Opinion
No. 06-03-00053-CV
Submitted: July 1, 2004.
Decided: July 23, 2004.
On Appeal from the 76th Judicial District Court, Morris County, Texas, Trial Court No. 20,749.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In an attempt to shore up his marriage, Gary W. Lewis conveyed to his wife, Sondra C. Lewis, an undivided one-half interest in a 153.5-acre tract of land in Morris County. Nevertheless, despite this purported gesture of goodwill, Gary and Sondra's marriage ended in divorce, and the trial court awarded each party an undivided one-half interest in the 153.5-acre tract. Gary now appeals the division of property. Gary attacks (1) the property division as disproportionate, in large part because the trial court failed to find that Sondra defrauded or unduly influenced him, or that his conveyance was made under duress, and (2) the trial court's discovery ruling allowing Sondra additional time to compile discovery responses, which, Gary alleges, compounded the property division error, because the division was made without considering her ultimate failure to provide those discovery responses. We affirm.
1. Property Division Was Proper
In dividing marital property on divorce, Texas trial courts have broad discretion, and their judgments will not be disturbed on appeal unless they clearly abuse that discretion. McClary v. Thompson, 65 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). Although that discretion is not without limit, we presume the trial court properly exercised its discretion, and require the appellant "to show from the record that the division was so disproportionate, and thus unjust and unfair, as to constitute an abuse," In re Marriage of Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.), and that the error probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment, Smith v. Smith, 620 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1981, no writ). We will find error if the trial court mischaracterizes a major asset of the parties' estate which denies a just and right division of the community estate. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Tex. 2003); McClary, 65 S.W.3d at 833. If we find an abuse of discretion has occurred, we cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court's division of property, but must remand to the lower court for a new division of the community estate. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); In re Marriage of Morris, 123 S.W.3d 864, 867-68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
Gary contends that the trial court erred by improperly dividing what he claims is his separate property interest in all of the 153.5-acre tract of land and by failing to recognize as his separate property $94,100.00. His overarching argument is that, because the disputed 153.5-acre tract was originally in his name and he only later conveyed an undivided one-half interest to Sondra after she "tricked, duped and defrauded" him into doing so, the conveyance should properly be voided as having been induced by fraud. See Pulchny v. Pulchny, 555 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). While a careful review of the record supports Gary's position that the 153.5-acre tract was, at one time, completely his separate property, it does not likewise support his allegations of fraud, duress, or undue influence. As the sole trier of fact, the trial court acted well within its discretion in refusing to find fraud, duress, or undue influence.
We do not address Gary's cryptic assertion that the trial court failed to credit him with the value of work he performed on the land Absent any explanation, argument, or legal analysis, we deem this issue inadequately briefed. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h).
We conclude first that, at the time of the divorce and property division, the 153.5 acres was separate property, owned in equal, undivided shares by Sondra and Gary. It is generally presumed that property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is community property, rebutted only by a spouse's clear and convincing demonstration of the property's separate character. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003 (Vernon 1998). Whether property is considered community or separate is determined by the inception of title, which occurs "when a party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested." Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Strong v. Garrett, 224 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. 1949)). "The major consideration in determining the characterization of property as community or separate is the intention of spouses shown by the circumstances surrounding the inception of title." Scott v. Estate of Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.).
The parties' testimony in this case agrees that the funds used to purchase the 153.5-acre tract in question derived from Gary's separate property — a $94,100.00 settlement from a previous marriage and $60,000.00 from the sale of a 117.7-acre tract of land Gary owned before marrying Sondra. Gary testified that he used the proceeds from the sale of his 117.7-acre tract as a down payment on the 153.5-acre tract. The remaining balance was paid with two checks drawn on Gary and Sondra's joint bank account, apparently with the understanding that Gary would then refund the account by depositing $94,100.00 of his own money. Sondra agreed that the 117.7-acre tract was Gary's separate property, purchased before they married, and that the proceeds from the sale of the property were used as a down payment on the 153.5-acre tract. It is undisputed that Gary's $94,100.00 was deposited in the joint account shortly after writing the checks to satisfy the balance on the property.
