Opinion
H030253
5-22-2007
In re the marriage of XIADO SONG and DAN YE. XIAODO SONG, Appellant, v. DAN YE, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
This is a purported appeal from an interim order denying a motion brought by appellant Song (Husband) to have his marriage to respondent Ye (Wife) annulled on grounds of fraud under Chinese law. The question before us is whether substantial evidence supports the trial courts implied findings that Wife was 20 years old at the time of her marriage and used a valid identification number, and its express finding that Husband colluded with Wife to procure a marriage license in China. We find the order is not appealable, but exercise our discretion to treat the attempt to appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. We also find that substantial evidence supports the courts findings, and we affirm the courts order denying annulment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
Legal Proceedings
Husband and Wife separated and Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in September 2003. In May 2006, Husband filed an application requesting that "the issue of invalid/void marriage be added to the hearing currently set in this matter for May 9, 2006." In a declaration under penalty of perjury in support of the application, Husband averred that he believed Wife "did not follow the proper requirements for marriage" thus rendering the marriage invalid. Specifically, Husband alleged that "Under Chinese law both parties must register in person. I was not personally present when [Wife] registered our marriage. In addition, I do not believe [Wife] followed additional requirements under Chinese law in order to obtain a valid marriage." Husband said he would submit "a settlement conference statement to the court addressing the law and the additional procedural requirements which [Wife] failed to meet."
No amended petition seeking annulment of the marriage based on fraud was ever filed. (Fam. Code § 2210, subd. (d).)
Wife responded by requesting reasonable fees and actual costs to oppose an unnecessary motion. In a declaration under penalty of perjury made in support of her request for fees and costs, Wife averred as follows. She and Husband married in China on September 5, 1990, and separated on September 23, 2003, after 13 years of marriage and two children born in 1995 and 1996. They have significant community property assets and filed joint tax returns during the marriage. Husband applied for a visa to the United States for Wife and later for U.S. citizenship for Wife based on their marriage. Husband filed for divorce and litigated the dissolution matter almost to judgment as a valid marriage. He forged her signature and falsely modified the notary signature page from another document on a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that he intended to attach to his proposed judgment. His efforts to annul the marriage come a year and a half after Wife discovered the forgery and after her request to set aside the MSA.
A hearing was held on May 9, 2006. Mary So, an interpreter of Chinese, was called by Husband to translate excerpts from Chinas family law and certain other documents.
These included: (1) Article 8 of a booklet entitled the Marriage Law of The Peoples Republic of China; (2) Article 12 of the same booklet [Exhibit 1]; (3) a judicial authentication with an English translation attached [Exhibit 2]; a marriage registration application with an English translation attached [Exhibit 3]; a booklet including a notarization on the first page, relating to the identification number indicated on the marriage registration application [Exhibit 4]. With the exception of Exhibit 2, all were admitted into evidence.
Wifes Testimony
Wife met Husband in June 1990 when she was 20 years old. She did not know why some school documents indicated she was younger. Her official, government-issued identification indicated she was 20 years old. She knew Husband for about three weeks before he returned to the United States. He asked her to marry him. At first, she hesitated, because she was in college and wanted to finish it. Husband talked to her father and he agreed to the marriage, so then she agreed.
They went together for their health examinations which took about half a day and entailed many more tests than a blood test. They went to the marriage bureau together thinking they could get registered that day, but when they got there an officer informed them that they first needed to do many things that they were unable to do that day. Among other things, they were told they needed the health examination results and a specific picture for the certification.
Husband left to return to the United States. He called her every week. Wife knew she couldnt go by herself to get the marriage certificate. Husband told her his cousin could "be just like him, use his passport, to go with me to get the certification." He wanted to marry her, and he sent the person to go with her. She knew Husbands name was substituted for someone else when she signed the marriage certificate, but she did it to make it easy for him.
Husband and Wife were married for 13 years.
On her income and expense declaration signed by Wife under penalty of perjury, Wife indicated she had completed two years of college. On a different income and expense declaration, she left the number of years in college blank. The discrepancy was the result of a misunderstanding about whether she should list her college years since she had not received a degree or certificate.
Husbands Testimony
Husband met Wife when he went to China in 1990. At that time, he intended to marry, but not necessarily to marry Wife. He was dating five or six other women, but Wife was the only one who finished the paperwork.
Husband denied going with Wife to the marriage registration bureau to make inquiries, and he also denied taking a special picture with her as required by the marriage bureau. He did take a blood test in China in preparation for marriage, in case he met anyone. When he left China to return to the United States, he had not decided to marry her. He made the decision to marry her when she told him she had finished all the necessary paperwork. He believed she could process the paperwork legally, "[s]o I said thats fine, you can go ahead and do it."
