We agree. In determining whether disbarment is the appropriate discipline for Cunningham's violations, we note in aggravation that this is Cunningham's third disciplinary infraction, having received a 12-month suspension in March 2003 for commingling of funds in his escrow account, see In the Matter of Cunningham, 276 Ga. 400 ( 578 SE2d 892) (2003) and a public reprimand in 1993, id., that Bar Rule 4-103 makes a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction, alone, grounds for suspension or disbarment; that allowing a convicted attorney to continue to practice erodes public confidence in the legal system, see In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581 ( 272 SE2d 313) (1980); that, although no evidence exists to establish that any of Cunningham's clients were directly harmed by his actions, members of the public were harmed by the client's fraudulent scheme which was greatly facilitated by Cunningham's agreement to assist the client in processing and disbursing the funds collected from the numerous victims; and that Cunningham does not seem to acknowledge that he made serious errors in judgment. In mitigation, we find that it appears that Cunningham generally does a competent job handling matters for his clients; and that Cunningham was cooperative with the federal authorities during the initial stages of their inv