Opinion
No. 3-571 / 03-0951
Filed August 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, William L. Thomas, Judge.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their children. AFFIRMED.
Robert Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-mother.
Phillip Seidl, Cedar Rapids, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Lance Heeren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Lucy Harrington, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Phillip and Stephanie O. appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to their four children. Phillip and Stephanie are the parents of Whitney, Samantha, Alyssa, and Makala, ages eleven, eight, six, and two, respectively, at the time of trial. Phillip is also the father of a son by a different mother. Phillip's parental rights to his son were terminated in 1996.
Both parents have a lengthy history of illegal drug use. The Department of Human Services began working with the family in the early part of 2001 after receiving reports that the family home was filthy and unfit for children. The family received numerous services but remained in chaos. Stephanie had ongoing mental health problems that she refused to treat and was incapable of maintaining the home. In March 2001 an abuse report determined Whitney had been sexually abused by an unknown perpetrator. In August 2001 three of the girls were subjected to inappropriate touching by their half-brother. Both parents continued to abuse controlled substances. On September 21, 2001, the parents stipulated the children were in need of assistance. That same day, the juvenile court removed the children from their parents' care. The children have remained in foster care ever since with no trial periods at home.
The parents received numerous services after the children were removed. The condition of the family home improved significantly; however, the parents continued to struggle with substance abuse issues and Stephanie failed to follow through with treatment of her mental health problems as outlined in the case plan. Neither parent completed substance abuse treatment, and neither was able to abstain from the use of controlled substances.
On December 18, 2002, the State filed its petition to terminate Phillip and
Stephanie's parental rights to Whitney, Samantha, Alyssa, and Makala. Trial commenced on February 20, 2003, but could not be completed in the allotted time. Trial reconvened on April 9, 2003, and was completed. On May 19, 2003, the court terminated Stephanie and Phillip's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (f), (g), (h), and (i) (Supp. 2001). Both parents appeal.
We review termination orders de novo . In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
Both Phillip and Stephanie contend the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Phillip also argues the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children and suggests the juvenile court should have granted the parents additional time to reunify with the children.
In order to terminate a parent's rights under section 232.116(1)(h), the State must show by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is three years of age or younger, (2) the child is in need of assistance, (3) the child has been removed from home for six of last twelve months, and (4) the child cannot be returned home. Similarly, termination under section 232.116(1)(f) requires proof that (1) the child is four years of age or older, (2) the child is in need of assistance, (3) the child has been removed for twelve of the last eighteen months or for the last twelve consecutive months, and (4) the child cannot be returned home. The parents do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the first three elements of either statute. Instead, they contend the children could safely be returned home because of the progress the parents made after the children were removed from their care. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court's termination order.
Section 232.116(1)(h) applies to Makala and section 232.116(1)(f) applies to her three older sisters.
As we have already mentioned, both parents have a history of abusing controlled substances. Unfortunately, they also have a history of noncompliance with attempts to provide them with substance abuse treatment. Despite receiving numerous services, the parents have shown they cannot remain drug free while parenting their children. Phillip tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2002 and Stephanie tested positive in December 2002. During the break in the trial, both parents again tested positive for drugs. The record reveals Stephanie has also failed to adequately address her mental health issues.
In determining the immediate and long-term best interests of Whitney, Samantha, Alyssa, and Makala, we consider what the future likely holds if they are returned to Stephanie and Phillip. See In re J.W.D., 458 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). "Insight for that determination is to be gained from evidence of the parents' past performance for that performance may be indicative of the quality of future care the parents are capable of providing." In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). We agree with the juvenile court's conclusion that the children cannot be safely returned to Stephanie and Phillip's care because the parents have not responded appropriately to the services offered and have not established they can remain drug free while parenting their children. Because we find the grounds for termination under sections 232.116(1)(f) and (h) have been proven, we need not consider the other grounds upon which parental rights were terminated. Id.at911 (stating we only need to find grounds to terminate parental rights under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court in order to affirm).
We now turn to Phillip's claim that the court erred in not granting him additional time to reunite with his children. While the law requires a "full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills," this patience has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. Id. At some point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The record reveals Phillip was given ample time to make the progress necessary to reunify with his children. Instead, he chose to continue to abuse controlled substances. It is clear that additional time would not rectify the circumstances which led to the initial adjudication. We reject this assignment of error.
Phillip also argues the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children. We conclude the deficiency lies not with the services offered but with Phillip's unwillingness to comply with them.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.