He never sent Wife his passport to finish the processing. Later, she informed him it was done. He did not recognize the passport number on the marriage registration application [Exhibit 3] as his. However, the number matched the passport Husband provided at his deposition. He did not know how that was done; he thought he might have told Wife the number on the phone or through some other communication, but he never mailed his passport to anyone.
The day he left China to return to the United States, he posed for a photograph taken at the train station. Also in the photograph were Wife, his two sisters, an uncle, the uncles wife, his mother, a niece and some people he did not recognize and could not say were relatives. From 1990 to 1993, when Wife emigrated to the United States, Husband went back to China once a year for three weeks. He had marital relations with Wife.
Husband applied for Wifes immigration visa to the United States as his wife and prepared documents to that effect. At that time, based on all the information provided by Wife, he believed he was properly married to wife. He filed joint tax returns with Wife. He applied for her naturalization as a U.S. citizen as his wife, he filed for divorce from her as his wife, and purchased community property with her. He began an investigation into the validity of the marriage after he noted a discrepancy concerning Wifes education in some income and expense declarations.
Husband admitted that he forged his brothers signature on the proof of service of the summons in the divorce action [Exhibit A]. He also forged his brothers name to a notice and acknowledgment of receipt. However, he forged the signatures in front of Wife and with her agreement. He also typed the marital agreement and made some grammatical corrections after Wife typed a first draft. He then signed the document, backdated it to September 27, 2003, and "signed for [Wife]" because she was in China. Wife had given him a power of attorney in 2002 in connection with a real estate transaction; he believed that document "technically" allowed him to sign her name to any document he wanted.
Trial Courts Ruling
The court stated its ruling as follows: "I think that the evidence is clear that both parties at times are willing to bend the rules if its convenient to them. I dont have to either find all of these different acts to be true or to condemn [them] to decide this issue. [¶] It comes down to two things. What happened and [what] if anything we do about it. And the what happened category, we have two theories. The petitioner was duped or the petitioner colluded. I believe that the evidence is fairly strong that the petitioner colluded. In fact, I think that the reason that he was able to so successfully investigate and find the evidence hes now using is precisely because he knew that that was the process generally described by the petitioner about how they went about this certificate. I think it is reinforced by the fact that they tend to use novel self-help procedures throughout the course of their marriage whether its through the use of a ... power of attorney or having the brother sign a proof of service or whatever it is. Theyre simply looking at not so much that theyre breaking the law or committing perjury. Theyre just doing it the quickest, easiest way they can under the circumstances. [¶] And I think that the petitioner knew what was going on. I think that the idea that at 35 he would have accepted this 19 year old showing up with a marriage certificate and feeling that was a [fait accompli] without having ... to participate in any way, her ability to have his social security. I did happen to take a look at the photograph and I did think that the person in number 2 was in remarkably close resemblance to the petitioner. And I dont think that was an accident that that was the person that would have been used. [¶] So I think theres a lot of evidence that suggests that given the busy schedules, the fact petitioner had to be back in the United States, that he knew that this process was achieved other than by literally going along with what the statute mandate[s]. [¶] Now what do we do about it because basically both parties have said we kind of fibbed about how we went about it, you know, or at least Im concluding that. The respondent admitted it, and Im attributing that conduct to the petitioner. I dont think that the process described in article 8 creates a null and void or dissolved marriage. In fact, the last sentence of article 8 would undermine that kind of interpretation because it says if a marriage has not been registered, the registration shall be processed belatedly. That doesnt suggest that it just nunc pro tunc back to the act of getting a registration in a proper way or not getting at all automatically makes it a null or void marriage. Article 10 doesnt mention the facts in this case and neither does Article 12. I dont think that the process by which they go about getting it falls within the category that automatically makes it a null and void marriage and so thats my ruling. The motion to set aside is denied."
Husband timely filed a notice of appeal.
CONTENTIONS
Husbands contentions on appeal are these: The trial court erroneously denied his motion to annul the marriage because (1) no evidence supports the courts finding of collusion; (2) Wife misrepresented her actual age at the time of the marriage and (3) she used a fake identification number to fraudulently register the marriage, thus indicating her lack of intent to marry.
DISCUSSION
Appealability
Husband baldly asserts that "the [courts] order is appealable because it is a final interim order." Wife does not challenge Husbands statement, but views this as an appeal taken from a motion "for leave to amend his [dissolution] [p]etition to include a cause of action for nullity/fraud," which issues were set for "an early, bifurcated trial." In fact, no motion to amend was ever made, but even if it had been made, it would not have made the resulting order appealable.
