Opinion
No. 2-291 / 02-0305
Filed April 10, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her son. AFFIRMED.
Mary E. Chicchelly of Seidl Chicchelly, Marion, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, and Lance Heeren, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
David N. Nadler of Johnston Nathanson, Cedar Rapids, for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her son. She contends the Department of Human Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child. Upon review, we find this matter fits the criterion outlined in Iowa Court Rule 21.29 for the issuance of a memorandum opinion. We affirm the juvenile court's ruling terminating the mother's parental rights.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
Mary is the mother of William, born December 21, 2000. William was born with cocaine in his system. As a result, a referral was made to the Department of Human Services (Department) to assess the child's safety. The mother met with a child abuse investigator and hospital staff, and was informed of the potential risks to William if she continued to use crack-cocaine. Mary stated she would no longer use crack.
On January 5, 2001, a caseworker learned that Mary had smoked crack-cocaine on January 4 with a friend while William was asleep on the couch in her home. The Department sought and obtained an order removing William from the home.
On February 9, 2001, William was adjudicated a child in need of assistance due to Mary's abuse of alcohol and crack-cocaine. William was continued in foster family care where he has remained ever since.
The court ordered Mary to complete a substance-abuse program as a condition of a case permanency plan. She began inpatient substance-abuse treatment on February 16, 2001 and completed the program on March 15, 2001. Three days after completing the program she resumed her use of alcohol and crack-cocaine. She reentered a substance-abuse program, but was kicked out after fighting with another resident. Mary continued to use drugs and alcohol, and her visits with William were suspended. Mary entered residential treatment for the third time in late April. During this stay, her visits with her son were reinstated.
After completing a thirty-day program, Mary transferred to the House of Mercy program in Des Moines. The Department arranged for a service provider to transport William to Des Moines once a month for supervised visitation. Mary was also informed she could travel to Cedar Rapids for additional visits.
A report filed by the Department of Human Services in August 2001 indicated that Mary was making progress. She requested that her son be moved to Des Moines to facilitate her contact with him. On September 12, 2001, following a review hearing, the court ordered the Department to locate a foster-family home in the Des Moines area for William, so that visitation could be expanded. Unfortunately, six days after the court's order, Mary left the House of Mercy program. The record reveals that following a weekend visit to Cedar Rapids, Mary began having difficulty following the rules of the program. She became argumentative and began blaming others for her circumstances. There was also an incident where she falsely reported her location. Mary left the House of Mercy with no plan for ongoing treatment. She did not provide a forwarding address to the House of Mercy and did not contact the Department of Human Services to report her discharge or provide a new address. After leaving the House of Mercy, Mary failed to maintain contact with her child.
In October 2001, the State filed a petition to terminate Mary's parental rights to William. Mary did not attend the termination hearing, but was represented by counsel. Following hearing the juvenile court terminated Mary's parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b) (abandonment), (1)(d) (no significant and meaningful contact), (1)(g) (child under three cannot be returned home), and (1)(k) (chronic substance abuse precludes return of children) (2001). The court also terminated the parental rights of William's father. Only Mary has appealed. Our review of her appeal is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
II. Reasonable Efforts .
We find clear and convincing evidence supports termination of Mary's parental rights on all grounds found by the juvenile court. The only issue presented by this appeal is whether the State made reasonable efforts to reunify Mary with her child.
Except under certain limited circumstances, the Department must make reasonable efforts toward reunification of a family, consistent with the child's health and safety. Iowa Code§ 232.102(7) and (10)(a); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Iowa 2000). Mary maintains the Department failed to satisfy this statutory mandate. We disagree.
The record reveals ample evidence of departmental services tailored to deal with Mary's drug addiction and her related parenting deficiencies. It is the mother's responsibility to maintain contact with the Department in order to have services and visitation available to her. The record reveals Mary walked away from treatment she obviously needed just six days after the court decided her son should be moved closer to her to facilitate her parent-skill development. In this case, it is clear that the primary barrier to reunification has not been a lack of appropriate services, but instead a lack of consistent follow through with the services offered. Mary has three older children who were removed from her care because of founded reports of denial of critical care and physical abuse. Despite numerous services and assistance, she was never able to resume permanent care of these children and they remained under the supervision of the juvenile court until they reached adulthood or another permanent placement was achieved. When a parent is incapable of changing to allow her child to return home, a termination is necessary. We conclude the requirement that reasonable services be provided was satisfied.
We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Mary's parental rights to William.
AFFIRMED.