Although this evidence informs us as to the separate character of the 153.5-acre tract, this is consistent with the trial court's order granting each party an undivided one-half separate property interest in the land In fact, Sondra's interest in the property is not the result of an improper division of mischaracterized property; rather, Gary himself conveyed to Sondra her undivided one-half interest in the property several months after its purchase. The question we must now address is whether the trial court erred in failing to find that Sondra committed fraud, exercised undue influence, or that Gary's conveyance was made under duress.
Gary's basic argument in support of these allegations is that he agreed, in good faith, to convey to Sondra an interest in the 153.5-acre tract in an effort to demonstrate his commitment to making their marriage work. He testified that the conveyance was made at Sondra's insistence and with the understanding that Sondra would move back in with him after having maintained a long-distance relationship for approximately three years. Gary also testified that he felt pressured into making the conveyance because he felt badly when Sondra told him that he had given her a sexually transmitted disease. When Sondra did not relocate, Gary filed for divorce.
While we agree that "[a] promise to do an act in the future may form the basis for an action in fraud when it is made with the intention, design and purpose of deceiving," and that circumstantial evidence may be considered in determining fraud, the question of a party's intent is a matter peculiarly reserved for the trier of fact. Pulchny, 555 S.W.2d at 545-46 (citing Manziel v. Williams, 262 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1953, no writ)). First, we note that there is no direct evidence and no finding by the trial court that Sondra promised she would move in the event Gary agreed to convey to her an interest in the disputed property. Second, even if such a promise had been made, because there is evidence suggesting Sondra did intend to move, we must defer to the trial court's discretion as the sole trier of fact, presuming that the court chose to believe the testimony of one party over the other.
In addition to Sondra's testimony that it was her intention to move back to Morris County after the completion of the house they anticipated building on the property, the evidence shows that Sondra deposited into Gary and Sondra's joint account $227,487.50 she received for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. This is significant because she was aware of, and did not object to, Gary spending considerable sums on livestock and equipment that could only have been purchased for the benefit of the 153.5 acres. There was also testimony that the funds used for the foundation laid on the property derived from the joint account. All of these expenditures from an account to which Gary never contributed more than the $94,100.00 already discussed at least suggests Sondra's intent to reconcile and relocate.
We similarly find no merit in Gary's claims that Sondra exercised undue influence and that he made the conveyance to Sondra under duress. When considering undue influence in executing a deed, courts consider three factors: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence, (2) whether the influence operated to subvert or overpower the grantor's mind, and (3) whether the grantor would not have executed the deed but for the influence. Molnari v. Palmer, 890 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ). When considering duress, courts must determine whether a party has threatened to do some act against the other party that it had no legal right to do. Tenneco Oil Co. v. Gulsby Eng'g, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd). Gary testified that he conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the 153.5 acres "to . . . pacify [Sondra] in order to show her that [he] was trying to make [the marriage] work." He also testified to conveying the interest because he felt badly about giving her genital herpes and figured he should try to make things work out because he did not want to have the guilt hanging over his head. The record is simply devoid of any evidence that Sondra threatened Gary in any way or that her spousal influence over him operated to subvert or overpower his ability to make sound decisions.
Not only must the threatening party indicate its willingness to do something it is not legally entitled to do, but the
threat must be of such character as to destroy the free agency of the party to whom it is directed. It must overcome his will and cause him to do that which he would not otherwise do, and which he was not legally bound to do. The restraint caused by such threat must be imminent, and must be such that the person to whom it is directed has no present means of protection.
Creative Mfg., Inc. v. Unik, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Discovery Ruling Not Error
Gary also contends that the trial court erred by allowing Sondra additional time to compile discovery responses without taking into account her failure to do so when making its final decision. Not only did Gary fail to object to the trial court's granting of additional time, but he also makes no attempt to explain how the determination constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1; see Tex. Dep't Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2004). Even if error was adequately preserved for our review, Gary's contention that the court did not take into account Sondra's failure to provide complete discovery is unsupported. There is nothing in the record suggesting that the trial court did not consider all of the evidence when dividing the parties' property.
Conclusion
The trial court acted within its discretion in making no findings of fraud, duress, or undue influence, and properly determined that each party was entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the 153.5-acre tract.
Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.