As a general rule, no appeal lies from a prejudgment, interim ruling on a bifurcated issue absent trial court certification. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 904.1, subd. (a)(10); Fam. Code § 2025; Plaza Tulare v. Tradewell Stores, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 522, 523-524; see also In re Marriage of McFarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 251, 256, fn. 9 ["As Macfarlane discovered when we dismissed as premature her appeal from the ruling on the validity of the quitclaim deeds, `a mere ruling on a bifurcated issue such as the issues tried in this case is not immediately appealable absent trial court certification"].) Here, so far as the record shows, no such certification was sought or obtained.
However, the appeal was timely filed, Wife does not object to the appeal, and "a dismissal would be unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous." (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 714, fn. 1.) We therefore exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for an extraordinary writ within our original jurisdiction. (In re Marriage of Doherty (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 895, 898.)
Standard of Review
Husband argues that since his appeal "arises from the trial courts erroneous application of China marriage Law as well as [an] abuse in discretion, which resulted [in] a finding that Appellant colluded in the false marriage registration application conducted solely by Appellee," this court should apply "independent review." Again, no citation supports this argument. Wife, by contrast, argues that our review is circumscribed by the substantial evidence rule, citing Lammers v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1309 and In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614. She also argues that a trial courts exercise of discretion is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard and that, under that standard of review, a trial courts order is subject to reversal only when, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the order, no judge could reasonably have made the order. (In re Marriage of Loyd (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 754, 759; In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866.)
Our review of the courts findings, both implied and express, is governed by the substantial evidence rule. "The law is well established in this state that a finding of the trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal if there is evidence of a substantial character which reasonably supports the judgment." (Oakley v. Oakley (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 188, 190; Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624; Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870.) "[I]n examining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a questioned finding, an appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the finding as made, taking into account, as well, all inferences which might reasonably have been thought by the trial court to lead to the same conclusion. Every substantial conflict in the testimony is, under the rule which has always prevailed in this court, to be resolved in favor of the finding." (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142.) Under this rule, the trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve any witness, and the testimony of one witness, even a party, can be sufficient to support a judgment. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 614.) We review any questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Elsenheimer v. Elsenheimer (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1536.)
We review the courts findings and the evidence in light of these rules.
Chinese Marriage Law
"Ordinarily, the law of the place of marriage controls its validity." (Colbert v. Colbert (1946) 28 Cal.2d 276, 280, interpreting former Civ. Code § 63; now see Fam. Code § 308.) Accordingly, the court below applied Chinese law to Husbands motion to invalidate the marriage. As translated to the court, the relevant provisions of Chinas marriage law are as follows.
Family Code section 308 provides: "A marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state."
Article 8 states: "Parties requesting to be married, both male and female, must personally appear before the marriage registration office to process the marriage registration. If found in compliance with regulations of this law, [they] shall be permitted to register and a marriage certificate issued. [¶ ] Upon acquiring the marriage certificate, the relationship between husband and wife is immediately established. If a marriage has not been registered, the registration shall be processed belatedly."
Article 10 states: "Marriage is null and void should one of the following conditions exist: Number 1, bigamy. Number 2, existence of any kinship whereby marriage is prohibited. Number 3, existence of any disease, medical science deems as unfit for marriage prior to marriage, and no cure is effected after marriage. And Number 4, statutory marriageable age not yet attained."
Article 12 states: "Voided or dissolved marriage is invalid from its inception. Parties do not possess the privileges and obligations of husband and wife. Disposition of properties acquired during the period of cohabitation shall be by agreement between the parties; when no agreement could be reached, decision shall be made by the Peoples Court in the principles of caring for the party not at fault. For property disposition caused by nullification of marriage through bigamy, there shall be no infringement of the property rights and interests of the parties lawfully married. Provisions of this law regarding parents and children shall apply to children born to the parties."
Husbands Claim That He Did Not Collude with Wife to Complete the Marriage Registration
Husband argues that the court abused its discretion by finding that he colluded with Wife in the completion of the marriage registration, because no evidence supports that finding. Specifically, he argues the court had no basis to conclude that the person who stood in for him for the purposes of the marriage registration was his relative. He argues that there were no fingerprints or testimony showing that it was his relative who went to the registration office with Wife; that "just because that person was a resembler of [Husband] does not mean that [Husband] has reason to know that he would appear for [Husband] in applying marriage registration, let alone collude in the plot." He also is "not convinced that the resemblance itself suffices preponderance by the evidence that concludes [Husbands] collusion in the marriage registration application" and does not "believe that the relative [wife] alleged was the actual person who went to the registration office with her." Thus, he claims, the courts finding lacks substantial evidence because it was based solely on an irrelevant family photograph (presumably the one taken at the train station, depicting wife with him and his relatives).
