was required to show: 1) Masterhan was susceptible to undue influence, 2) Sanchez had an opportunity to exercise undue influence and effect a wrongful purpose, 3) Sanchez had a disposition to unduly influence to procure an improper favor, and 4) the result was clearly the effect of undue influence. In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Iowa 1984).
A. Susceptibility
We believe there is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could have found Masterhan susceptible to undue influence. Masterhan moved from Iowa to Florida when he was in his seventies. For several years he lived in a travel trailer under filthy and unsanitary conditions, precipitating an investigation by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services.
During this time, he met Sanchez. She assisted him with writing letters and with financial matters. She took him to medical appointments, paid his bills, and prepared and mailed his correspondence, including requests to have his assets transferred from Iowa to Florida. Her name appeared as joint owner on one of Masterhan's accounts and her daughter's name appeared as joint owner on another.
Sanchez characterized her acts as acts of kindness toward a solitary, helpless man. The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services took a dimmer view, expressing uncertainty about the motives of these helping hands and concern that Masterhan was "listening to individuals in the community who are giving him poor advice" and was "at risk for possible exploitation without supervision of his money and assets."
As Masterhan's physical health began to deteriorate, Sanchez opened her home to him and began serving as his caretaker. A medical progress note revealed Sanchez was unwilling to pursue the idea of a home health aide to assist Masterhan, preferring instead to "just keep on with the present situation."
By 1997, Masterhan had been living with Sanchez full-time for two years. His physical limitations rendered him completely house-bound. Cf. In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d 530, 532 (finding no undue influence where beneficiary visited testator for four days in the month the will was executed). Sanchez fed and bathed Masterhan and attended to virtually all his daily needs. Cf. In re Latch's Estate, 162 N.W.2d 465, 468-69 (Iowa 1968) (noting that, although decedent had lived with beneficiary for over thirty years, he did as he pleased, got around, and took care of his own business). While Sanchez again suggests her motives in assuming these duties were nothing but altruistic, the record reflects she received a stipend for her care of about $18,000 annually, beginning in 1995 and continuing virtually to the time of Masterhan's death in 1998.
We recognize that despite this evidence of Masterhan's physical dependence on Sanchez, there is scant evidence that Masterhan's mind deteriorated along with his body. Masterhan had an exact knowledge of the extent of his real estate and other assets and kept close track of the stock market until the end. However, a reasonable fact-finder could have found that Masterhan's virtually complete dependence on Sanchez combined with her involvement in his financial affairs rendered Masterhan susceptible to undue influence. Notably, Sanchez, not Masterhan, initiated discussions concerning a will, contacted an attorney, and prepared the notes on which the attorney relied in drafting the will. See In re Adams' Estate, 234 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1975) (finding sufficient evidence of undue influence when arrangements for preparation and execution of will made by beneficiary, not testator); cf. Drosos v. Drosos, 251 Iowa 777, 787, 103 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1960) (finding evidence wife reminded hospital-bound patient he had no will and asked if he wanted to call his attorney insufficient to establish undue influence). Sanchez was in the home when the will was executed and was in earshot of Masterhan's discussions with the attorney concerning the will. She paid for the attorney's services with cash, contrary to her past practice of billing the Iowa individuals who handled Masterhan's funds, and she did not tell those Iowans about the will until after Masterhan's death.
There is also record evidence that Masterhan had previously been talked into giving up his money. Masterhan's sister testified he gave approximately $6000 in Supplemental Security Income funds to an acquaintance, who only returned the money after King contacted the police. We believe the sum of the evidence is sufficient to establish Masterhan's susceptibility to undue influence, notwithstanding Masterhan's mental acuity at the time he executed the will.
B. Opportunity to Exercise Undue Influence
The second element, opportunity to influence and effect a wrongful purpose, was easily satisfied. Sanchez conceded she assisted Masterhan for about sixteen years. She further conceded Masterhan's bank accounts included herself and daughter as joint owners rather than mere signatories and further conceded that one account listed her grandchildren as beneficiaries. Finally, she did not disclose the existence of the will to anyone in Iowa, despite prior correspondence with the Iowans. See In re Telsrow's Estate, 237 Iowa 672, 679, 22 N.W.2d 792, 797 (1946). We believe this evidence is sufficient to support the second element.
C. Disposition to Unduly Influence
A reasonable fact-finder could have found this element based on Sanchez's willingness to have her name placed as joint owner on a bank account, her unwillingness to inform interested Iowans of Masterhan's one and only will, and her unwillingness to consider the assistance of a home health aide.
D. Effect of Undue Influence
The district court determined that the last will was "clearly the result of this undue influence." We believe the evidence summarized above supports the court's determination.
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of our standard of review. Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would support contrary inferences. Boehm v. Allen, 506 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). Credibility determinations are properly left to the fact-finder. See In re Estate of Bayer, 574 N.W.2d 667, 670-71 (Iowa 1998). Here, the trial judge stated he "paid particular attention to the credibility of the parties and their witnesses as revealed by their appearance and demeanor, their interest in the case, and the consistency of their testimony with facts established independent of their testimony."
There is certainly evidence from which one could find that Masterhan consciously and voluntarily bequeathed all his property to the only person willing to assist him in his final years. See In re Will of Pritchard, 443 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). However, a reasonable fact-finder could have found otherwise. See Frazier v. State Central Sav. Bank, 217 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Iowa 1974) (noting court disposed to find evidence sufficient even in "borderline case"). Accordingly, we affirm the determination of undue influence.
II. Disposition
We find sufficient evidence to establish undue influence without considering whether there was a confidential relationship between Sanchez and Masterhan. Therefore, we need not address Sanchez's second assignment of error relating to the court's application of confidential relationship principles. We affirm the district court's invalidation of Masterhan's will.