In his reply brief, Husband acknowledges that other evidence was presented to support the courts finding of fraud on the marriage bureau, but he maintains that "[Wife] defrauded the marriage bureau, and claimed that the man she was with was Xiaodo Song. This is fraud, and it does not create a legally valid marriage."
Substantial evidence amply supports the courts factual findings. Husband admitted in his testimony that he forged both his wifes and his brothers signatures to the marital settlement agreement. Wife testified that in order to complete the marriage registration without defendants presence, she and Husband arranged for her to present Husbands passport and his cousin to act as proxy. Thus, the court was justified in concluding that the parties had demonstrated a capacity for utilizing "self-help" procedures involving fraud. In addition, the evidence before the court demonstrated that after the marriage was registered, the parties manifested their intent to be married with respect to immigration, tax, procreation and property. There is no dearth of evidence of husbands and wifes intention to be married and of their collusion to make that intention a reality.
The question remains whether the court correctly concluded that, under Chinese law, husbands and wifes use of fraudulent means to register their marriage did not void the marriage in its inception. Reviewing that question de novo (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432), we conclude the trial court was correct.
The sole issue here is one of statutory construction, and we apply the following familiar rules to this task. " `When construing a statute, we must "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." [Citations.] `[W]e begin with the words of a statute and give these words their ordinary meaning. [Citation.] `If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, then we need go no further. [Citation.] If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider `a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. [Citation.] Using these extrinsic aids, we `select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. " (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 211-212.)
Article 10 of Chinas marriage law limits null and void marriages to those involving bigamy, incest, incurable disease that renders one partner unfit for marriage and lack of attainment of marriageable age. The plain words of the statute do not place fraudulent procurement of a marriage license in that category. Article 12 does not add any new or different circumstance to Article 10s list of circumstances that categorically render a marriage null and void. As relevant to the issue before this court, Article 12 establishes at most that "null and void" as used in Article 10, means void in its inception, not merely voidable.
Only Article 8 addresses the circumstances surrounding the procedure to register a marriage. "Parties requesting to be married, both male and female, must personally appear before the marriage registration office to process the marriage registration. If found in compliance with regulations of this law, [they] shall be permitted to register and a marriage certificate issued. [¶] Upon acquiring the marriage certificate, the relationship between husband and wife is immediately established. If a marriage has not been registered, the registration shall be processed belatedly." Article 8 does not state that failure to register the marriage in accordance with its provisions renders the marriage void in its inception. Read in conjunction with Articles 10 and 12, failure to comply in all the particulars of Article 8, at most, renders the marriage voidable. This is evident from the language of Article 8 which provides that "[u]pon acquiring the marriage certificate, the relationship between husband and wife is immediately established," and from the last sentence of Article 8, which provides that "if a marriage has not been registered, the registration shall be processed belatedly." (Italics added.) This language clearly signals that issuance of a marriage certificate, even if issued on the basis of faulty registration, creates a marriage, and that the registration deficiency is remediable. Analogizing the situation here to a marriage where the certificate has issued but the marriage has not been properly registered, the trial court correctly concluded that under Chinese law, the marriage between Husband and Wife was voidable, but not void in its inception.
We note that, in this respect, Chinese law appears to be similar to California law. Family Code section 2210 provides in relevant part: "A marriage is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity if any of the following conditions existed at the time of the marriage: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless the party whose consent was obtained by fraud afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife." As construed by our courts, this statute does not nullify every marriage induced by a fraudulent act or omission. "In California, fraud must go to the very essence of the marital relation before it is sufficient for an annulment." (In re Marriage of Johnston (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 499, 502.)
In her Respondents brief, Wife attempts to bring before the court yet another Chinese law by way of a "certified partial translation of attached Supreme Court of the Peoples Republic of China — Justice Committee Legal Interpretation" attached to the brief as Exhibit A. In his reply brief, Husband objects to our consideration of the law. We note that the trial court did not have the benefit of this law. Wife has not asked that we judicially notice the law, or provided us with a basis to do so on our own motion. For all those reasons, we decline to consider it.
Substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that the parties intended to marry and colluded to procure a marriage certificate. Under Chinese law, collusion does not make a marriage void from its inception. On these facts, the trial court did not err in declining to annul the marriage.
Husbands Claim that Wife Was Not of Marriageable Age.
Husband argues that because Wife was 19 years old — one year younger than the asserted marriageable age of 20 for a woman under Chinese law — the court should have granted him an annulment. The contention is frivolous.
First, no evidence was presented to the trial court, or to this court, about the marriageable age for women under Chinese law. There is a good reason why this is so: the argument was not made in the trial court. Husbands trial counsel began her opening statement by saying, "This is a case of the 35-year-old Chinese man who was duped by a pretty young 19-year-old Chinese woman." Immediately after she concluded her remarks the trial court inquired: "Let me just be clear. Is the claim of her age an independent separate ground or is that only a part of the ... factual picture?" Counsel replied that it was not an independent ground.
In his opening brief, Husband asserts that Article 6 of the China Marriage Law sets the marriageable for men at 22 and for women at 20. The only citation is a footnote stating "See China Marriage Law Article 6 Id. 1." The text of Article 6 was never translated for the trial court, nor does it appear in the reporters or clerks transcript on appeal.
Counsel explained: "[A]fter doing some research, I found that only a void marriage is bigamus [sic] or, lets see, incestuous relationship that a voidable marriage — Chinese law changed and even though it may not have been valid at the time that they married because of her age, shes supposed to be 22, she wasnt. Chinese law after a while changed. And if theyve been together for a while and it wasnt correct, its not really an issue except that my client didnt know until later so he didnt have a chance to take action but thats just part of the picture now."
Ordinarily, issues that were not raised in the trial court cannot be raised and will not be considered on appeal. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134.) An exception exists if the issue raised belatedly is a " `pure question of law which is presented on undisputed facts " that relate to an important issue of public policy. (Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.) This case does not qualify on either ground. The issue is therefore waived.
Assuming arguendo the issue is not waived, Husbands contention is nevertheless baseless. Wife testified that she was 20 years old at the time of the marriage. Asked to explain why some school documents listed her at a younger age, Wife testified that she did not know why they did, since her official identification, published by the government and obtained from the agency in charge of certifying birthdates, indicated she was 20 years old when she married. No contrary evidence was either proferred or admitted at trial. Wifes testimony, if credited by the trial court, constitutes substantial evidence to support an implied finding that Wife was of marriageable age when she married Husband. The trial courts comment, in its statement of decision, characterizing Wife as a 19 year old and Husband as a 35 year old, does not demonstrate that the trial court did not credit Wifes testimony. On the contrary, it is clear from the courts total comments that it viewed as preposterous the idea of a 35-year-old man being duped into marrying a 19-year-old girl under the circumstances present here.
In his reply brief, Husband points to pages 39 through 58 of the clerks transcript, which he unsuccessfully attempted to attach to his brief as "Exhibit A." The referenced pages in the clerks transcript were attached as "Exhibit C" to "Petitioners Trial Brief re: Validity of Marriage." The tag on page 39 shows that it was originally marked as defendants exhibit C relating to "deponent Song" and was dated "2-6-06." There is no indication that this exhibit was ever admitted as evidence at trial.
Husbands Claim that Wife Used a False Identification Number
Husband asserts that Wife "used a false ID number for the marriage registration," and that this fact "reveals her lack of intent to enter into a marriage" with him. Husband relies on a document attached to his trial brief which states: "By querying Integrated Management Information System of Public Security Bureau of Changsha City, there are no household data of Ye Dan whose ID Card No. is 43010370061320804, and ID Card No. 43010370061320804 is not existed. [¶] Feb. 16, 2005 [¶] Address Query Office, Public Security Bureau of Changsha City (Seal)." This document was not admitted into evidence.
On the other hand, Wifes counsel stated in his offer of proof that Wifes testimony "regarding the issue that was raised about her identification card and its existence or nonexistence is that she was in the process of transferring from her school registration to her own registration outside of the school and that she had received a temporary identification card the equivalent of a temporary drivers license and she presented that official document, which is a temporary identification, indicating correctly that she is 20 years old and her residence. That was accepted by the marriage bureau staff, which is indicated here that that will be reviewed by the marriage registration staff. She watched that review occur, she watched them approve it, and she subsequently received the certificate of marriage, which is a separate document from the application form which weve been talking about today."
Wife was never specifically questioned about the validity of her identification card at the trial, but she did testify that her official identification showed she was 20 years old and that it was similar to a drivers license. From this testimony, the trial court was entitled to infer that Wife did not use a false identification number to procure a marriage license. Furthermore, Wifes testimony provides ample basis for the trial courts implied finding that she intended to enter into a marriage with Husband. Wifes testimony, which the trial court evidently credited, provides substantial evidence for its implied findings.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the trial courts findings, and the trial court did not err in refusing to annul the marriage.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
Duffy, J.